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		INTRODUCTION			
To	 what	 criminal	 procedural	 standard	 do	 we	 hold	 another	
country?1	At	first	blush,	one	answer	is	intuitive:	hold	other	countries	
to	the	same	fundamental	rights2	enumerated	here	in	the	United	States.	
This	 procedure	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution,	 codified	 in	
statute,	and	articulated	in	case	law.	Formally,	criminal	defendants	are	
entitled	 to	 individual	 rights	 such	 as	 freedom	 from	 unreasonable	
search	 and	 seizure;	 guarantees	 to	 a	 speedy	 and	 public	 trial	 by	 an	
impartial	 jury;	and	freedom	from	cruel	and	unusual	punishment.	 In	
our	 era	 of	mass	 incarceration,	 such	 formal	 rights	 are	 under	 attack	
given	 legislative	 overreach,	 executive	 discretion,	 and	 judicial	
retrenchment.3	
 
	 1.	 For	purposes	of	this	Article,	this	is	a	question	focused	on	the	United	States	as	
a	 jurisdiction	 evaluating	 foreign	 sovereigns	 and	 international	 criminal	 systems.	
Another	way	of	phrasing	this	question	could	be	“to	what	criminal	procedural	standard	
should	the	U.S.	criminal	justice	system	hold	itself	when	engaging	with	foreign	criminal	
justice	 systems?”	This	question	 is	 thus	 related	 to,	but	distinct	 from,	 the	matter	of	a	
global	criminal	procedural	standard,	such	as	that	of	the	international	criminal	courts	
establishing	 their	 rules	 of	 procedure	 and	 evidence,	 see	 generally	KARIM	A.A.	KHAN,	
CAROLINE	BUISMAN	&	CHRISTOPHER	GOSNELL,	PRINCIPLES	 OF	EVIDENCE	 IN	 INTERNATIONAL	
CRIMINAL	JUSTICE	(2010)	(discussing	the	evolution	of	rules	of	procedure	and	evidence	
which	have	developed	in	international	criminal	tribunals).	
	 2.	 While	to	some	degree,	“rights”	may	be	broadly	construed	to	encompass	any	
criminal	legal	procedure	(for	example,	the	right	to	have	an	initial	appearance	within	
the	first	24	hours	is	a	procedural	right	provided	under	the	Federal	Rules	of	Criminal	
Procedure),	 the	 emphasis	 of	 this	 Article	 is	 the	 rights	 enumerated	 in	 the	 U.S.	
Constitution.	Future	research	could	explore	more	granular	procedural	details,	such	as	
charging	procedure,	to	show	the	differential	in	procedures	between	two	or	more	legal	
systems.	
	 3.	 See,	e.g.,	William	J.	Stuntz,	The	Pathological	Politics	of	Criminal	Law,	100	MICH.	
L.	REV.	505	(2001)	(analyzing	legislative	and	judicial	aspects	of	the	politicization	of	the	
criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 why	 they	 are	 barriers	 to	 addressing	 the	 structural	
problems	 of	 criminal	 law);	 Joshua	 Kleinfeld,	 Laura	 I.	 Appleman,	 Richard	 A.	
Bierschbach,	Kenworthey	Bilz,	 Josh	Bowers,	 John	Braithwaite,	Robert	P.	Burns,	R.A.	
Duff,	Albert	W.	Dzur,	Thomas	F.	Geraghty,	Adriaan	Lanni,	Marah	Stith	McLeod,	Janice	
Nadler,	Anthony	O’Rourke,	Paul	H.	Robinson,	Jonathan	Simon,	Jocelyn	Simonson,	Tom	
R.	Tyler	&	Ekow	N.	Yankah,	White	Paper	of	Democratic	Criminal	Justice,	111	NW.	U.	L.	
REV.	 1693	 (2017)	 (laying	 out	 “thirty	 proposals	 for	 the	 democratic	 criminal	 justice	
reform”);	 Rachel	 E.	 Barkow,	 Prosecutorial	 Administration:	 Prosecutor	 Bias	 and	 the	
Department	of	Justice,	99	VA.	L.	REV.	271,	274	(2013)	(showing	how	the	DOJ	administers	
corrections,	forensics,	and	clemency);	see	also	Nicholas	Fandos	&	Maggie	Haberman,	
Trump	Embraces	a	Path	to	Revise	U.S.	Sentencing	and	Prison	Laws,	N.Y.	TIMES	(Nov.	14,	
2018),	https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/prison-sentencing	
-trump.html	 [https://perma.cc/2NLK-F7RU]	 (describing	 executive	 support	 for	
bipartisan	legislative	criminal	justice	reform).	
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Often	overlooked	in	this	discussion	is	an	emerging	front	in	which	
U.S.	criminal	justice	may	diverge	substantially	from	its	centuries-old	
procedural	 framework.	 Today,	 all	 three	 branches	 now	 engage	 in	 a	
criminal	procedural	line	drawing	in	which	fundamental	rights	are	no	
longer	 so	 fundamental.	 Instead,	 the	 U.S.	 government	 increasingly	
distinguishes	between	a	mandatory	inner	set	of	truly	inviolable	rights	
and	others	that	 it	deems	marginal	and	expendable.	This	arises	both	
when	foreign	countries	assist	in	criminal	cases	and	when	the	United	
States	facilitates	foreign	criminal	prosecutions.	Consider	the	following	
examples:	
The	 United	 States	 indicts	 and	 arrests	 a	 U.S.	 citizen	 on	 drug	
trafficking	charges.	Before	her	trial,	she	moves	to	suppress	evidence	
that	 Canadian	 law	 enforcement	 obtained	 in	 Montreal	 without	 a	
warrant	and	subsequently	turned	over	to	U.S.	law	enforcement.4	The	
court	denies	her	motion	to	suppress	on	the	ground	that	Canadian	law	
enforcement’s	 actions	 did	 not	 “shock	 the	 judicial	 conscience”5	 and	
thus	did	not	violate	her	Fourth	Amendment	right.6	
Switzerland	 convicts	 in	 absentia	 a	 U.S.	 citizen	 for	 committing	
securities	 fraud	 in	 Zurich	 and	 then	 requests	 that	 the	 United	 States	
extradite	 him	 to	 Switzerland	 to	 serve	 his	 sentence.	 The	 fugitive	
challenges	the	extradition	before	a	U.S.	magistrate	judge,	arguing	that	
the	Swiss	conviction	without	his	physical	presence	violated	his	rights	
to	 confront	 witnesses	 and	 to	 speedy	 trial.7	 The	 judge	 rejects	 his	
challenge	on	 the	 ground	 that	 Swiss	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 a	 foreign	
affairs	matter.8	Shortly	thereafter,	he	is	extradited	to	Switzerland	to	
serve	his	sentence	there.	
A	U.S.	national	is	convicted	of	possessing	cocaine	with	intent	to	
distribute.	 At	 sentencing,	 the	 government	 moves	 for	 an	 upward	
departure	 of	 his	 sentence	 given	 a	 prior	 conviction	 in	 Mexico	 for	
importing	narcotic	drugs.	The	defendant	objects	on	the	ground	that	he	
 
	 4.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	IV	(“The	right	of	the	people	to	be	secure	in	their	persons,	
houses,	papers,	and	effects,	against	unreasonable	searches	and	seizures,	shall	not	be	
violated,	and	no	Warrants	shall	issue,	but	upon	probable	cause	.	.	.	.”).	
	 5.	 United	States	v.	Mitro,	800	F.2d	1480,	1483	(1st	Cir.	1989).	
	 6.	 Cf.	United	States	v.	Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	259,	261	(1990)	(holding	that	
the	Fourth	Amendment	does	not	apply	to	search	and	seizure	of	property	“owned	by	a	
nonresident	alien	and	located	in	a	foreign	country”).	
	 7.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	VI	(“In	all	criminal	prosecutions,	the	accused	shall	enjoy	
the	right	to	a	speedy	and	public	trial,	by	an	impartial	jury	.	.	.	[and]	to	be	confronted	
with	the	witnesses	against	him	.	.	.	.”).	
	 8.	 In	re	Ernst,	No.	97	CRIM.MISC.1	PG.22,	1998	WL	395267,	at	*14	(S.D.N.Y.	Jul.	
14,	 1998)	 (“Ernst	 claims	 that	 his	 conviction	in	absentia	was	 ‘fundamentally	 unfair’	
because	(1)	Ernst	was	not	permitted	to	call	witnesses	to	testify	in	his	own	behalf	and	
(2)	the	long	delay	in	the	commencement	of	the	trial	violated	Ernst’s	right	to	a	speedy	
trial.	The	rule	of	non-inquiry	precludes	the	assertion	of	these	claims.”).	
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was	denied	both	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	and	the	right	to	counsel	in	
the	Mexican	proceeding.9	The	judge	splits	the	difference,	finding	first	
that	it	would	be	“cultural	imperialism”	to	insist	on	a	Sixth	Amendment	
right	to	trial	by	jury	abroad.10	However,	the	judge	also	finds	that	denial	
of	right	to	counsel	in	Mexican	proceedings	constitutes	a	basis	for	not	
relying	on	the	foreign	conviction,	given	that	“a	central	dimension	of	
American	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 counsel	 at	 all	
significant	stages	of	the	criminal	proceeding.”11	
These	 examples	 illustrate	 the	 central	 problem	 of	 this	 Article:	
what	happens	when	the	United	States	compromises	on	rights	in	order	
to	 facilitate	 law	 enforcement	 cooperation	with	 other	 nations?	 This	
question	arises	with	increasing	frequency	due	to	the	accelerating	rate	
of	interaction	between	national	criminal	justice	systems.12	Today,	the	
United	States	has	a	law	enforcement	relationship	with	virtually	every	
country	and	is	often	obligated—either	pursuant	to	treaty	or	informal	
working	 practices—to	 assist	 other	 countries	 in	 their	 criminal	 law	
enforcement	mandates.13	Inversely,	these	relationships	also	give	rise	
to	 “foreign	affairs	prosecutions,”14	 or	U.S.	 criminal	 cases	with	 some	
foreign	nexus.	As	I	have	argued	previously,	such	cases—such	as	the	El	
Chapo	and	FIFA	prosecutions—are	proliferating	 in	 an	age	of	 cross-
border,	cyber,	and	 international	crime.15	A	relevant	question	 in	this	
 
	 9.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	VI	(“In	all	criminal	prosecutions,	the	accused	shall	enjoy	
the	right	to	a	speedy	and	public	trial,	by	an	impartial	jury	.	.	.	and	to	have	the	Assistance	
of	Counsel	for	his	defense.”).	
	 10.	 E.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	Moskovits,	 784	 F.	 Supp.	 183,	 190	 (E.D.	 Pa.	 1991)	 (“It	
would,	however,	be	a	form	of	cultural	imperialism	for	the	United	States	to	insist	that	it	
would	not	countenance,	for	U.S.	purposes,	recognition	of	a	foreign	criminal	judgment	
which	came	from	a	legal	culture	which	did	not	employ	the	jury	.	.	.	.”).	
	 11.	 Id.	at	191	(“My	understanding	is	that	the	Supreme	Court	calls	for	the	presence	
of	 counsel	 at	 all	 significant	 stages	 in	 the	 American	 criminal	 proceeding,	 and	 what	
analysis	we	can	make	of	the	Mexican	procedures,	as	they	affected	Mr.	Moskovits,	would	
show	the	Careo	hearings	to	have	been	crucial.”).	
	 12.	 Steven	 Arrigg	 Koh,	Foreign	 Affairs	 Prosecutions,	 94	N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 340,	 354	
(2019)	(noting	a	significant	rise	in	cases	involving	foreign	activity).	
	 13.	 Id.	at	 358	 (highlighting	 “dense	 network	 of	 bilateral	 treaties	 regulating	 law	
enforcement	cooperation	around	extradition	and	mutual	legal	aid	assistance”).	
	 14.	 Id.	at	340.	
	 15.	 See,	e.g.,	Steven	Arrigg	Koh,	The	Huawei	Arrest:	How	It	Likely	Happened	and	
What	 Comes	 Next,	 JUST	 SEC.	 (Dec.	 10,	 2018),	 https://www.justsecurity.org/61799/	
huawei-arrest-happened	 [https://perma.cc/8TY9-HPBR].	 International	 criminal	
tribunals	 are	 also	 recognizing	 the	 need	 to	 foster	 cross-border	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation	 to	 provide	 accountability	 for	 crime.	 See	 Theodor	 Meron,	 Closing	 the	
Accountability	Gap:	Concrete	Steps	Toward	Ending	Impunity	for	Atrocity	Crimes,	112	AM.	
J.	INT’L	L.	433,	441–42	(2018)	(discussing	steps	that	state	actors	and	agencies	may	take	
to	 facilitate	 prevention	 and	prosecution	 of	 atrocity	 crimes);	 see	 also	 Geoff	Dancy	&	
Florencia	Montal,	Unintended	 Positive	 Complementarity:	Why	 International	 Criminal	
Court	Investigations	May	Increase	Domestic	Human	Rights	Prosecutions,	111	AM.	J.	INT’L	
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context	is	what	criminal	process	should	govern	and	protect	individual	
defendants.	
Up	until	now,	 scholarship	has	not	comprehensively	considered	
the	 nature	 of	 such	 criminal	 procedural	 rights	 and	 duties	 in	 the	
transnational	context.16	Most	of	the	literature	that	has	addressed	this	
question—including	 extradition	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 non-inquiry,17	
recognition	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments,18	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality,19	 personal	 and	 legislative	 jurisdiction,20	 cross-
border	 transfer	 of	 evidence,21	 and	 judicial	 engagement	 with	
 
L.	689	(2017)	(suggesting	that	ICC	prosecutions	may	promote	domestic	human	rights	
prosecutions).	
	 16.	 One	 earlier	 attempt	 did	 so	 before	 9/11	 and	 focused	 on	 the	 doctrinal	
developments	of	Fourth,	Fifth,	and	Sixth	Amendment	protections.	Frank	Tuerkheimer,	
Globalization	of	U.S.	Law	Enforcement:	Does	the	Constitution	Come	Along,	39	HOUS.	L.	
REV.	307,	308,	327,	335,	351	(2002).	This	Article	builds	upon	this	foundation	in	our	
contemporary	 era	 and	 does	 so	 by	 situating	 cross-border	 law	 enforcement	
developments	alongside	broader	contexts	of	constitutional	legal	history,	human	rights,	
and	political	theory.	
	 17.	 John	 T.	 Parry,	 International	 Extradition,	 the	 Rule	 of	 Non-Inquiry,	 and	 the	
Problem	of	Sovereignty,	90	B.U.	L.	REV.	1973	(2010)	(examining	the	rule	of	non-inquiry	
and	proposing	more	judicial	involvement	in	extradition	cases);	Lis	Wiehl,	Extradition	
Law	at	the	Crossroads:	The	Trend	Toward	Extending	Greater	Constitutional	Procedural	
Protections	to	Fugitives	Fighting	Extradition	from	the	United	States,	19	MICH.	J.	INT’L	L.	
729,	732	 (1998)	 (analyzing	 the	 lack	of	 judicial	 involvement	 in	 extraditions	 and	 the	
effect	it	has	on	“procedural	protections”).	
	 18.	 Little	has	been	written	on	 the	recognition	of	 foreign	criminal	 judgments	at	
U.S.	sentencing,	and	what	has	been	written	has	generally	argued	that	courts	should	be	
more	 circumspect	 in	 their	 consideration	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	 but	 has	 not	
considered	 the	broader	question	of	 cross-sovereign	 criminal	procedural	 rights.	See,	
e.g.,	Nora	V.	Demleitner,	Thwarting	a	New	Start?	Foreign	Convictions,	Sentencing,	and	
Collateral	 Sanctions,	 36	U.	TOL.	L.	REV.	 505	 (2005)	 (arguing	 for	more	 limited	use	 of	
foreign	 conviction	by	U.S.	 courts	 at	 sentencing,	with	 concern	 for	whether	 a	 foreign	
conviction	demonstrates	a	risk	of	recidivism).	See	generally	A.	Kenneth	Pye,	The	Effect	
of	Foreign	Criminal	 Judgments	within	 the	United	States,	32	UMKC	L.	REV.	114	(1964)	
(discussing	 the	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 effect	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	 have	
within	the	United	States).	
	 19.	 Work	 on	 constitutional	 extraterritoriality	 has	 often	 proceeded	 from	 the	
perspective	of	the	history	of	American	empire	and	thus	constitutional	application	to	
U.S.	proceedings.	See,	e.g.,	KAL	RAUSTIALA,	DOES	THE	CONSTITUTION	FOLLOW	THE	FLAG?	THE	
EVOLUTION	 OF	 TERRITORIALITY	 IN	 AMERICAN	 LAW	 (2009)	 (discussing	 the	 evolution	 of	
constitutional	 extraterritoriality	 and	 its	 interrelationship	 with	 U.S.	 history).	 This	
Article,	by	contrast,	focuses	on	the	related	but	distinct	question	of	U.S.	evaluation	of	
criminal	procedural	rights	in	foreign	legal	systems.	
	 20.	 Michael	Farbiarz,	Accuracy	and	Adjudication:	The	Promise	of	Extraterritorial	
Due	Process,	 116	COLUM.	L.	REV.	 625,	626	 (2016)	 (arguing	 for	due	process	 curbs	on	
personal	 jurisdiction	 in	 criminal	 cases);	 Michael	 Farbiarz,	 Extraterritorial	 Criminal	
Jurisdiction,	114	MICH.	L.	REV.	507,	516–17	(2016)	(describing	how	due	process	limits	
extraterritorial	legislative	jurisdiction).	
	 21.	 See	 generally	 L.	 Song	 Richardson,	Due	 Process	 for	 the	 Global	 Crime	 Age:	 A	
Proposal,	 41	 CORNELL	 INT’L	L.J.	 347	 (2008)	 (proposing	 a	 transnational	 due	 process	
256	 MINNESOTA	LAW	REVIEW	 [105:251	
	
authoritarian	 legal	 systems22—have	 all	 considered	 aspects	 of	 core	
criminal	 procedure	 and/or	 judicial	 engagement	 with	 foreign	 legal	
systems	without	 recognizing	 the	 same	overarching	phenomenon	at	
play	 descriptively	 or	 considering	 its	 normative	 implications.	
Meanwhile,	legal	scholarship	on	procedural	rights	has	done	so	outside	
of	 the	 transnational	 criminal	 context.	 Incorporation	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	
Rights—a	classic	dispute	in	both	Supreme	Court	jurisprudence	and	in	
legal	scholarship—rooted	itself	in	questions	of	the	plain	language	of	
the	Fourteenth	Amendment	Due	Process	Clause,	Framers’	intent,	and	
policy	 reasoning,23	 but	 more	 recent	 critiques	 of	 the	 selective	
incorporation	 approach	 to	 “constitutionalization”	 of	 criminal	
procedure24	have	not	been	considered	in	contemporary	transnational	
criminal	debates.	The	limited	international	human	rights	scholarship	
on	 criminal	 procedural	 rights	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 national	
constitutional	 protections25	 and,	 more	 often,	 human	 rights	 before	
 
model	that	minimizes	foreign	policy	concerns	in	the	mutual	legal	assistance	context).	
	 22.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Mark	 Jia,	 Illiberal	 Law	 in	 American	 Courts,	 168	 U.	 PA.	 L.	 REV.	
(forthcoming	 2020)	 (manuscript	 at	 26–27)	 (on	 file	 with	 author)	 (“[C]ourts	 must	
sometimes	evaluate	foreign	law	or	institutions	.	.	.	.	Judges	may	have	to	assess	foreign	
laws	while	managing	discovery	or	while	 considering	 forum	selection	clauses,	 stays,	
and	 antisuit	 injunctions.	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 common	 ‘evaluative’	 doctrines	 in	 the	
authoritarian	 law	 setting	 are	 those	 concerning	 forum	 non	 conveniens	 and	 foreign	
judgments	recognition	.	.	.	.”).	
	 23.	 See	Akhil	Reed	Amar,	The	Bill	of	Rights	and	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	101	
YALE	L.J.	1193	(1992);	Raoul	Berger,	 Incorporation	of	 the	Bill	of	Rights:	Akhil	Amar’s	
Wishing	Well,	62	U.	CIN.	L.	REV.	1	(1993);	Raoul	Berger,	Incorporation	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	
in	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment:	 A	 Nine-Lived	 Cat,	 42	 OHIO	ST.	L.J.	 435	 (1981);	 Louis	
Henkin,	“Selective	Incorporation”	in	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	73	YALE	L.J.	74	(1963);	
Lawrence	Rosenthal,	The	New	Originalism	Meets	the	Fourteenth	Amendment:	Original	
Public	 Meaning	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Incorporation,	 18	 J.	 CONTEMP.	 LEGAL	 ISSUES	 361	
(2009);	 Bryan	 H.	 Wildenthal,	 The	 Lost	 Compromise:	 Reassessing	 the	 Early	
Understanding	 in	 Court	 and	 Congress	 on	 Incorporation	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 in	 the	
Fourteenth	Amendment,	61	OHIO	ST.	L.J.	1051	(2000).	
	 24.	 See,	 e.g.,	William	 J.	 Stuntz,	The	Political	Constitution	of	Criminal	 Justice,	119	
HARV.	L.	REV.	 780,	781	 (2006)	 (“The	 constitutional	proceduralism	of	 the	1960s	and	
after	helped	 to	create	 the	harsh	 justice	of	 the	1970s	and	after.”);	Tracey	L.	Meares,	
Everything	 Old	 Is	 New	 Again:	 Fundamental	 Fairness	 and	 the	 Legitimacy	 of	 Criminal	
Justice,	3	OHIO	ST.	J.	CRIM.	L.	105,	113	(2005)	(“Codes	specify	rules,	not	norms.”).	
	 25.	 M.	 Cherif	 Bassiouni,	 Human	 Rights	 in	 the	 Context	 of	 Criminal	 Justice:	
Identifying	International	Procedural	Protections	and	Equivalent	Protections	in	National	
Constitutions,	 3	 DUKE	 J.	COMPAR.	&	 INT’L	L.	 235	 (1993)	 (establishing	 certain	 general	
principles	 of	 human	 rights	 protection	 for	 individuals	 in	 national	 criminal	 justice	
processes);	 Chrisje	 Brants	 &	 Stijn	 Franken,	 The	 Protection	 of	 Fundamental	 Human	
Rights	in	Criminal	Process:	General	Report,	5	UTRECHT	L.	REV.	7	(2009)	(considering	the	
ways	in	which	national	jurisdictions’	legal	systems	promote	or	hinder	implementation	
of	fundamental	rights	in	criminal	process).	More	fruitful	work	has,	however,	been	done	
on	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 rights	 side.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Sital	Kalantry,	 Jocelyn	E.	 Getgen	&	
Steven	 Arrigg	 Koh,	Enhancing	 Enforcement	 of	 Economic,	 Social,	 and	 Cultural	 Rights	
Using	Indicators:	A	Focus	on	the	Right	to	Education	in	the	ICESCR,	32	HUM.	RTS.	Q.	253	
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international	 criminal	 tribunals.26	 And	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	
scholarship	 on	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 judgments	 is	 on	 the	 civil	 or	
arbitral	side.27	This	Article	builds	on	this	scholarship.		
My	central	argument	is	that	core	criminal	procedure—a	standard	
that	enumerates	certain	fundamental	procedural	rights	but	allows	for	
flexibility	in	evaluating	foreign	criminal	process—should	be	applied	
to	 all	 criminal	 law	enforcement	 cooperation	with	other	nations.	To	
build	this	case,	Part	I	will	describe	how	all	three	government	branches	
have	evaluated	other	sovereigns	using	 this	core	criminal	procedure	
approach,	 which	 first	 emerged	 in	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 incorporation	 and	
international	 human	 rights	 engagement	 but	 now	 appears	 in	 novel	
cross-border	 electronic	 evidence	 cooperation.	 It	 will	 also	 describe	
how,	at	other	times,	courts	have	applied	a	vaguer	outlier	approach	to	
foreign	evidence	material	to	conviction,	foreign	judgments	material	to	
sentencing,	and	extradition.	This	Part	will	also	provide	an	explanatory	
account	for	how	these	two	distinct	approaches	developed	historically.	
Part	II,	drawing	on	global	justice	political	theory,	normatively	grounds	
core	criminal	procedure	in	domestic	procedural	rights,	international	
human	rights	standards,	and	comparative	functionalism.	Finally,	Part	
III	will	consider	the	broader	implications	of	core	criminal	procedure	
for	 engagement	 with	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 and	 newer	
international	investigative	mechanisms.	
Ultimately,	this	Article	makes	four	contributions.	First,	it	enriches	
historical	 and	 contemporary	understandings	of	 criminal	procedure,	
using	the	cross-border	law	enforcement	context	as	a	launching	point	
to	 explore	 how	 the	 U.S.	 government	 has	 negotiated	 criminal	
procedural	 questions	 over	 the	 last	 century.	 Second,	 this	 Article	
 
(2010);	 Katherine	 G.	 Young,	 The	 Minimum	 Core	 of	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Rights:	 A	
Concept	in	Search	of	Content,	33	YALE	J.	INT’L	L.	113	(2008).	
	 26.	 See,	e.g.,	Sonja	Starr,	Rethinking	“Effective	Remedies”:	Remedial	Deterrence	in	
International	Courts,	83	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	693	(2008)	(showing	how	problematic	remedial	
rules	in	human	rights	law	may	be	in	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	the	former	
Yugoslavia	and	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	Rwanda);	David	Scheffer	&	Ashley	
Cox,	The	Constitutionality	of	the	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	98	J.	
CRIM.	 L.	&	 CRIMINOLOGY	 983	 (2008)	 (considering	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 Rome	
Statute	 provisions	 in	 the	 event	 of	 U.S.	 ratification	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	
International	Criminal	Court).	
	 27.	 See	Yuliya	 Zeynalova,	The	 Law	 on	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Foreign	
Judgments:	Is	It	Broken	and	How	Do	We	Fix	It?,	31	BERKELEY	J.	INT’L	L.	150,	179	(2013)	
(noting	that	countries	must	acknowledge	arbitral	awards	as	binding	and	carry	them	
out	 in	 compliance	 with	 local	 procedural	 requirements);	 David	 Westin,	 Enforcing	
Foreign	Commercial	Judgments	and	Arbitral	Awards	in	the	United	States,	West	Germany,	
and	England,	19	LAW	&	POL’Y	INT’L	BUS.	325,	340	(1987)	(stating	that	foreign	judgments	
in	 the	United	 States	 are	 enforceable	 unless	 they	 are	 fundamentally	 in	 conflict	with	
basic	notions	of	fairness	or	key	elements	of	the	U.S.	legal	system).	
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contributes	 to	 international	 law	 scholarship	 by	 showing	 how	 the	
United	States	creates	and	implements	bilateral	and	multilateral	treaty	
obligations	concerning	criminal	procedural	rights.	In	doing	so,	it	also	
provides	 some	 guidance	 for	 future	 government	 actors	 engaging	 in	
criminal	procedural	line	drawing	when	negotiating	treaties	or	other	
cross-border	 law	 enforcement	 agreements.	 Third,	 it	 adds	 to	 the	
literature	on	comparative	 law,	showing	how	functionalism	“touches	
down”	when	legal	systems	with	conflicting	criminal	procedural	norms	
interact	 in	 cross-border	 cases.28	 And	 finally,	 it	 uses	 a	 legal	
methodology	 to	 inform	 political	 philosophy—specifically,	 global	
justice	theory—by	affirming	what	specific	criminal	procedural	rights	
may	constitute	a	“core”	amongst	a	Rawlsian	law	of	peoples.29	
I.		CROSS-SOVEREIGN	CRIMINAL	PROCEDURAL	LINE	DRAWING:	
TWO	APPROACHES			
This	Part	describes	how	the	U.S.	government	engages	in	what	I	
call	cross-sovereign	criminal	procedural	line	drawing,	or	the	process	
of	 evaluating	 which	 criminal	 procedural	 rights	 to	 require	 when	
criminal	cases	involve	another	sovereign.	As	a	descriptive	taxonomy,	
this	Part	will	describe	two	approaches	that	the	political	and	judicial	
branches	have	 taken	 in	such	 line	drawing.	First	 is	 the	core	criminal	
procedure	or	fundamental	rights	approach,	in	which	the	United	States	
guarantees	 certain—but	 not	 all—enumerated	 criminal	 procedural	
rights	 vis-à-vis	 another	 sovereign.	 Second	 is	 the	minimalist	 outlier	
approach,	 an	 ad	 hoc	 analysis	 that	 ignores	 criminal	 procedural	
guarantees	 in	 all	 but	 the	 most	 flagrant	 cases	 wherein	 the	 other	
sovereign’s	procedure	“shocks	the	conscience.”	
The	doctrinal	contexts	 in	which	these	 issues	arise	vary	greatly.	
For	example,	the	United	States	may	send	fugitives	outward	to	other	
countries,	whereas	other	examples	involve	foreign	evidence	coming	
inward	 to	 U.S.	 criminal	 cases.	 Furthermore,	 they	 arise	 at	 various	
stages	 of	 the	 criminal	 process,	 such	 as	 investigations,	 pre-trial	
litigation	regarding	admission	of	evidence,	and	at	sentencing.	And	yet	
all	ultimately	resolve	to	the	same	fundamental	issue—holding	foreign	
sovereigns	 to	 a	 certain	 criminal	 procedural	 standard—and,	
ultimately,	 to	 the	 central	 criminal	 justice	 concerns,	 namely,	 the	
carceral	deprivation	of	liberty	or,	at	the	extreme,	execution.		
 
	 28.	 Markus	D.	Dubber,	Comparative	Criminal	 Law,	 in	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	OF	
COMPARATIVE	LAW	1277,	1277	(Mathias	Reimann	&	Reinhard	Zimmermann	eds.,	2012)	
(“[C]omparative	criminal	law	has	attracted	little	attention,	at	least	compared	to	other	
types	of	law.”).	
	 29.	 See	infra	Part	II.A.2.	
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The	 formal,	 applicable	 sources	 of	 law	 may	 also	 vary.	 Core	
criminal	procedure	arises	when	the	Supreme	Court	interprets	the	Bill	
of	Rights,	or	when	the	political	branches	negotiate	and	ratify	treaties	
related	 to	 international	 human	 rights	 or	 electronic	 evidence.	
Similarly,	 the	 “outlier”	 approach	may	 turn	 on	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Fifth	 Amendment	 due	 process	 clause,	 federal	 courts’	 general	
supervisory	powers,	or	various	judicially-created	rules	such	as	that	of	
non-inquiry.	The	ambiguity	in	this	space	owes	to	the	fact	that	these	
cases	 lie	between	 two	clear	poles	of	constitutional	concern.	On	one	
extreme,	the	Constitution	clearly	regulates	domestic	prosecutions;30	
on	 the	other	extreme,	 it	has	nothing	 to	say	about	a	 foreign	country	
prosecuting	its	own	national	abroad.	These	cases	unfold	in	between,	
wherein,	at	times,	the	Constitution	regulates	law	enforcement	conduct	
based	on	territory	or	nationality,	but	at	other	times	it	does	not.31	
To	 be	 clear	 at	 the	 outset:	 U.S.	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 not	 the	
paragon	 of	 criminal	 procedural	 perfection,	 and	 cross-border	 law	
enforcement	 cooperation	 is	 not	 the	 sole	 context	 wherein	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 are	 worryingly	 parsed.	 Recent	 federal	
jurisprudence	has	eroded	many	axiomatic	criminal	procedural	rights	
such	as	the	warrant	requirement,32	Miranda,33	and	the	right	to	counsel	
at	lineups.34	More	specifically,	even	these	eroded	rights	may	not	apply	
in	various	domestic	criminal	procedural	circumstances.	For	example,	
Boykin	 rights—applicable	 in	 the	 plea	 colloquy	 context—encompass	
 
	 30.	 E.g.,	U.S.	CONST.	amend.	XI	(describing	certain	rights	and	procedural	elements	
of	criminal	prosecutions).	
	 31.	 As	Kal	Raustiala	has	noted,	“the	United	States	still	lacks	a	firm	answer	to	the	
question	of	whether	the	Constitution	follows	the	flag,	the	government,	the	individual,	
or	the	directive	of	the	president.”	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	224.	Rising	U.S.	power	
has	 coincided	 with	 a	 relaxation	 of	 traditional	 Westphalian	 territorial	 doctrines;	
American	 courts	 have	 frequently	 accepted	 executive	 assertions	 that	 constitutional	
protections	are	territorial.	Id.	at	188–89.	This	Article	focuses	on	the	implications	of	this	
tension,	just	at	the	edges	of	these	constitutional	protections.	
	 32.	 See,	e.g.,	California	v.	Acevedo,	500	U.S.	565,	582	(1991)	(Scalia,	J.,	concurring)	
(describing	 the	warrant	 requirement	 as	 “basically	 unrecognizable”	 due	 to	 its	many	
exceptions).	
	 33.	 See,	 e.g.,	 New	 York	 v.	 Quarles,	 467	 U.S.	 649,	 657	 (1984)	 (recognizing	 an	
exception	to	the	Miranda	rule	in	situations	“posing	a	threat	to	the	public	safety”).	
	 34.	 See,	e.g.,	Kirby	v.	Illinois,	406	U.S.	682,	691	(1972)	(holding	that	defendants	
have	no	Sixth	Amendment	right	to	counsel	at	a	pre-indictment	identification	because	
no	adversary	judicial	proceeding	triggering	the	right	has	begun);	see	also,	e.g.,	Akhil	
Reed	Amar,	Fourth	Amendment	First	Principles,	107	HARV.	L.	REV.	757,	757	(1994)	(“The	
Fourth	Amendment	today	is	an	embarrassment.	Much	of	what	the	Supreme	Court	has	
said	 in	 the	 last	half	 century—that	 the	Amendment	generally	 calls	 for	warrants	 and	
probable	 cause	 for	 all	 searches	 and	 seizures,	 and	 exclusion	 of	 illegally	 obtained	
evidence—is	 initially	 plausible	 but	 ultimately	 misguided.	.	.	.	 Warrants	 are	 not	
required—unless	they	are.”).	
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only	the	right	against	compulsory	self-incrimination,	the	right	to	a	jury	
trial,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 confront	 witnesses;35	 more	 generally,	 guilty	
pleas	 short	 circuit	many	 rights	 individual	defendants	may	assert	 in	
our	criminal	justice	system.36	Additionally,	defendants	may	not	assert	
Fourth	 Amendment	 claims	 on	 collateral	 review	 of	 state	 criminal	
convictions	 in	 federal	 habeas	 corpus	 proceedings,	 given	 that	 the	
Supreme	Court	has	ruled	that	the	exclusionary	rule	is	a	prophylactic	
remedy.37	Relatedly,	the	same	applies	to	judicial	restrictions	on	Bivens	
remedies	 and	 qualified	 immunity.38	 These	 contexts	 differ	 from	 the	
focus	of	this	Article	because	they	are	either	not	concerned	with	cross-
sovereign	criminal	procedural	rights,	or	arise	in	the	civil	context.	
A. THE	CORE	CRIMINAL	PROCEDURE	APPROACH	
Pursuant	 to	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach,	 the	 United	
States	 guarantees	 certain—but	 not	 all—enumerated	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 vis-à-vis	 another	 sovereign.	 This	 approach	 has	
emerged	 in	 the	 history	 of	 incorporation	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights,	
negotiation	and	ratification	of	international	human	rights	treaties,	and	
in	the	Clarifying	Lawful	Overseas	Use	of	Data	(CLOUD)	Act	of	2018.	
1. Incorporation	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	
Core	 criminal	 procedure	 originates	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	
and,	more	specifically,	the	beginnings	of	the	“constitutionalization”	of	
criminal	procedure.	Of	course,	the	history	of	incorporation	of	the	Bill	
 
	 35.	 Boykin	v.	Alabama,	395	U.S.	238,	243	(1969).	
	 36.	 See	 FREDERICK	 T.	 DAVIS,	 AMERICAN	 CRIMINAL	 JUSTICE:	 AN	 INTRODUCTION	 80	
(2019)	(noting	that	U.S.	criminal	procedural	rights	are	premised	on	the	assumption	
that	 a	 trial	 will	 take	 place,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 is	 an	 increasingly	 uncommon	
occurrence).	
	 37.	 See	Stone	v.	Powell,	428	U.S.	465,	493	(1976)	(“There	is	no	reason	to	believe,	
however,	 that	 the	 overall	 educative	 effect	 of	 the	 exclusionary	 rule	 would	 be	
appreciably	 diminished	 if	 search-and-seizure	 claims	 could	 not	 be	 raised	 in	 federal	
habeas	corpus	review	of	state	convictions.”).	But	cf.	Martinez	v.	Ryan,	566	U.S.	1,	17	
(2012)	(“Where,	under	state	law,	claims	of	ineffective	assistance	of	trial	counsel	must	
be	raised	in	an	initial-review	collateral	proceeding,	a	procedural	default	will	not	bar	a	
federal	habeas	court	from	hearing	a	substantial	claim	of	ineffective	assistance	at	trial	
if,	in	the	initial-review	collateral	proceeding,	there	was	no	counsel	or	counsel	in	that	
proceeding	was	ineffective.”).	
	 38.	 Ordinarily,	a	plaintiff	may	maintain	suit	against	a	government	officer	under	
two	circumstances:	(1)	where	the	officer	allegedly	acted	outside	of	delegated	statutory	
power,	or	(2)	where	the	officer	acted	within	the	conferred	statutory	limits	of	the	office	
but	allegedly	offended	a	provision	of	the	Constitution.	Larson	v.	Domestic	&	Foreign	
Com.	Corp.,	337	U.S.	682,	689–91	(1949).	Nonetheless,	Congress	retains	the	authority	
to	 adopt	 alternative	 remedies	 for	 resolving	 legal	 complaints.	See	Gregory	C.	 Sisk,	A	
Primer	on	 the	Doctrine	of	Federal	 Sovereign	 Immunity,	 58	OKLA.	L.	REV.	439,	456–57	
(2005).	
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of	 Rights’	 criminal	 procedural	 protections	 through	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment	is	as	canonical	as	it	is	familiar.	Adopted	in	the	wake	of	the	
U.S.	Civil	War,	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	prohibits	individual	states	
from	“depriv[ing]	any	person	of	life,	liberty,	or	property,	without	due	
process	of	law.”39	From	the	early	1930s	to	early	1960s,40	the	Supreme	
Court	interpreted	this	clause	not	as	requiring	that	states	uphold	the	
criminal	procedural	protections	in	the	Bill	of	Rights,	but	as	protecting	
“fundamental	fairness.”41	For	example,	in	Powell	v.	Alabama,	the	Court	
found	 that	 a	 state’s	 denial	 of	 counsel	 deprived	 due	 process	 in	 the	
infamous	 Scottsboro	 trial,	 a	 capital	 case	 involving	 two	 African	
Americans	convicted	of	rape	without,	 inter	alia,	 the	assistance	of	an	
attorney	 at	 trial.42	 In	 holding	 that	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	
protects	 fundamental	 rights,	 the	 Court	 emphasized	 that	 such	
protection	was	“not	because	those	rights	are	enumerated	in	the	first	
eight	Amendments,	but	because	they	are	of	such	a	nature	that	they	are	
included	 in	 the	 ‘conception	 of	 due	 process	 of	 law.’”43	 In	 weighing	
whether	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 protected	 from	 state	 action	
rights	enumerated	in	the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Amendments,	the	Court	asked	
whether	such	a	right	constituted	one	of	the	“fundamental	principles	of	
liberty	and	 justice	which	 lie	at	 the	base	of	all	our	civil	and	political	
institutions.”44	
But	starting	in	1961,	the	Warren	Court	moved	toward	a	right-by-
right	 “selective	 incorporation”	 approach	 to	 criminal	 procedural	
protections,45	 ultimately	 incorporating	 through	 the	 Fourteenth	
Amendment	 due	 process	 clause	 virtually	 all	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights’	
criminal	procedural	guarantees,	a	process	continuing	to	the	present	
 
	 39.	 U.S.	CONST.	amend.	XIV.	
	 40.	 See	Jerold	H.	Israel,	Selective	Incorporation	Revisited,	71	GEO.	L.J.	253,	256,	304	
(1982)	(noting	that	an	initial	period	of	“fundamental	fairness”	application	began	in	the	
wake	of	the	adoption	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	lasted	until	the	early	1960s).	
	 41.	 Id.	at	273.	 	
	 42.	 287	U.S.	45,	71	(1932).	
	 43.	 Id.	at	67–68	(quoting	Twining	v.	New	Jersey,	211	U.S.	78,	99	(1908));	ERWIN	
CHEMERINSKY	 &	 LAURIE	 L.	 LEVENSON,	 CRIMINAL	 PROCEDURE:	 INVESTIGATION	 21	 (3d	 ed.	
2018).	
	 44.	 Powell,	287	U.S.	at	67	(citing	Hebert	v.	Louisiana,	272	U.S.	312,	316	(1926)).	
	 45.	 See	George	C.	Thomas	III,	The	Criminal	Procedure	Road	Not	Taken:	Due	Process	
and	the	Protection	of	Innocence,	3	OHIO	ST.	J.	CRIM.	L.	169,	172	(2005)	(“Of	the	criminal	
procedure	rights	in	the	Bill	of	Rights,	the	first	incorporation	was	not	until	1961	when	
the	Court	[in	Mapp	v.	Ohio,	367	U.S.	643	(1961)]	required	states	to	follow	the	Fourth	
Amendment	exclusionary	rule	and	suppress	evidence	that	had	been	unconstitutionally	
seized.”);	 Israel,	 supra	 note	 40,	 at	 253	 (“In	 June	 1960	 Justice	 Brennan’s	 separate	
opinion	in	Ohio	ex	rel.	Eaton	v.	Price	set	forth	what	came	to	be	the	doctrinal	foundation	
of	the	Warren	Court’s	criminal	procedure	revolution	.	.	.	[and]	what	is	now	commonly	
described	as	the	 ‘selective	 incorporation’	 theory	of	 the	[F]ourteenth	[A]mendment.”	
(footnote	omitted)).	
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day.46	 Such	 abandonment	 of	 the	 fundamental	 fairness	 approach	 is	
widely	 recognized	 as	 “one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 legacies	 of	 the	
Warren	 Court.	.	.	.”47	 In	 opting	 for	 selective	 incorporation,	 the	
Supreme	Court	 articulated	 a	 test	wherein	 it	would	 first	 look	 at	 the	
entirety	of	the	right	(as	opposed	to	a	fact-specific	analysis)	and	then	
ask	whether	the	provision	is	“fundamental	to	our	scheme	of	ordered	
liberty”48	or	“deeply	rooted	in	this	Nation’s	history	and	tradition.”49	
Drawing	on	this	analysis,	the	Court	has	by	now	incorporated	virtually	
all	rights,50	including:	the	warrant	requirement,51	exclusionary	rule,52	
and	 freedom	 from	unreasonable	 searches	 and	 seizures53	 under	 the	
Fourth	Amendment;	 the	Double	Jeopardy	Clause,54	privilege	against	
self-incrimination,55	and	Just	Compensation	Clause56	under	the	Fifth	
Amendment;	 the	 rights	 to	 trial	 by	 jury,57	 compulsory	 process,58	
speedy	trial,59	confrontation	of	adverse	witnesses,60	and	assistance	of	
counsel61	under	the	Sixth	Amendment;	and	the	prohibitions	against	
cruel	 and	 unusual	 punishment,62	 excessive	 bail,63	 and	 excessive	
fines64	 under	 the	 Eighth	 Amendment.	 At	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 only	
criminal	 procedural	 rights	 not	 to	 be	 incorporated	 are	 the	 Fifth	
Amendment	right	to	indictment	by	a	grand	jury	and	Sixth	Amendment	
right	to	a	jury	selected	from	residents	of	the	state	and	district	where	
the	crime	occurred.65	Once	a	protection	is	incorporated,	“there	is	no	
 
	 46.	 See	 generally,	 e.g.,	 Timbs	 v.	 Indiana,	 139	 S.	 Ct.	 682,	 686–87	 (2019)	
(incorporating	the	Eighth	Amendment’s	Excessive	Fines	Clause	against	the	states).	
	 47.	 See	Meares,	supra	note	24.	
	 48.	 See,	e.g.,	Timbs,	139	S.	Ct.	at	686–88	(applying	this	test	to	the	Excessive	Fines	
Clause	of	the	Eighth	Amendment);	McDonald	v.	City	of	Chicago,	561	U.S.	742,	758–59	
(2010)	(applying	this	test	to	the	Second	Amendment).	
	 49.	 See	McDonald,	561	U.S.	at	767	(quoting	Washington	v.	Glucksberg,	521	U.S.	
702,	721	(1997)).	
	 50.	 See	 generally	 RUSSELL	 L.	WEAVER,	 JOHN	M.	 BURKOFF	 &	 CATHERINE	 HANCOCK,	
CRIMINAL	PROCEDURE:	A	CONTEMPORARY	APPROACH	25–26	(2d	ed.	2018).	
	 51.	 Aguilar	v.	Texas,	378	U.S.	108	(1964).	
	 52.	 Mapp	v.	Ohio,	367	U.S.	643,	659–60	(1961).	
	 53.	 Wolf	v.	Colorado,	338	U.S.	25,	25–26	(1949).	
	 54.	 Benton	v.	Maryland,	395	U.S.	784,	787	(1969).	
	 55.	 Malloy	v.	Hogan,	378	U.S.	1,	2–3	(1964).	
	 56.	 Chi.,	Burlington	&	Quincy	R.R.	Co.	v.	Chicago,	166	U.S.	226,	233–34	(1897).	
	 57.	 Duncan	v.	Louisiana,	391	U.S.	145,	149	(1968).	
	 58.	 Washington	v.	Texas,	388	U.S.	14,	17–19	(1967).	
	 59.	 Klopfer	v.	North	Carolina,	386	U.S.	213,	223	(1967).	
	 60.	 Pointer	v.	Texas,	380	U.S.	400,	403	(1965).	
	 61.	 Gideon	v.	Wainwright,	372	U.S.	335,	339–40	(1963).	
	 62.	 Robinson	v.	California,	370	U.S.	660,	666	(1962).	
	 63.	 Schilb	v.	Kuebel,	404	U.S.	357,	365	(1971).	
	 64.	 Timbs	v.	Indiana,	139	S.	Ct.	682,	691	(2019).	
	 65.	 F.	Andrew	Hessick	&	Elizabeth	Fisher,	Structural	Rights	and	Incorporation,	71	
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daylight	 between	 the	 federal	 and	 state	 conduct	 it	 prohibits	 or	
requires.”66	
This	history	is	relevant	to	core	criminal	procedure	in	three	ways.	
As	an	initial	matter,	incorporation	exposes	the	inherent	challenges	in	
criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing.	 The	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	
incorporation	debates	among	the	members	of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	
illustrate	the	slippery	nature	of	this	inquiry.	For	example,	in	Duncan	v.	
Louisiana,	 Justices	White	 and	Harlan,	 purporting	 to	 apply	 the	 same	
standard,	disagreed	as	to	whether	it	was	“fundamentally	unfair”	for	
the	state	of	Louisiana	to	withhold	from	Gary	Duncan	the	right	to	a	jury	
trial	 for	 the	 charge	 of	 simple	 battery.67	Meanwhile,	 in	 a	 concurring	
opinion,	Justice	Black	altogether	rejected	the	doctrine	of	fundamental	
fairness,	stating	that	such	inquiry	“depends	entirely	on	the	particular	
judge’s	idea	of	ethics	and	morals	instead	of	requiring	him	to	depend	
on	the	boundaries	fixed	by	the	written	words	of	the	Constitution.”68	
Second,	 incorporation	 reveals	 the	 three	 options	 available	 to	
courts	when	evaluating	the	criminal	procedures	of	other	sovereigns.	
One	 is	 a	 “hands	 off”	 approach,	 permitting	 the	 other	 sovereign	
discretion	to	guarantee	whichever	criminal	procedural	rights	it	deems	
to	be	fundamental.	The	opposite	extreme	is	a	total	incorporation,	or	
“normalization”	 approach,	 calling	 for	 criminal	 procedure	 to	 be	 co-
extensive	with	that	of	the	U.S.	Bill	of	Rights	and	related	rights	flowing	
from	 them.	 The	 middle	 option—between	 rigorous	 insistence	 on	
identical	procedural	guarantees	and	laissez-faire	permissibility	of	all	
foreign	 procedure—consists	 of	 two	 other	 possibilities.	 Courts	 can	
selectively	 incorporate	 a	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 by	 guaranteeing	
only	 certain	 rights,	 rooted	 in	notions	 of	 fundamental	 guarantees	 in	
Anglo-American	jurisprudence.	Or,	courts	may	apply	a	more	nebulous	
fundamental	 fairness	 or	 “outlier	 test”	 in	 which	 much	 state	
investigative	and/or	adjudicative	action	is	permitted	unless	the	other	
sovereign	grossly	violates	some	core	criminal	procedural	norm.	
 
ALA.	L.	REV.	163,	168,	175	n.78	(2019).	
	 66.	 Timbs,	 139	 S.	 Ct.	 at	 685	 (noting	 that	 the	 only	 exception	 is	 the	 Sixth	
Amendment	requirement	of	jury	unanimity).	
	 67.	 Duncan	v.	Louisiana,	391	U.S.	145,	149,	193	(1968).	Justice	White,	writing	for	
the	majority,	held	that	“trial	by	jury	in	criminal	cases	is	fundamental	to	the	American	
scheme	of	justice,”	id.	at	149,	while	Justice	Harlan,	in	dissent,	stated	that	trial	by	jury	is	
“a	good	means	[of	trying	criminal	cases],	but	it	is	not	the	only	fair	means,	and	it	is	not	
demonstrably	better	than	the	alternatives	States	might	devise,”	id.	at	193	(Harlan,	J.,	
dissenting).	
	 68.	 Id.	at	168–69	(Black,	J.,	concurring);	see	also	Fed.	Power	Comm’n	v.	Nat.	Gas	
Pipeline	Co.,	315	U.S.	575,	600–01	(1942)	(Black,	Douglas,	and	Murphy,	JJ.,	concurring)	
(discussing	 how	 the	 fundamental	 fairness	 doctrine	 is	 an	 elastic	 approach	 allowing	
judges	to	substitute	for	legislatures).	
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Finally,	 the	 long	 history	 of	 incorporation	 has	 given	 room	 to	
understand	 the	 positives	 and	 negatives	 of	 a	 fundamental	 rights	
approach	 to	 criminal	 procedure.	 For	 example,	 William	 Stuntz	 has	
famously	 critiqued	 the	 Warren	 Court’s	 procedural	 revolution	 as	
spawning	aggressive	 law	enforcement	 in	 the	 latter	part	of	 the	20th	
century.69	Additionally,	Tracey	Meares	has	argued	that	codes	such	as	
the	Bill	of	Rights	are	advantageous	 in	promoting	reform,	given	 that	
they	specify	rules	over	norms	and	provide	“sharp-edged	prophylactic	
prohibitions”	that	guard	against	suspicion	of	judicial	actors	otherwise	
prepared	 to	 justify	 law	 enforcement	 practices	 using	 open-ended	
fundamental	fairness	norms.70	The	flip	side,	though,	is	that	such	rules	
may	be	crudely	inflexible	and	may	create	costs	relating	to	under-	and	
over-inclusiveness.71		
2. International	Human	Rights	with	Criminal	Procedural	
Guarantees	
Core	 criminal	 procedure	 also	 animates	 U.S.	 engagement	 with	
international	 human	 rights	 law.	 During	 the	 mid-20th	 century,	
countries	had	to	agree	on	certain	core	criminal	procedural	rights	in	
the	drafting	of	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR),	as	
well	as	in	the	ratification	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	
Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR).72	 In	 contrast	 to	 judicial	 right-by-right	
incorporation,	 here	 the	 political	 branches	 could	 comprehensively	
assess	a	system	of	rights	to	establish	as	core.	
The	early	UDHR	negotiation	history	shows	that	the	United	States	
did	not	expect	to	parse	the	definition	and	scope	of	human	rights.73	The	
U.S.	 government	 initially	 favored	 including	 an	 international	 bill	 of	
rights	into	the	U.N.	Charter,	focusing	specifically	on	civil	and	political	
rights	similar	to	those	in	the	U.S.	Bill	of	Rights—instead	of	economic	
rights	and	enforcement	measures.74	The	U.S.	delegation	assumed	that	
 
	 69.	 Stuntz,	 supra	note	24	 (“The	constitutional	proceduralism	of	 the	1960s	and	
after	helped	to	create	the	harsh	justice	of	the	1970s	and	after.”	(footnote	omitted)).	
	 70.	 See	Meares,	supra	note	24	(“Codes	specify	rules,	not	norms.”).	
	 71.	 Id.	
	 72.	 Zachary	 Elkins,	 Tom	 Ginsburg	 &	 Beth	 Simmons,	 Getting	 to	 Rights:	 Treaty	
Ratification,	Constitutional	Convergence,	and	Human	Rights	Practice,	54	HARV.	L.	REV.	
61,	 65–66	 (2013)	 (noting	 the	 process	 of	 countries	 agreeing	 on	 certain	 rights,	 in	
particular	criminal	procedural	rights,	when	drafting	the	UDHR).	
	 73.	 See	generally	SAMUEL	MOYN,	THE	LAST	UTOPIA:	HUMAN	RIGHTS	IN	HISTORY	62–72	
(2010)	 (reviewing	 the	 history	 of	 the	 UDHR	 negotiation	 and	 highlighting	 the	 cross-
cultural	complexities	in	doing	so).	
	 74.	 See	 M.	 GLEN	 JOHNSON	 &	 JANUSZ	 SYMONIDES,	 THE	 UNIVERSAL	 DECLARATION	 OF	
HUMAN	RIGHTS:	A	HISTORY	OF	ITS	CREATION	AND	IMPLEMENTATION	1948–1998,	at	28–29	
(1998).	
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human	rights	were	clearly	defined	concepts,	with	a	focus	on	civil	and	
political	 rights	 as	 opposed	 to	 economic	 security	 rights;75	 so	 while	
there	was	some	discussion	of	certain	freedoms	relevant	to	Franklin	D.	
Roosevelt’s	 “four	 freedoms”	speech	 from	1941,76	 the	delegation	did	
little	 preparatory	work	 to	define	human	 rights	 in	 a	 broader,	 cross-
cultural	sense.77	
However,	disagreements	with	foreign	nations	as	to	the	substance	
and	 language	 of	 such	 rights	 led	 the	 United	 States	 and	 other	
participating	nations	to	conclude	that	a	separate	bill	of	rights	should	
be	 drafted	 and	 negotiated	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	U.N.	 Charter	
itself	was	adopted,	leaving	the	Charter	with	only	a	brief	reference	to	
human	 rights.78	 When	 the	 time	 came	 to	 negotiate	 the	 Declaration	
itself,	the	various	parties	aimed	to	articulate	“a	common	conception	of	
human	 rights	 that	 would	 command	 acceptance	 despite	 huge	
differences	 in	 culture,	 political	 systems,	 geographic	 location	 and	
economic	 circumstance.”79	 Negotiations	 ultimately	 turned	 on	 a	
variety	of	tensions,	including	natural	law	versus	positivism,	liberalism	
versus	 Marxism,	 and	 western	 perspectives	 versus	 non-western	
perspectives.80	
With	 regard	 to	 criminal	 procedure,	 an	 initial	 question	 of	 the	
UDHR	drafting	process	was	which	rights	to	even	include.81	Designed	
precisely	to	strengthen	the	independence	of	the	judiciary,	Articles	6–
12	 are	 the	 UDHR’s	 central	 provisions	 concerning	 the	 rights	 of	
defendants	in	criminal	proceedings.82	In	the	end,	the	UDHR’s	final	text	
protects	only	a	few	criminal	procedural	rights,	lacking	the	specificity	
 
	 75.	 See	 id.	 at	 40–42	 (describing	 the	 clash	 of	 values	 and	 particularly	 the	
assumptions	of	the	American	Law	Institute	on	foundational	rights).	
	 76.	 See	 generally	 Franklin	 D.	 Roosevelt,	 President	 of	 the	 U.S.,	 Eighth	 Annual	
Message	to	Congress	(Four	Freedoms	Speech)	(Jan.	6,	1941)	(listing	four	key	human	
freedoms	including	(1)	freedom	of	speech	and	expression;	(2)	freedom	of	every	person	
to	worship	God	in	their	own	way;	(3)	freedom	from	want;	and	(4)	freedom	from	fear).	
	 77.	 Even	the	American	Law	Institute,	which	 in	1942	appointed	a	committee	of	
lawyers	and	political	 scientists	 from	several	different	 countries	 including	Germany,	
Poland,	 India,	and	Lebanon,	was	unable	 to	 reach	complete	consensus	regarding	 the	
definition	 of	 human	 rights.	 JOHNSON,	 supra	 note	 74,	at	 40–41;	 see	 also	Statement	 of	
Essential	Human	Rights	Presented	by	the	Delegation	of	Panama,	U.N.	Doc.	A/148	(Oct.	
24,	1946)	(defining	essential	freedoms).	
	 78.	 JOHNSON,	supra	note	74,	at	27–29.	See	also	Delegation	of	Panama,	Statement	of	
Essential	Human	Rights	Presented	by	the	Delegation	of	Panama,	U.N.	Doc.	A/148	(Oct.	
24,	1946).	
	 79.	 JOHNSON,	supra	note	74,	at	39.	
	 80.	 Id.	at	42–48;	SAMUEL	MOYN,	NOT	ENOUGH:	HUMAN	RIGHTS	IN	AN	UNEQUAL	WORLD	
57–61	(2018)	(reviewing	the	history	of	UDHR	negotiation).	
	 81.	 JOHANNES	MORSINK,	 THE	 UNIVERSAL	 DECLARATION	 OF	 HUMAN	 RIGHTS:	 ORIGINS,	
DRAFTING,	AND	INTENT	51	(1999).	
	 82.	 See	id.	at	49–58.	
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of	 the	 U.S.	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 but	 affirming	 general	 principles	 that	 are	
immanent	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution.	 In	 particular,	 Articles	 6–12	
guarantee	universal	recognition	as	a	person	and	equality	before	the	
law,83	effective	judicial	remedy	for	violation	of	fundamental	rights,84	
freedom	from	arbitrary	arrest	or	detention,85	 “full	equality	 to	a	 fair	
and	 public	 hearing	 by	 an	 independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal,”86	
presumption	 of	 innocence,87	 protection	 against	 retroactivity,88	 and	
protection	against	“arbitrary	 interference”	with	a	person’s	“privacy,	
family,	 home	 or	 correspondence.”89	 In	 other	 words,	 such	 rights	
constitute	a	core	criminal	procedure	narrower	than	that	guaranteed	
in	the	U.S.	Constitution:	rights	to	assistance	of	counsel,	freedom	from	
cruel	and	unusual	punishment,	and	unreasonable	search	and	seizure	
are	all	absent.90	
History	reveals	that	the	U.S.	delegation	initially	favored	a	more	
robust	conception	of	rights	in	the	UDHR.	Specifically,	the	United	States	
made	 proposals	 to	 expand	 the	 protections	 guaranteed	 by	 these	
articles.	 For	 example,	 the	 United	 States	 proposed	 that	 the	 UDHR	
include	the	right	of	arrestees	to	“be	promptly	informed	of	the	charges	
against	 [them],	 and	 to	 trial	 within	 a	 reasonable	 time	 or	 to	 be	
released,”91	 but	 the	 provision’s	 final	 form	 guarantees	 protection	
against	merely	 “arbitrary	arrest,	detention,	or	exile.”92	Additionally,	
the	 United	 States	 proposed	 adding	 the	 rights	 of	 confrontation	 and	
counsel,93	but	the	final	language	of	the	provision	only	guarantees	“a	
fair	and	public	hearing	by	an	independent	and	impartial	tribunal.”94	
Criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing	 was	 not	 only	 evident	 in	 the	
negotiation	of	 the	UDHR;	 it	was	 also	 apparent	 in	 the	 ratification	of	
international	human	rights	treaties.95	In	particular,	this	arose	in	U.S.	
 
	 83.	 G.A.	Res.	217	(III)	A,	UDHR,	arts.	6–7	(Dec.	10,	1948)	[hereinafter	UDHR].	
	 84.	 Id.	art.	8.	
	 85.	 Id.	art.	9.	
	 86.	 Id.	art.	10.	
	 87.	 Id.	art.	11(1).	
	 88.	 Id.	art.	11(2).	
	 89.	 Id.	art.	12.	
	 90.	 See	generally	id.	
	 91.	 1	THE	UNIVERSAL	DECLARATION	OF	HUMAN	RIGHTS:	THE	TRAVAUX	PRÉPARATOIRES	
1023	(William	A.	Schabas	ed.,	2013)	[hereinafter	U.S.	SUGGESTIONS	FOR	UDHR].	
	 92.	 UDHR,	supra	note	83,	art.	9.	
	 93.	 U.S.	SUGGESTIONS	FOR	UDHR,	supra	note	91,	at	712.	
	 94.	 UHDR,	supra	note	83,	art.	10.	Although	Article	11	provides	to	the	accused	“all	
the	guarantees	necessary	for	his	defence	[sic],”	it	does	not	expressly	provide	for	the	
right	to	the	assistance	of	counsel.	Id.	art.	11.	
	 95.	 Given	 its	 status	 as	 a	 declaration,	 the	 UDHR	 is	 not	 a	 human	 rights	 treaty,	
though	 many	 of	 the	 UDHR’s	 provisions	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 customary	
international	law,	incorporated	into	domestic	law	via	other	human	rights	treaties,	or	
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action	regarding	Article	14	of	the	ICCPR,	which	requires	rights	such	as	
equality	 before	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 presumption	 of	 innocence,	
presence	 at	 criminal	 trial	without	 undue	 delay,	 appeal,	 and	 double	
jeopardy.96	Here,	the	United	States	for	the	first	time	curtailed	rights	
located	beyond	its	core	conception.97	Specifically,	it	did	so	by	attaching	
certain	reservations,	understandings,	and	declarations	(RUDs)	to	its	
ratification	of	the	ICCPR.98	
For	example,	with	regard	to	the	right	to	counsel,	the	United	States	
stated	 its	 understanding	 that	 the	 guarantee	 of	 “legal	 assistance	 of	
[one’s]	 choosing”99	 does	 not	 require	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 criminal	
defendant’s	 counsel	of	 choice	when	 the	defendant	 is	provided	with	
court-appointed	counsel	on	ground	of	indigence,	when	the	defendant	
is	financially	able	to	retain	alternative	counsel,	or	when	imprisonment	
is	not	imposed.100	Additionally,	with	regard	to	the	right	to	“obtain	the	
attendance	and	examination	of	witnesses	on	his	behalf,”	 the	United	
States	expressed	understanding	that	such	right	does	not	prohibit	the	
requirement	that	a	defendant	seeking	to	compel	a	witness	must	show	
that	such	witness	is	necessary	for	her	defense.101	Further,	the	United	
States	 reserved	 its	 acceptance	 of	 a	 separate	 criminal	 procedural	
standard	for	juveniles	as	compared	with	adults,	maintaining	that,	in	
exceptional	 circumstances,	 juveniles	 may	 be	 treated	 as	 adults	 in	
criminal	proceedings.102	Finally,	 the	United	States	attached	RUDs	to	
 
otherwise	incorporated	into	domestic	law.	Hurst	Hannum,	The	UDHR	in	National	and	
International	Law,	3	HEALTH	&	HUM.	RTS.	144,	145–46	(1998).	
	 96.	 See	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	art.	14,	Dec.	19,	1966,	
S.	 EXEC.	DOC.	NO.	 E,	 95-2,	 999	 U.N.T.S.	 171	 [hereinafter	 ICCPR];	 Hum.	 Rts.	 Comm.,	
General	Comment	No.	32:	Article	14:	Right	to	Equality	Before	Courts	and	Tribunals	and	
to	 a	 Fair	 Trial,	 ¶¶	 3–4,	 U.N.	 Doc.	 CCPR/C/GC/32	 (Aug.	 23,	 2007)	 (noting	 the	
complexities	of	the	various	Article	14	guarantees	with	different	scopes	of	application,	
though	noting	that	a	general	reservation	to	the	right	to	a	 fair	 trial	would	defeat	the	
object	and	purpose	of	the	treaty).	
	 97.	 See	David	P.	Stewart,	United	States	Ratification	of	 the	Covenant	on	Civil	and	
Political	Rights:	The	Significance	of	the	Reservations,	Understandings,	and	Declarations,	
42	DEPAUL	L.	REV.	1183,	1186	(1993).	
	 98.	 “RUDs”	are	the	“reservations,	understandings,	and	declarations”	upon	which	
U.S.	ratification	of	the	ICCPR	was	conditioned,	proposed	by	the	Carter	Administration	
after	extensive	inter-agency	review	and	consultation.	See	id.	1199–1200.	
	 99.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	96.	
	 100.	 Stewart,	supra	note	97,	at	1199–1200.	
	 101.	 Id.	at	1200.	
	 102.	 Id.	at	1195.	
268	 MINNESOTA	LAW	REVIEW	 [105:251	
	
its	 acceptance	 of	 the	 ICCPR	 guarantees	 regarding	 compensatory	
damages103	and	rights	against	double	jeopardy.104	
3. Electronic	Evidence	
The	final	example	of	core	criminal	procedure	is	the	most	cutting	
edge.	 The	 U.S.	 government	 has	 recently	 articulated	 core	 criminal	
procedure	in	statutory	rules	governing	the	transmission	of	in-country	
electronic	data	abroad	for	use	in	foreign	criminal	cases.	The	Clarifying	
Lawful	Overseas	Use	of	Data	 (CLOUD)	Act,	 enacted	 in	2018,	 is	best	
known	for	amending	the	Stored	Communications	Act	to	allow	U.S.	law	
enforcement	 to	compel	 internet	service	providers	 (ISPs)	 to	provide	
data	 stored	 on	 servers	 abroad.105	 However,	 it	 also	 empowers	 the	
executive	 branch	 to	 enter	 bilateral	 agreements	 with	 foreign	
governments,	which	may	then	directly	request	electronic	data	 from	
U.S.	ISPs	and	use	that	data	as	evidence	in	a	foreign	prosecution.106	In	
many	 cases,	 this	 obviates	 the	 need	 for	 mutual	 legal	 assistance,	
increasing	efficiency	in	law	enforcement	cooperation.107	
Notably,	 the	Act	mandates	 that	 the	Attorney	General,	with	 the	
concurrence	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State,	 certify	 to	 Congress	 its	
determination,	 inter	 alia,	 that	 every	 foreign	 legal	 system	 “afford[]	
robust	 substantive	and	procedural	protections	 for	privacy	and	civil	
 
	 103.	 While	the	ICCPR	guarantees	compensatory	damages	for	unlawful	arrests,	the	
United	 States	 does	 not	 generally	 accord	 a	 right	 to	 compensation	 for	 an	 arrest	 or	
detention	made	in	good	faith	but	ultimately	determined	to	have	been	unlawful.	See	id.	
at	1197–98.	
	 104.	 Again,	the	United	States	stated	its	understanding	that	the	ICCPR	prohibition	
against	double	jeopardy	is	not	absolute;	it	applies	only	when	the	judgment	of	acquittal	
has	 been	 rendered	 by	 a	 court	 of	 the	 same	 governmental	 unit,	 whether	 the	 federal	
government	 or	 a	 constituent	 unit.	 See	 id.	 at	 1200.	 Finally,	 of	 the	 seven	 major	
international	human	 rights	 treaties,	 the	only	other	 to	 touch	on	 criminal	procedural	
guarantees	is	the	U.N.	Convention	against	Torture,	which	includes	provisions	that	bear	
on	 criminal	 procedural	 rights.	 See	 UNFPA,	 Core	 International	 Human	 Rights	
Instruments,	 UNITED	 NATIONS	 POPULATION	 FUND	 (2004),	 https://www.unfpa.org/	
resources/core-international-human-rights-instruments	 [https://perma.cc/SV4H	
-VZMS];	 Convention	 Against	 Torture	 and	 Other	 Cruel,	 Inhuman	 or	 Degrading	
Treatment	or	Punishment	art.	3,	Feb.	4,	1985,	S.	TREATY	DOC.	NO.	100-20,	1465	U.N.T.S.	
85	[hereinafter	CAT].	
	 105.	 See	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	2713	 (“A	 provider	 of	 electronic	 communication	 service	 or	
remote	computing	service	shall	comply	with	the	obligations	of	this	chapter	to	preserve,	
backup,	or	disclose	the	contents	of	a	wire	or	electronic	communication	.	.	.	regardless	
of	whether	[it]	is	located	within	or	outside	of	the	United	States.”).	
	 106.	 See	id.	§	2523(b).	
	 107.	 See	 generally	U.S.	DEP’T	OF	 JUST.,	PROMOTING	PUBLIC	SAFETY,	PRIVACY,	 AND	THE	
RULE	OF	LAW	AROUND	THE	WORLD:	THE	PURPOSE	AND	IMPACT	OF	THE	CLOUD	ACT	(2019),	
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1153446/download	[https://	
perma.cc/Y2DP-8JTC]	(noting	the	purpose	and	potential	benefits	of	the	CLOUD	Act).	
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liberties.”108	 The	 Act	 provides	 both	 procedural	 and	 substantive	
guidance	 as	 to	 how	 the	 executive	 branch	 should	 make	 that	
determination,	mandating	that	it	consider	factors	such	as	“adequate	
substantive	 and	 procedural	 laws	 on	 cybercrime	 and	 electronic	
evidence,”109	 respect	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 nondiscrimination	
principles,	and	applicable	human	rights	standards.110	Regarding	the	
latter,	the	Act	specifies	rights	such	as	“protection	from	arbitrary	and	
unlawful	 interference	with	 privacy;”	 “fair	 trial	 rights;”	 “freedom	 of	
expression,	 association,	 and	 peaceful	 assembly;”	 “prohibitions	 on	
arbitrary	arrest	and	detention;”	and	“prohibitions	against	torture	and	
cruel,	 inhuman,	 or	 degrading	 treatment	 or	 punishment.”111	 It	 also	
categorically	 exempts	 such	 certifications	 and	 determinations	 from	
judicial	review.112	
In	 summary,	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach	 explicitly	
guarantees	certain	fundamental	rights.	In	the	incorporation	context,	
core	criminal	procedure	encompasses	virtually	all	U.S.	Bill	of	Rights	
guarantees,	 save	 for	 the	 Fifth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 indictment	 by	
grand	 jury	 and	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 a	 jury	 selected	 from	
residents	 of	 the	 state	 and	 district	 where	 the	 crime	 occurred.	 The	
ICCPR	provides	rights	of	intermediate	specificity—including	rights	to	
presence	at	trial	without	undue	delay,	presumption	of	innocence,	and	
protection	against	double	jeopardy.113	And	the	UDHR	and	CLOUD	Act	
provide	 the	most	basic	minimum	guarantees	 to	 fair	 trial	 rights	and	
prohibitions	on	arbitrary	arrest	and	detention.114	
 
	 108.	 See	18	U.S.C.	§	2523(b).	
	 109.	 See	 id.	 §	 2523(b)(1)(B)(i)	 (specifying	 that	 states	may	 demonstrate	 this	 by	
being	a	party	to	the	Convention	on	Cybercrime,	which	entered	into	force	January	7,	
2004,	or	through	domestic	laws	that	are	consistent	with	the	Convention).	
	 110.	 See	id.	§	2523(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii).	
	 111.	 Id.	§	2523(b)(1)(B)(iii).	The	Act	also	specifies	certain	requirements	 for	 the	
agreements	 themselves,	 such	 as	 a	 prohibition	 on	 targeting	 U.S.	 persons.	 See	 id.	
§	2523(b)(4).	
	 112.	 See	id.	§	2523(c).	The	CLOUD	Act	also	notes	that	“[i]nternational	agreements	
provide	a	mechanism	for	resolving	these	potential	conflicting	legal	obligations	where	
the	United	States	and	the	relevant	foreign	government	share	a	common	commitment	
to	the	rule	of	law	and	the	protection	of	privacy	and	civil	liberties.”	Clarifying	Lawful	
Overseas	Use	of	Data	(CLOUD)	Act,	Pub.	L.	No.	115-141,	div.	V,	§	102,	132	Stat.	1213,	
1213	(2018).	Given	the	CLOUD	Act	was	recently	passed	into	law,	it	has	not	yet	been	
tested	 in	 the	 courts	 nor	 discussed	 in	 depth	 in	 academic	 literature.	 This	will	 surely	
change	 soon,	 however.	 In	 October	 2019,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 United	 Kingdom	
concluded	the	first	bilateral	agreement	under	the	Act,	paving	the	way	for	each	country	
to	 obtain	 electronic	 evidence	 directly	 from	 ISPs	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 other.	 See	
Agreement	on	Access	to	Electronic	Data	for	the	Purpose	of	Countering	Serious	Crime,	
U.K.-U.S.,	Oct.	3,	2019,	CS	USA	No.	6/2019.	
	 113.	 See	ICCPR,	supra	note	96.	
	 114.	 See	 UDHR,	 supra	 note	 83,	 arts.	 6–12;	 CAT,	 supra	 note	 104;	 18	 U.S.C.	
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B. THE	OUTLIER	APPROACH	
While	 core	 criminal	 procedure,	 in	 the	 contexts	 above,	 is	
enumerated,	prospective,	and	relatively	coherent	 in	 its	approach	 to	
fundamental	 rights,	 the	 outlier	 approach	 described	 in	 this	 Part	 is	
imprecise,	retrospective,	and	ad	hoc.	Pursuant	to	this	approach,	in	all	
but	the	most	flagrant	cases	of	foreign	criminal	justice	system	abuse,	
U.S.	 courts	 will	 problematically	 draw	 criminal	 procedural	 lines	 to	
admit	foreign	evidence,	consider	foreign	convictions,	or	extradite	to	
foreign	countries.	
1. Evidence	Material	to	Conviction	
The	 outlier	 approach	 manifests	 itself,	 first,	 when	 foreign	 law	
enforcement	 investigators	 produce	 evidence	 that	 U.S.	 prosecutors	
move	to	admit	in	U.S.	criminal	proceedings.		
This	issue	presents	itself	with	increasing	frequency	today,	but	its	
roots	 are	 of	 old	 vintage.115	 While	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 is	 silent	
regarding	its	territorial	reach,	the	Insular	Cases	of	1901	distinguished	
between	 incorporated	 and	 unincorporated	 territories	 as	 respective	
zones	 in	which	 “fundamental”	 and	 “nonfundamental”	 constitutional	
limitations	applied,	respectively.116	From	this	point	until	 the	1950s,	
constitutional	 rights	 “follow[ed]	 the	 flag”—i.e.,	 to	 newly-acquired	
territories—but	nowhere	else.117	And	while	 the	plurality	opinion	 in	
the	1957	case	Reid	v.	Covert	reasoned	that	Bill	of	Rights	protections	
should	 apply	 to	 U.S.	 citizens	 everywhere,118	 Justice	 Kennedy’s	
approach,	 first	 articulated	 in	 his	 concurrence	 in	 United	 States	 v.	
Verdugo-Urquidez	 (1990)	 and	 later	 in	 his	 majority	 opinion	 in	
Boumediene	v.	Bush	(2008),	held	that	the	Constitution	does	not	apply	
abroad—at	least	with	regard	to	foreign	nationals—when	it	would	be	
“impracticable	and	anomalous.”119	The	 issue	 in	many	of	 these	cases	
differed	slightly	 from	 the	question	at	hand	 in	 this	Article,	however,	
because	they	largely	concerned	application	of	the	U.S.	Bill	of	Rights	to	
 
§	2523(b)(1)(B)(ii)–(iii).	
	 115.	 See	 generally	 RAUSTIALA,	 supra	 note	 19	 (discussing	 the	 evolution	 of	
constitutional	extraterritoriality	and	its	interrelationship	with	U.S.	history).	
	 116.	 See	Gerald	L.	Neuman,	Understanding	Global	Due	Process,	23	GEO.	IMMIGR.	L.J.	
365,	366	(2009).	
	 117.	 RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	25–26.	
	 118.	 See	Reid	v.	Covert,	354	U.S.	1,	17	(1957).	
	 119.	 Boumediene	 v.	 Bush,	 553	 U.S.	 723,	 759	 (2008)	 (citing	 United	 States	 v.	
Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	259,	277–78	(1990)	 (Kennedy,	 J.,	 concurring));	see	also	
Neuman,	supra	note	116,	at	375	(“We	may	assume,	however,	that	U.S.	citizens	retain	
their	 belief	 in	 U.S.	 privacy	 values	 even	 when	 present	 in	 countries	 with	 different	
customs,	and	we	might	regard	as	 legitimate	the	citizens’	expectation	that	 their	own	
government	.	.	.	would	behave	consistently	toward	them.”).	
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the	 American	 empire,	 i.e.,	 to	 the	 United	 States	 acting	 as	 sovereign,	
albeit	 outside	 of	 core	 U.S.	 territory.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 central	
question	 in	 such	 cases	 was	 whether	 the	 Constitution	 protected	
Americans	that	 the	U.S.	government	tried	overseas.120	A	related	but	
distinct	 line	 of	 cases	 concerns	 U.S.	 courts	 evaluating	 foreign	
sovereigns	 applying	 the	 outlier	 approach	 to	 the	 fruits	 of	
extraterritorial	 searches,	 statements	 obtained	 during	 foreign	
custodial	interrogation,	and	other	areas	wherein	foreign	evidence	is	
introduced	in	domestic	criminal	proceedings.121		
This	 foreign	 sovereign	 evaluation	 plays	 out	 in	 two	 different	
doctrinal	scenarios.	First,	there	are	the	cases	on	the	applicability	of	the	
U.S.	 Constitution	 abroad,	 wherein	 courts	 engage	 in	 complex	 line	
drawing	 to	 determine	 when	 constitutional	 rights	 apply	 to	 foreign	
evidence	and	legal	procedures.	For	instance,	the	Supreme	Court	has	
created	a	test	wherein	constitutional	and	statutory	protections	do	not	
apply	extraterritorially	if	such	protection	would	be	“impracticable	and	
anomalous.”122	 Under	 this	 aforementioned	 test,	 constitutional	
protections	 will	 turn	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 “practical	 concerns”	
involved	 in	 applying	 the	 rights,123	 rather	 than	 on	 straightforward	
application	of	constitutional	principles	and	precedent,	as	would	be	the	
case	in	ordinary	domestic	prosecutions.124	The	courts	have	similarly	
created	 tests	 to	 determine	 who	 benefits	 from	 constitutional	
protections.	Under	the	prevailing	view	articulated	in	Boumediene,	the	
extraterritorial	 rights	 of	 both	 citizens	 and	 noncitizens	 vary	 from	
location	 to	 location,	 and	 from	 circumstance	 to	 circumstance.125	 For	
 
	 120.	 See	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	140	(“[B]oth	cases	posed	a	familiar	question:	
did	the	Constitution	protect	Americans	tried	overseas	by	the	U.S.	government?”);	see	
also	Sarah	H.	Cleveland,	Powers	Inherent	in	Sovereignty:	Indians,	Aliens,	Territories,	and	
the	Nineteenth	Century	Origins	of	Plenary	Power	over	Foreign	Affairs,	81	TEX.	L.	REV.	1	
(2002)	 (examining	 the	 historical	 origins	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 “inherent	 powers”	 over	
foreign	affairs	and	the	Supreme	Court’s	ultimate	ratification	of	that	doctrine	in	its	late-
nineteenth-century	decisions	concerning	Indians,	aliens,	and	territories).	
	 121.	 See,	 e.g.,	United	States	v.	Emmanuel,	565	F.3d	1324,	1330	 (11th	Cir.	2009)	
(“The	 general	 rule	 is	 that	 evidence	 obtained	 from	 searches	 carried	 out	 by	 foreign	
officials	in	their	own	countries	is	admissible	in	United	States	courts,	even	if	the	search	
would	 not	 otherwise	 comply	 with	 United	 States	 law	 or	 the	 law	 of	 the	 foreign	
country.	.	.	.	But	this	Circuit	has	recognized	.	.	.	that	evidence	from	foreign	searches	is	
inadmissible	if	the	conduct	of	the	foreign	officials	during	the	search	‘shocks	the	judicial	
conscience.’”).	
	 122.	 See	Boumediene,	553	U.S.	at	759	(quoting	Reid,	354	U.S.	at	74–75	(Harlan,	J.,	
concurring))	(citing	Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	at	277–78	(Kennedy,	J.,	concurring)).	
	 123.	 Id.	
	 124.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Terry	 v.	 Ohio,	 392	 U.S.	 1,	 20–30	 (1968)	 (applying	 constitutional	
principles	and	precedent	to	determine	the	reasonableness	of	search	and	seizure).	
	 125.	 Boumediene,	 553	 U.S.	 at	 766	 (“[A]t	 least	 three	 factors	 are	 relevant	 in	
determining	the	reach	of	the	Suspension	Clause:	(1)	the	citizenship	and	status	of	the	
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non-citizens,	 the	 courts	 have	 sometimes	 determined	 that	 whether	
they	benefit	from	constitutional	protections	in	U.S.	courts	depends	on	
the	extent	of	their	“voluntary	connection[s]”	to	the	United	States.126	
Even	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 apply	 abroad,	
courts	 may	 still	 exclude	 evidence	 using	 the	 outlier	 approach.	 The	
Fourth	Amendment	is	the	prime	example	here.	Generally,	U.S.	courts	
will	admit	evidence	that	foreign	officials	obtain	from	a	search	in	their	
own	 country,	 even	 when	 such	 search	 would	 not	 comply	 with	 U.S.	
law.127	 But	 when	 foreign	 law	 enforcement	 is	 operating	 entirely	
independently	 in	 its	 criminal	 investigations,	 and	 thus	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment	does	not	apply,	evidence	gathered	will	still	be	excluded	
when	the	foreign	law	enforcement	methods	“shock	the	conscience”	of	
the	U.S.	court.128	This	discretion	is	rooted	in	federal	courts’	inherent	
“supervisory	 powers	 over	 the	 administration	 of	 federal	 justice,”129	
and	 protects	 against	 foreign	 government	 conduct	 that	 “violates	
fundamental	 international	 norms	 of	 decency.”130	 This	 constitutes	 a	
 
detainee	and	the	adequacy	of	the	process	through	which	that	status	determination	was	
made;	(2)	the	nature	of	the	sites	where	apprehension	and	then	detention	took	place;	
and	(3)	the	practical	obstacles	inherent	in	resolving	the	prisoner’s	entitlement	to	the	
writ.”).	
	 126.	 See	Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	at	271;	Rodriguez	v.	Swartz,	111	F.	Supp.	3d	
1025,	1036–37	(D.	Ariz.	2015),	vacated,	140	S.	Ct.	1258	(2020).	
	 127.	 United	States	v.	Emmanuel,	565	F.3d	1324,	1330	(11th	Cir.	2009);	see	also	
Verdugo-Urquidez,	 494	 U.S.	 at	 274	 (adding	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment	does	not	 apply	 to	 searches/seizures	of	 nonresident	 aliens	 located	 in	 a	
foreign	country).	Is	(non)compliance	with	foreign	law	considered	when	determining	
reasonableness	of	foreign	searches?	The	Ninth	Circuit	says	yes;	the	Fifth,	Seventh,	and	
Eleventh	Circuits	say	no.	Compare	United	States	v.	Peterson,	812	F.2d	486,	490	(5th	
Cir.	1987)	(holding	that	courts	should	address	law	of	foreign	country	when	assessing	
reasonableness	 of	 foreign	 search),	with	 Emmanuel,	 565	 F.3d	 at	 1330	 (holding	 that	
evidence	obtained	from	searches	by	foreign	officials	is	generally	admissible,	even	if	the	
search	 violated	 foreign	 law),	 United	 States	 v.	Morrow,	 537	 F.2d	 120,	 140	 (5th	 Cir.	
1976)	(refusing	to	hold	that	the	Government	must	demonstrate	that	a	search	was	legal	
under	 the	 laws	 of	 a	 foreign	 country	 when	 it	 enters	 evidence	 gleaned	 from	 such	 a	
search),	and	United	States	v.	Stokes,	726	F.3d	880,	890	(7th	Cir.	2013)	(adopting	the	
language	of	Emmanuel,	though	also	including	Peterson	in	a	string	cite).	An	exception	to	
this	rule	is	that	the	Fourth	Amendment	applies	when	the	United	States	is	in	a	“joint	
venture”	or	when	foreign	authorities	are	acting	as	U.S.	agents.	See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	
Abu	Ali,	528	F.3d	210,	228	(4th	Cir.	2008),	cert.	denied	Ali	v.	United	States,	555	U.S.	
1170	(2009).	
	 128.	 E.g.,	United	States	v.	Maturo,	982	F.2d	57,	60–61	(2d	Cir.	1992);	United	States	
v.	Nagelberg,	434	F.2d	585,	587	n.1	(2d	Cir.	1970).	
	 129.	 Emmanuel,	565	F.3d	at	1330	(quoting	Birdsell	v.	United	States,	346	F.2d	775,	
782	n.10	(5th	Cir.	1965))	(citing	United	States	v.	Barona,	56	F.3d	1087,	1096	(9th	Cir.	
1995)).	
	 130.	 United	 States	 v.	 Mitro,	 880	 F.2d	 1480,	 1483–84	 (1st	 Cir.	 1989)	 (quoting	
Stephen	A.	 Saltzburg,	The	Reach	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 Beyond	 the	Terra	 Firma	 of	 the	
United	States,	20	VA.	J.	INT’L	L.	741,	775	(1980)).	
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“high	 bar.”131	 For	 instance,	 the	 Second	 Circuit	 has	 affirmed	 the	
admission	 of	 evidence	 that	may	 have	 been	 obtained	 by	 Israeli	 law	
enforcement	without	 a	warrant	 under	 Israeli	 law.132	 Or	 as	 another	
example,	the	Eleventh	Circuit	has	found	that	lack	of	Bahamian	judicial	
review	 by	 a	 neutral	 magistrate	 over	 wiretaps	 did	 not	 shock	 the	
conscience,	given	that	fundamental	international	norms	of	decency	do	
not	 require	 in	 all	 jurisdictions	 such	 review	 over	 applications	 to	
intercept	wire	communications.133	
Fifth	 Amendment	 interrogation	 jurisprudence	 similarly	
exemplifies	 the	 outlier	 approach.	 Interrogation	 abroad	 by	 foreign	
authorities	 does	 not	 require	 Miranda	 warnings,	 given	 that	 the	
Constitution	 cannot	 compel	 such	 foreign	 law	 enforcement	 conduct	
and,	 furthermore,	 U.S.	 court	 exclusion	 has	 little	 deterrent	 effect	 on	
foreign	police	practices.134	 But	 if	 the	U.S.	 government	 subsequently	
moves	to	admit	such	statements	into	evidence	in	a	domestic	criminal	
case,	 it	must	demonstrate	 that	such	statements	were	voluntary	and	
that	 the	methods	 for	 obtaining	 such	 statements	 did	 not	 “shock	 the	
conscience.”135	This	“shocks	the	conscience”	test	derives	from	the	Due	
Process	 Clauses	 of	 the	 Fifth	 and	 Fourteenth	 Amendments,136	 and	
courts	 use	 it	 as	 a	 backstop	 to	 ensure	 that	 “decencies	 of	 civilized	
conduct”	are	met	even	where	the	Constitution	would	not	ordinarily	
 
	 131.	 United	States	v.	Knowles,	No.	CR	12-266,	2015	WL	10890271,	at	*4	(D.D.C.	
Dec.	30,	2015)	(“Though	neither	the	Supreme	Court	nor	the	D.C.	Circuit	has	articulated	
a	clear	test	to	use	to	evaluate	whether	government	conduct	shocks	the	conscience,	the	
Supreme	Court	and	other	circuits	emphasize	the	high	bar	such	conduct	must	satisfy.”).	
	 132.	 United	States	v.	Getto,	729	F.3d	221,	229	(2d	Cir.	2013).	
	 133.	 Emmanuel,	565	F.3d	at	1331	(“But	it	is	clear	enough	that	the	conduct	of	the	
Bahamian	officials	does	not	shock	our	conscience.	Sergeant	Woodside’s	request	for	a	
wiretap	on	Emmanuel’s	telephones	went	through	four	levels	of	review	and	the	request	
had	to	be	renewed	every	14	days.”);	see	also	United	States	v.	Castrillon,	No.	S2	05	Cr.	
156(CM),	2007	WL	2398810,	at	*3	(S.D.N.Y.	Aug.	15,	2007)	(holding	that	“the	conduct	
identified	by	the	defendants	as	conscience-shocking-that	[sic]	Colombian	law	does	not	
require	 a	 neutral	 and	 detached	 magistrate	 to	 review	 wiretap	 applications	 [or]	 a	
showing	of	probable	cause	.	.	.	falls	far	short	of	that	standard”).	
	 134.	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Frank,	599	F.3d	1221,	1228	(11th	Cir.	2010);	United	
States	v.	Heller,	625	F.2d	594,	599	(5th	Cir.	1980).	
	 135.	 E.g.,	United	States	v.	Allen,	864	F.3d	63,	82	(2d	Cir.	2017)	(noting	that	while	
the	Fourth	Amendment	prohibits	unreasonable	 searches	and	seizures	 regardless	of	
whether	 the	 evidence	 is	 sought	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	 criminal	 trial,	 a	 Fifth	 Amendment	
violation	may	occur	only	if	a	statement	is	introduced	at	trial);	Casey	v.	Dep’t	of	State,	
980	 F.2d	 1472,	 1477	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 1992)	 (showing	 “great	 deference”	 to	 Costa	 Rica’s	
determination	of	extraditability	in	ruling	against	defendant	who	alleged	that	the	State	
Department	misrepresented	RICO	charges	as	being	drug	charges,	thereby	subjecting	
him	to	a	Costa	Rican	treaty’s	dual	criminality	provision,	whereas	RICO	charges	would	
not	have	the	same	effect	because	Costa	Rica	did	not	have	a	RICO	equivalent).	
	 136.	 See	Harbury	v.	Deutch,	233	F.3d	596,	602	(D.C.	Cir.	2000);	Rochin	v.	California,	
342	U.S.	165,	172–73	(1952).	
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apply.137	 For	 example,	 the	 Eleventh	 Circuit	 has	 found	 voluntary	 a	
statement	 that	 Cambodian	 law	 enforcement	 elicited	 when	 the	
defendant	was	interrogated	for	less	than	two	hours,	was	offered	food	
and	 water,	 was	 not	 beaten	 or	 threatened,	 and	 was	 “treated	 with	
respect.”138	Similarly,	the	Southern	District	of	New	York	has	found	that	
a	statement	given	 to	Colombian	 law	enforcement	did	not	shock	 the	
conscience	when	the	defendant	was	first	advised	of	his	rights	under	
Colombian	 law—which	 included	 the	 right	 to	 remain	 silent	 and	 the	
right	to	counsel—even	though	he	did	not	appear	to	have	waived	such	
rights	and	was	neither	informed	that	anything	he	said	could	be	used	
against	him	in	a	court	of	law,	nor	that	an	attorney	would	be	appointed	
for	him	if	he	could	not	afford	one.139	
These	 tests	 are	ad	hoc,	 fact-specific,	 and	 at	 times	 criticized.	As	
some	 scholars	 have	 noted,	 the	 meaning	 of	 “impracticable	 and	
anomalous”	 is	 unclear.140	 The	 U.S.	 District	 Court	 for	 the	 District	 of	
Columbia	 has	 noted	 that	 “neither	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 nor	 the	 D.C.	
Circuit	has	articulated	a	 clear	 test	 .	.	.	 to	 evaluate	whether	 [foreign]	
government	 conduct	 shocks	 the	 conscience”	 in	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment	context.141	And	some	judges	have	criticized	this	approach	
on	 the	 ground	 that	 it	 opens	 U.S.	 nationals	 up	 to	 the	 “vagaries”	 of	
foreign	criminal	justice	systems.142	
2.	 Judgments	Material	to	Sentencing	
U.S.	 courts	 also	 use	 an	 outlier	 approach	 at	 sentencing,	 asking	
whether	a	defendant’s	prior	conviction	 in	a	 foreign	country	may	be	
used	as	a	basis	for	upward	departure	of	the	U.S.	sentence.143	
 
	 137.	 United	States	v.	Abu	Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	338,	380	(E.D.	Va.	2005).	
	 138.	 Frank,	599	F.3d	at	1229.	
	 139.	 United	 States	 v.	 Lopez-Imitola,	 No.	 03	 CR.294,	 2004	 WL	 2534153,	 at	 *3	
(S.D.N.Y.	Nov.	9,	2004).	
	 140.	 See	Neuman,	supra	note	116,	at	391–92.	
	 141.	 United	States	v.	Knowles,	No.	12-266,	2015	WL	10890271,	at	*4	(D.D.C.	Dec.	
30,	2015).	
	 142.	 See,	 e.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	 Barona,	 56	 F.3d	 1087,	 1100	 (9th	 Cir.	 1995)	
(Reinhardt,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (“[W]hat	 the	 majority	 holds	 is	 that	 the	 only	 Fourth	
Amendment	protections	United	States	citizens	who	travel	abroad	enjoy	vis-a-vis	the	
United	 States	 government	 are	 those	 safeguards,	 if	 any,	 afforded	 by	 the	 laws	 of	 the	
foreign	nations	they	visit.”).	In	Barona,	the	majority	affirmed	the	admission	of	evidence	
obtained	in	Denmark	through	a	joint	venture	between	Danish	and	U.S.	authorities	as	
reasonable	 on	 the	basis	 that	 all	 authorities	 fully	 complied	with	Danish	 law	 in	 their	
investigation.	Id.	at	1096.	
	 143.	 A	 departure	 allows	 sentencing	 courts	 to	 impose	 sentences	 outside	 or	
otherwise	 different	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 guideline	 range,	 or—if	 the	 departure	 is	
based	on	inadequate	criminal	history—to	assign	a	different	criminal	history	category,	
allowing	 the	 court	 to	 impose	 a	 sentence	 outside	 the	 guideline	 range.	 OFF.	 OF	GEN.	
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At	 the	 federal	 level,	 although	 the	 U.S.	 Sentencing	 Guidelines	
specify	that	foreign	convictions	may	not	be	taken	into	account	when	
computing	a	defendant’s	criminal	history,	they	expressly	provide	that	
such	 convictions	 may	 be	 considered	 at	 sentencing	 “[i]f	 reliable	
information	indicates	that	the	defendant’s	criminal	history	category	
substantially	 under-represents	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 defendant’s	
criminal	history	or	the	likelihood	that	the	defendant	will	commit	other	
crimes.”144	Among	the	states,	considerable	differences	exist	regarding	
the	extent	 to	which	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	may	be	 recognized,	
particularly	in	the	context	of	repeat	offender	statutes.145	Some	state	
courts	 have	 insisted	 that	 prosecutors	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 foreign	
legal	 system	 in	 which	 a	 defendant	 was	 previously	 convicted	 is	
“fundamentally	fair,”146	but	most	have	been	willing	to	consider	foreign	
convictions	 when	 determining	 sentences	 without	 any	 such	
requirement	on	the	part	of	prosecutors.147	
When	the	government	moves	for	upward	departure	based	on	a	
foreign	conviction,	courts	virtually	always	reject	defendant	challenges	
to	 such	 upward	 departure.	 The	 variation	 in	 the	 case	 law	 is	 how	
specifically	 courts	 consider	 criminal	 procedural	 guarantees	 when	
doing	 so.	 Some	 courts,	 in	 addressing	 the	 use	 of	 foreign	 criminal	
convictions	 at	 sentencing,	 have	 rejected	 challenges	 to	 upward	
departure	 without	 addressing	 any	 specific	 procedural	 rights.148	 In	
 
COUNS.,	 U.S.	 SENT’G	 COMM’N,	 DEPARTURE	 AND	 VARIANCE	 PRIMER	 1,	 5	 (2014),	 https://	
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2014_Primer_Departure_Va
riance.pdf	[https://perma.cc/3C5P-ABL8].	
	 144.	 See	U.S.	SENT’G	GUIDELINES	MANUAL	§	4A1.3	 (U.S.	SENT’G	COMM’N	2018).	Such	
“information”	includes	“[p]rior	sentence(s)	not	used	in	computing	the	criminal	history	
category	(e.g.,	sentences	for	foreign	and	tribal	convictions).”	Id.	§	4A1.3(a)(2)(A);	see	
also	id.	§	4A1.2(h)	(“Sentences	resulting	from	foreign	convictions	are	not	counted,	but	
may	 be	 considered	 under	 §	4A1.3	 (Departures	 Based	 on	 Inadequacy	 of	 Criminal	
History	Category	(Policy	Statement)).”).	
	 145.	 As	 of	 1994,	 eight	 states	 expressly	 allowed	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 foreign	
judgments,	 twenty	 states	 disallowed	 it,	 and	 the	 remaining	 states	 had	 not	 clearly	
decided	 the	 issue.	 See	 Alex	 Glashausser,	 Note,	 The	 Treatment	 of	 Foreign	 Country	
Convictions	as	Predicates	for	Sentence	Enhancement	Under	Recidivist	Statutes,	44	DUKE	
L.J.	134,	139	(1994).	
	 146.	 See,	 e.g.,	 People	 v.	 Wallach,	 312	 N.W.2d	 387,	 404	 (Mich.	 Ct.	 App.	 1981)	
(holding	 that,	 before	 it	 could	 introduce	 evidence	 of	 a	 Canadian	 conviction	 for	
impeachment	purposes,	the	prosecution	had	the	burden	of	showing	that	the	Canadian	
legal	system	was	fundamentally	fair),	vacated	on	other	grounds,	331	N.W.2d	730	(Mich.	
1983).	
	 147.	 See,	 e.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	 Small,	 183	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 755,	 769	 (W.D.	 Pa.	 2002)	
(noting	that,	regardless	of	their	fairness,	the	procedures	used	by	a	foreign	prosecutor	
did	not	“cast	any	serious	doubt	on	the	accuracy	of	the	fact-finding	process”),	aff’d,	333	
F.3d	425	(3d	Cir.	2003),	rev’d	on	other	grounds,	544	U.S.	385	(2005).	
	 148.	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Fordham,	187	F.3d	344,	348	(3d	Cir.	1999)	(affirming	
lower	court’s	determination	that	Mexican	conviction	was	“fair”	for	purposes	of	upward	
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such	cases,	courts	have	even	affirmed	sentence	enhancements	based	
on	foreign	convictions	obtained	through	criminal	proceedings	starkly	
different	from	those	in	the	United	States.	In	United	States	v.	Ngombwa,	
for	example,	the	Eighth	Circuit	affirmed	the	U.S.	District	Court	for	the	
Northern	District	of	Iowa’s	use	of	Rwandan	“gacaca	court”	in	absentia	
convictions	 in	 its	upward	departure	at	sentencing,	 sidestepping	 the	
defendant’s	claims	that	such	courts	lack	due	process	and	procedural	
rights.149	 The	 district	 court	 found	 that,	 although	 such	 proceedings	
“lacked	 certain	 rights”	 guaranteed	 domestically,	 expert	 testimony	
regarding	 the	 various	 procedural	 protections	 that	 were	 in	 place	
assured	 the	 court	 that	 such	proceedings	were	 “procedurally	 fair	 to	
accused	individuals,”	using	as	indicia	“a	healthy	ratio	of	acquittals	to	
convictions.”150	This	is	quite	astounding,	given	the	community-based	
gacaca	courts	lack	any	right	to	counsel,	the	presumption	of	innocence	
is	pressured,	and	in	many	cases	defendants	learn	of	the	nature	of	the	
allegations	against	them	only	on	the	day	of	their	trial.151	Indeed,	the	
United	States	lacks	a	formal	extradition	treaty	with	Rwanda.152	As	will	
be	 seen	 below,	 this	 suggests	 a	 lack	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 country’s	
criminal	justice	system.	
Other	courts	may	reference	the	“fundamental	fairness”	standard	
derived	from	the	Fourteenth	Amendment’s	due	process	clause.153	As	
 
departure	despite	uncertainty	regarding	whether	“Mexican	authorities	adhered	to	due	
process	in	sentencing	the	defendant”);	United	States	v.	Soliman,	889	F.2d	441,	445	(2d	
Cir.	 1989)	 (affirming	 upward	 departure	 based	 on	 defendant’s	 previous	 Italian	
conviction	 because	 trial	 judge	 was	 fully	 apprised	 of	 the	 “possible	 constitutional	
infirmities”	of	the	foreign	judgment);	see	also	Brice	v.	Pickett,	515	F.2d	153,	154	(9th	
Cir.	 1975)	 (“Even	 if	 .	.	.	 [defendant]	 could	 prove	 that	 the	 foreign	 conviction	 was	
obtained	 in	 proceedings	 which	 if	 conducted	 in	 this	 country	 would	 be	 violative	 of	
United	States	constitutional	guarantees,	we	find	no	requirement	that	a	foreign	court’s	
proceedings	or	conviction	must	conform	to	United	States	constitutional	standards.”).	
	 149.	 893	F.3d	546,	556	(8th	Cir.	2018);	see	also	United	States	v.	Ngombwa,	No.	14-
CR-123-LRR,	2017	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	17373,	at	*66	n.8	(N.D.	Iowa	Feb.	7,	2017).	
	 150.	 Ngombwa,	2017	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	17373,	at	*66	n.8.;	see	also	Maya	Goldstein	
Bolocan,	Rwandan	Gacaca:	An	Experiment	 in	Transitional	 Justice,	2004	J.	DISP.	RESOL.	
355,	381	(noting	gacaca	 courts’	 lack	of	competent	 judges,	prosecutors,	and	defense	
counsel).	
	 151.	 See	 HUM.	 RTS.	 WATCH,	 JUSTICE	 COMPROMISED:	 THE	 LEGACY	 OF	 RWANDA’S	
COMMUNITY-BASED	 GACACA	 COURTS	 27–65	 (2011)	 (reviewing	 gacaca	 procedure	 and	
arguable	 violations	 of	 the	 right	 to	 counsel,	 presumption	 of	 innocence,	 right	 to	 be	
informed	of	the	case	and	to	have	time	to	prepare	a	defense,	right	to	present	a	defense,	
right	 to	 testify	 in	 one’s	 defense	 and	 the	 right	 against	 self-incrimination,	 protection	
from	double	jeopardy,	the	right	to	be	present	at	one’s	own	trial,	and	the	right	not	to	be	
arbitrarily	detained).	
	 152.	 See	18	U.S.C.	§	3181	(listing	U.S.	extradition	treaty	partners).	
	 153.	 See,	 e.g.,	United	States	v.	Wilson,	556	F.2d	1177,	1178	 (4th	Cir.	1977)	 (per	
curiam)	 (“The	 only	 question	 here	 is	 whether	 the	 German	 legal	 system	 is	 so	
fundamentally	 unfair	 that	 a	 conviction	 obtained	 under	 it	 is	 inadmissible.	 The	
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noted	 above,	 the	 “fundamental	 fairness”	 inquiry—by	 which	 courts	
evaluate	whether	a	given	criminal	procedural	rule	is	consistent	with	
due	 process—typically	 proceeds	 by	 considering	whether	 the	 given	
right	 is	 contrary	 to	 “a	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 liberty	 and	 justice	
which	 inheres	 in	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 a	 free	 government	 and	 is	 the	
inalienable	right	of	a	citizen	of	such	a	government.”154	For	example,	in	
United	 States	 v.	 Kole,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 held	 that	 a	 prior	 Philippine	
conviction	in	which	the	defendant	was	denied	the	right	to	a	jury	trial	
was	 nonetheless	 consistent	 with	 fundamental	 fairness,	 as	 the	
Philippine	court’s	 judgment	reflected	“the	kind	of	careful,	searching	
analysis	of	evidence	that	one	would	expect	.	.	.	in	the	United	States.”155	
Applying	 the	 “fundamental	 fairness”	 standard	 derived	 from	 the	
Fourteenth	Amendment’s	Due	Process	Clause,	 courts	have	 typically	
found	 upward	 departure	 appropriate	 in	 such	 cases.156	 In	 general,	
courts	are	most	likely	to	affirm	upward	departure	based	on	a	foreign	
conviction	when	presented	with	reliable	information	concerning	the	
defendant’s	conduct	that	formed	the	basis	of	the	foreign	conviction.157	
In	terms	of	specific	procedural	rights,	courts	have	considered	foreign	
 
defendant	 has	 not	 shown	 that	 the	 German	 legal	 system	 lacks	 the	 procedural	
protections	necessary	for	fundamental	fairness.”).	
	 154.	 See	Twining	v.	New	Jersey,	211	U.S.	78,	106	(1908),	overruled	on	other	grounds	
by	Malloy	v.	Hogan,	378	U.S.	1	(1964).	
	 155.	 164	F.3d	164,	175	(3d	Cir.	1998).	
	 156.	 See	also	United	States	v.	McKeeve,	131	F.3d	1,	10	(1st	Cir.	1997)	(admitting	
foreign-administered	deposition	that	“did	not	comport	in	all	respects	with	American	
practice”	under	the	former	testimony	hearsay	exception	of	Federal	Rules	of	Evidence	
804(b)(1)	on	the	basis	that	“the	manner	of	examination	required	by	the	law	of	the	host	
nation	 .	.	.	 [was	 compatible]	 with	 our	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 fairness”).	 But	 see	
United	 States	 v.	 Moskovits,	 784	 F.	 Supp.	 183,	 190	 (E.D.	 Pa.	 1991)	 (“[W]e	 cannot	
countenance	reliance	on	a	foreign	criminal	conviction	where	it	can	be	said,	on	the	basis	
of	the	record	made,	that	there	was	a	failure	to	provide	for	counsel	at	crucial	stages	of	
the	process.”).	
	 157.	 In	 United	 States	 v.	 Delmarle,	 for	 instance,	 motivating	 the	 Second	 Circuit’s	
affirmation	of	the	use	of	an	Italian	in	absentia	conviction	was	a	reliable	record	of	the	
conduct	underlying	the	judgment.	99	F.3d	80,	85–86	(2d	Cir.	1996)	(“The	events	 .	.	.	
had	been	investigated	by	both	an	Italian	agency	and	the	United	States	Military	Police.	
The	 court	 considered	 the	 investigative	 report	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Military	 Police,	
which	 was	 accompanied	 by	 extensive	 documentation	 .	.	.	.”	 (internal	 quotations	
omitted));	 see	 also	 United	 States	 v.	 Ngombwa,	 No.	 14-CR-123-LRR,	 2017	 U.S.	 Dist.	
LEXIS	17373,	at	*66	(N.D.	Iowa	Feb.	7,	2017)	(“[T]he	court	finds	that	the	eyewitness	
reports	of	Defendant’s	acts	of	violence—bolstered	by	his	convictions	in	two	separate	
[Rwandan]	 courts—constitute	 ‘reliable	 information’	 indicating	 that	 Defendant’s	
classification	 in	 Criminal	 History	 Category	 I	 under-represents	 the	 severity	 of	 his	
criminal	history.”);	United	States	v.	Small,	183	F.	Supp.	2d	755,	769	(W.D.	Pa.	2002),	
aff’d,	333	F.3d	425	(2003),	rev’d,	544	U.S.	385	(2005)	(“Although	[violating	defendant’s	
right	 to	 remain	 silent]	 would	 be	 highly	 improper	 in	 a	 criminal	 prosecution	 in	 the	
United	States,	we	cannot	say	that	the	prosecutor’s	actions	cast	any	serious	doubt	on	
the	accuracy	of	the	fact-finding	process	.	.	.	.”	(emphasis	added)).	
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convictions	 obtained	 without	 assistance	 of	 counsel,158	 convictions	
obtained	 without	 the	 right	 to	 a	 jury	 trial,159	 and	 perhaps	 more	
dramatically,	convictions	obtained	in	absentia.160	
3.	 Extradition	
Extradition	is	where	the	U.S.	facilitation	of	foreign	prosecutions	
is	 at	 its	 apex.	 In	 this	 context,	 courts	 advance	 an	 outlier	 test	 when	
evaluating	foreign	criminal	justice	systems,	due	in	part	to	antecedent	
political	branch	action.	
The	 political	 branches	 are	 the	 first	 to	 engage	 in	 criminal	
procedural	 line	 drawing	 when	 they	 negotiate	 bilateral	 extradition	
treaties.	Under	Title	18	of	the	U.S.	Code,	such	a	treaty	is	necessary	to	
extradite	 a	 person	 out	 of	 the	 United	 States.161	 The	 U.S.	 political	
branches	have	thus	concluded	such	bilateral	extradition	treaties	with	
dozens	 of	 other	 countries.162	 In	 so	 doing,	 they	 act	 as	 criminal	
procedural	 gatekeepers,	 assessing	 other	 countries’	 criminal	 justice	
systems	 before	 entering	 mutually	 binding	 international	 legal	
obligations	to	extradite	to	and	from	that	country.	So,	for	example,	the	
United	States	has	ratified	extradition	treaties	with	France	and	Japan,	
but	not	with	Russia	or	China.163		
What	 exactly	 do	 the	 political	 branches	 assess	 in	 a	 potential	
extradition	 treaty	 partner?	Unfortunately,	 public	 statements	 in	 this	
regard	are	quite	sparse.	To	be	sure,	the	branches	do	not	require	the	
identical,	 finely-tuned	 constellation	 of	 U.S.	 rights.	 The	 majority	 of	
treaty	 partners	 are	 civil	 law	 countries,	 meaning	 they	 are	 non-
adversarial	 and	 thus	 procedurally	 distinct	 from	 common	 law	
jurisdictions.164	Indeed,	pursuant	to	these	treaties,	U.S.	nationals	may	
 
	 158.	 United	States	v.	Concha,	294	F.3d	1248,	1254–55	(10th	Cir.	2002);	Houle	v.	
United	States,	493	F.2d	915,	915–16	(5th	Cir.	1974)	(per	curiam).	
	 159.	 Kole,	164	F.3d	164,	165–66	(3d	Cir.	1998);	Small,	183	F.	Supp.	2d	at	768.	
	 160.	 Delmarle,	99	F.3d	at	85–86;	United	States	v.	Fleishman,	684	F.2d	1329,	1345	
(9th	Cir.	1982),	rev’d,	United	States	v.	Ibarra-Alcarez,	830	F.2d	968	(9th	Cir.	1987).	
	 161.	 See	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	 3181(a)	 (“The	 provisions	 of	 this	 chapter	 relating	 to	 the	
surrender	of	persons	who	have	committed	crimes	in	foreign	countries	shall	continue	
in	 force	 only	 during	 the	 existence	 of	 any	 treaty	 of	 extradition	 with	 such	 foreign	
government.”).	But	see	id.	§	3184	(permitting	the	United	States	to	extradite,	without	
regard	to	the	existence	of	a	treaty,	non-U.S.	persons	who	commit	crimes	of	violence	
against	United	States	nationals	in	foreign	countries).	
	 162.	 Id.	§	3181	(listing	the	countries	with	which	the	United	States	has	extradition	
agreements).	
	 163.	 Id.	
	 164.	 Compare	id.	(listing	the	countries	with	which	the	United	States	has	extradition	
agreements),	 with	 Field	 Listing:	 Legal	 Systems,	 CIA,	 https://www.cia.gov/library/	
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/308.html	[https://perma.cc/U2TM-TZYS]	
(listing	all	countries	by	legal	systems).	
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be	extradited	to	countries	lacking	a	right	to	trial	by	jury,165	in	which	
defendants	 lack	 the	 same	 robust	 ability	 to	 confront	 witnesses,166	
evidence	may	be	admitted	even	though	the	underlying	warrant	was	
issued	on	less	than	probable	cause,167	or	where	hearsay	evidence	is	
generally	admitted	in	the	investigating	judge’s	pre-trial	dossier	at	the	
outset	 of	 criminal	 proceedings.168	 Even	 after	 conclusion	 of	 the	
extradition	 treaty,	 executive	 branch	 extradition	 practice	 also	
demonstrates	some	critical	evaluation	of	foreign	criminal	procedure.	
For	 example,	 many	 civil	 law	 countries	 convict	 in	 absentia,	 i.e.,	 in	
instances	 where	 a	 criminal	 defendant	 is	 at	 large	 and	 thus	 not	
physically	 present	 at	 trial.169	 For	 the	 U.S.	 executive	 branch,	 such	 a	
conviction	is	a	step	too	far:	if	a	foreign	country	convicts	a	defendant	in	
absentia	and	such	defendant	is	located	in	U.S.	territory,	the	executive	
will	 request—as	 a	 condition	 precedent	 to	 extradition—that	 the	
individual	be	given	a	new	trial	upon	return	to	that	country.170	
We	might	expect	 the	 judiciary	to	police	the	boundaries	of	such	
executive	action.171	But	the	U.S.	 judiciary	has	crafted	a	“rule	of	non-
inquiry,”	meaning	courts	will	not	look	deeper	into	a	foreign	country’s	
 
	 165.	 See	generally	Valerie	P.	Hans,	 Jury	Systems	Around	the	World,	4	ANN.	REV.	L.	
SOC.	SCI.	275	(2008)	(surveying	the	various	forms	of	jury	trial	worldwide).	
	 166.	 See	 Lorena	 Bachmaier,	 Rights	 and	 Methods	 to	 Challenge	 Evidence	 and	
Witnesses	in	Civil	Law	Jurisdictions,	in	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	OF	CRIMINAL	PROCESS	841,	
853	(Darryl	K.	Brown,	Jenia	I.	Turner	&	Bettina	Weisser	eds.,	2019);	see	also	Abraham	
S.	Goldstein	&	Martin	Marcus,	The	Myth	of	Judicial	Supervision	in	Three	“Inquisitorial”	
Systems:	 France,	 Italy,	 and	 Germany,	 87	 YALE	 L.J.	 240,	 242	 n.7	 (1977)	 (“Some	 have	
suggested	that	the	judge’s	role	in	questioning	the	defendant	and	witnesses	at	trial	is	
the	most	distinctive	feature	of	the	[inquisitorial]	system.”).	
	 167.	 See	Christopher	Slobogin,	An	Empirically	Based	Comparison	of	American	and	
European	Regulatory	Approaches	 to	Police	 Investigation,	22	MICH.	J.	INT’L	L.	423,	426	
(2001)	(noting	that	England,	France,	and	Germany	issue	warrants	without	requiring	
probable	 cause	 and	 that	 European	 countries	 do	 not	 use	 exclusion	 as	 often	 to	
counteract	illegal	searches	and	seizures).	
	 168.	 See	Goldstein,	supra	note	166	(“[T]he	judge	is	expected	to	carry	the	factfinding	
initiative	at	trial,	using	the	file	(dossier)	prepared	during	the	pretrial	investigation	by	
an	 examining	 judge	 (or	 magistrate)	 or	 public	 prosecutor.”).	 See	 generally	 JOHN	H.	
LANGBEIN,	COMPARATIVE	CRIMINAL	PROCEDURE:	GERMANY	(1977)	(surveying	the	German	
system	of	criminal	procedure).	
	 169.	 See	Anne	L.	Quintal,	Rule	61:	The	“Voice	of	the	Victims”	Screams	out	for	Justice,	
36	COLUM.	J.	TRANSNAT’L	L.	723,	739	(1998).	
	 170.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Leslie	 Anderson,	 Protecting	 the	 Rights	 of	 the	 Requested	 Person	 in	
Extradition	Proceedings:	An	Argument	for	a	Humanitarian	Exception,	4	MICH.	J.	INT’L	L.	
153,	155–56	(1983)	(describing	an	instance	where	the	United	States	requested	a	new	
trial	upon	granting	extradition).	
	 171.	 See	John	Parry,	The	Lost	History	of	International	Extradition	Litigation,	43	VA.	
J.	INT’L	L.	93,	94–95	(2002)	(“[A]	citizen	accused	of	crimes	in	another	country	might	
seek	comfort	in	the	protections	of	due	process	.	.	.	.	[But	the]	extradition	process	does	
not	live	up	to	such	expectations	.	.	.	.”).	
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criminal	 process	 notwithstanding	 possible	 humanitarian	 concerns,	
deferring	instead	to	the	executive’s	evaluation	pursuant	to	its	Article	
II	power	and	the	requirement	of	an	extradition	treaty	pursuant	to	18	
U.S.C.	§	3181(a).172	Courts	also	cite	to	the	Secretary	of	State’s	ultimate	
discretion	not	 to	 issue	 a	 surrender	warrant	 in	 instances	where	 the	
fugitive	 has	 shown	 that	 he	 or	 she	would	 be	 tortured	 or	 otherwise	
denied	 the	 requisite	 process	 abroad.173	 Whether	 explicitly	 or	 not,	
courts	assume	that	they	are	“bound	by	the	existence	of	an	extradition	
treaty	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 trial	 will	 be	 fair.”174	 On	 occasion,	 the	
judiciary	has	 recognized	 a	 limit	 to	 this	 deference.	 For	 example,	 the	
Second	 Circuit	 has	 expressed	 “disquiet”	 over	 this	 doctrine,	
recognizing	 possible	 “situations	 where	 [an	 extraditee]	 would	 be	
subject	 to	 procedures	 or	 punishment	 so	 antipathetic	 to	 a	 federal	
court’s	sense	of	decency	as	to	require	reexamination.	.	.	.”175	However,	
courts	rarely	ever	pierce	this	veil,	typically	opting	to	instead	defer.176	
 
	 172.	 See,	e.g.,	Hoxha	v.	Levi,	465	F.3d	554,	563	(3d	Cir.	2006)	(denying	habeas	relief	
despite	 petitioner’s	 claims	 that	 he	 would	 be	 tortured	 if	 extradited	 because	 “such	
humanitarian	 considerations	 are	 within	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 executive	 branch	 and	
generally	should	not	be	addressed	by	the	courts”).	
	 173.	 See	Lopez-Smith	v.	Hood,	121	F.3d	1322,	1327	(9th	Cir.	1997)	(“[U]nder	what	
is	called	the	‘rule	of	non-inquiry’	in	extradition	law,	courts	in	this	country	refrain	from	
examining	the	penal	systems	of	requesting	nations,	 leaving	to	the	Secretary	of	State	
determinations	of	whether	the	defendant	is	likely	to	be	treated	humanely.”).	As	noted	
above,	 such	 deference	 also	 implicates	 foreign	 substantive	 criminal	 law.	 Individuals	
may	also	be	extradited	to	other	countries	and	prosecuted	for	crimes	that	would	not	
constitute	criminal	conduct	within	the	United	States.	In	re	Extradition	of	Demjanjuk,	
612	 F.	 Supp.	 544,	 569	 (N.D.	 Ohio	 1985)	 (“If	 the	 extradition	 treaty	 so	 provides,	 the	
United	States	may	surrender	a	person	to	be	prosecuted	for	acts	which	are	not	crimes	
in	 the	 United	 States.”);	 Factor	 v.	 Laubenheimer,	 290	 U.S.	 276,	 293	 (1933)	
(“Considerations	which	 should	 govern	 the	diplomatic	 relations	 between	nations	 .	.	.	
require	that	their	obligations	should	be	liberally	construed	so	as	to	effect	the	apparent	
intention	of	the	parties	to	secure	equality	and	reciprocity	between	them.”).	
	 174.	 Glucksman	v.	Henkel,	221	U.S.	508,	512	(1911).	
	 175.	 Gallina	v.	Fraser,	278	F.2d	77,	79	(2d	Cir.	1960)	(“We	can	imagine	situations	
where	the	relator,	upon	extradition,	would	be	subject	to	procedures	or	punishment	so	
antipathetic	to	a	federal	court’s	sense	of	decency	as	to	require	reexamination	of	the	
principle	set	out	above.”).	
	 176.	 Indeed,	it	appears	that	the	few	occasions	where	courts	appeared	to	chip	away	
at	 the	 rule	 of	 non-inquiry	 have	 since	 been	 overruled.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Cornejo-Barreto	 v.	
Seifert,	 218	 F.3d	 1004,	 1007	 (9th	 Cir.	 2000)	 (concluding	 that	 an	 individual	 facing	
extradition	who	claims	he	will	be	subjected	to	torture	in	the	requesting	country	may,	
under	 habeas	 corpus,	 petition	 for	 review	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 decision	 to	
extradite),	overruled	by	Trinidad	y	Garcia	v.	Thomas	683	F.3d	952,	957	(9th	Cir.	2012)	
(en	banc)	(“The	doctrine	of	separation	of	powers	and	the	rule	of	non-inquiry	block	any	
inquiry	into	the	substance	of	the	Secretary[]	[of	State’s]	declaration.	To	the	extent	that	
we	have	previously	implied	greater	judicial	review	of	the	substance	of	the	Secretary’s	
extradition	decision	other	than	compliance	with	her	obligations	under	domestic	law,	
we	overrule	that	precedent.”	(citations	omitted));	In	re	Burt,	737	F.2d	1477,	1484	(7th	
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Judicial	 reticence	 in	 this	 area	may	 stem	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
United	States’	duties	to	its	own	nationals	in	extraditions	are	unclear,	
falling	 between	 the	 twin	 doctrinal	 pillars	 of	 domestic	 criminal	
procedural	 violations	 and	 extradition	 prohibitions	 in	 cases	 of	
torture.177	 On	 one	 hand,	 any	 such	 foreign	 criminal	 process	 would	
clearly	violate	constitutionally	guaranteed	procedural	rights	were	it	
to	apply	in	a	domestic	U.S.	case.178	On	the	other	hand,	the	United	States	
has	 an	 absolute	 obligation	 not	 to	 extradite	 individuals	 to	 countries	
where	 they	 will	 be	 tortured.	 The	 principle	 of	 non-refoulement	
prohibits	the	expulsion	of	a	refugee	to	a	country	where	she	may	be	
persecuted.179		
Notably,	 several	 international	 instruments,	 including	 the	
Convention	Against	Torture	and	Other	Cruel,	Inhuman	or	Degrading	
Treatment	or	Punishment	(CAT),	explicitly	obligate	states	to	abide	by	
this	principle.180	Therefore,	as	party	to	the	ICCPR	and	CAT,	the	United	
 
Cir.	1984)	(“[F]ederal	courts	undertaking	habeas	corpus	review	of	extraditions	have	
the	authority	to	consider	the	substantive	conduct	of	the	United	States	in	undertaking	
its	 decision	 to	 extradite	 if	 such	 conduct	 violates	 constitutional	 rights.”),	 partially	
overruled	by	Venckiene	v.	United	States,	929	F.3d	843,	860	(7th	Cir.	2019).	
	 177.	 To	 be	 clear,	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 should	 not	 be	 misunderstood	 as	
suggesting	that	the	executive	branch	enjoys	unfettered	discretion	to	extradite	at	will.	
The	 judiciary	does	exercise	authority	over	 the	executive	branch	 in	 individual	 cases:	
inter	alia,	it	must	certify	that	DOJ	has	probable	cause	that	the	fugitive	has	committed	
the	alleged	crime	abroad.	See	RONALD	J.	HEDGES,	INTERNATIONAL	EXTRADITION:	A	GUIDE	
FOR	JUDGES	10	(2014)	(“[T]he	central	issue	[is]	whether	there	is	competent	evidence	to	
establish	 probable	 cause	 that	 the	 fugitive	 committed	 the	 offenses	 underlying	 the	
request	for	extradition.”).	But	before	any	such	case	reaches	such	judicial	review,	the	
political	branches	must	have	concluded	a	bilateral	extradition	treaty	with	the	foreign	
country.	 See	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	 3181(a)	 (“The	 provisions	 of	 this	 chapter	 relating	 to	 the	
surrender	of	persons	who	have	committed	crimes	in	foreign	countries	shall	continue	
in	 force	 only	 during	 the	 existence	 of	 any	 treaty	 of	 extradition	 with	 such	 foreign	
government.”).	And	once	the	political	branches	reach	such	a	conclusion,	the	judiciary	
construes	questions	regarding	foreign	criminal	process	to	be	a	foreign	affairs	matter.	
	 178.	 And,	of	course,	a	foreign	country’s	arrest	of	a	U.S.	national	present	in	a	foreign	
country	 would	 not	 explicitly	 trigger	 any	 U.S.	 duties	 to	 its	 nationals.	 See	 Arrest	 or	
Detention	of	a	U.S.	Citizen	Abroad,	U.S.	DEP’T	STATE,	https://travel.state.gov/content/	
travel/en/international-travel/emergencies/arrest-detention.html	[https://perma	
.cc/S95L-VFZM]	(explaining	the	limited	services	the	U.S.	government	can	provide	to	
arrested	citizens).	
	 179.	 The	 United	 States	 has,	 at	 times,	 nonetheless	 done	 so,	 depending	 upon	
diplomatic	assurances	before	transferring	 individuals	 to	countries	where	they	were	
likely	to	be	tortured.	Jonathan	Horowitz,	Fatally	Flawed	Anti-Torture	Assurances,	JUST	
SEC.	 (June	 13,	 2017),	 https://www.justsecurity.org/42009/fatally-flawed-anti	
-torture-assurances	[https://perma.cc/FL83-MXVF].	
	 180.	 CAT,	 supra	 note	 104,	 at	 114;	 see	 The	 Principle	 of	 Non-Refoulment	 Under	
International	 Human	 Rights	 Law,	 OFF.	 HIGH	 COMM’R	 FOR	 HUM.	 RTS.,	 https://www	
.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon
-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf	[https://perma.cc/X8N3	
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States	 will	 not	 deport	 someone	 to	 a	 country	 where	 she	 will	 be	
tortured,	 even	 giving	 that	 person	 asylum	 in	 certain	 cases.181	 These	
cases	 lie	 in	 the	middle:	 state	 action	 clearly	 exists	 because	 the	 U.S.	
government	 is	 physically	 taking	 custody	 of	 individuals	 and	moving	
them	across	borders,	and	yet	the	alleged	violations	of	individual	rights	
abroad	clearly	do	not	implicate	affirmative	negative	obligations	on	the	
state,	such	as	those	mandated	in	the	CAT.182	
Finally,	 U.S.	 courts	 differ	 regarding	 the	 weight	 to	 be	 given	 to	
foreign	convictions	in	absentia	when	determining	whether	a	foreign	
state	has	demonstrated	probable	cause	to	arrest	an	individual	within	
the	 United	 States.183	 Many	 U.S.	 courts	 have	 historically	 considered	
such	convictions	merely	as	charges	and	therefore	have	required	some	
independent	showing	of	probable	cause.184	Other	courts,	particularly	
in	recent	years,	have	held	that	convictions	in	absentia	can	conclusively	
establish	 probable	 cause.185	 In	 any	 case,	 that	 a	 defendant	 was	
 
-992S].	
	 181.	 See	ICCPR,	supra	note	96,	at	175;	CAT,	supra	note	103,	at	114;	see	also	Jeffrey	
G.	 Johnston,	 The	 Risk	 of	 Torture	 as	 a	 Basis	 for	 Refusing	 Extradition	 and	 the	 Use	 of	
Diplomatic	Assurances	to	Protect	Against	Torture	After	9/11,	11	INT’L	CRIM.	L.	REV.	1,	5–
6	(2011)	(noting	 that	both	 the	 ICCPR	and	the	CAT	would	be	violated	 if	a	requested	
country	extradited	a	defendant	to	a	country	wherein	they	would	be	tortured).	These	
duties	also	stem	from	international	legal	obligations	and	the	1967	Protocol	Relating	to	
the	Status	of	Refugees.	See	Protocol	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees,	Jan.	31,	1967,	
19	 U.S.T.	 6223,	 606	 U.N.T.S.	 267;	 Comm.	 Against	 Torture,	 General	 Comment	 No.	 4	
(2017)	on	the	Implementation	of	Article	3	of	the	Convention	in	the	Context	of	Article	
22,	 ¶	 18,	 U.N.	 Doc.	 CAT/C/GC/4	 (Sept.	 4,	 2018)	 (listing	 preventive	 measures	 to	
guarantee	the	principle	of	non-refoulement).	
	 182.	 As	will	be	discussed	in	Part	II,	infra,	this	ambiguity	underscores	a	broader	lack	
of	theory	regarding	U.S.	obligations—in	criminal	 justice	and	more	broadly—beyond	
those	encompassed	in	a	social	contract,	citizenship-based	conception	of	legal	duties.	
See	Noah	Feldman,	Cosmopolitan	Law?,	116	YALE	L.J.	1022,	1050–52	(2007).	
	 183.	 See	generally	Roberto	Iraola,	Foreign	Extradition	and	in	Absentia	Convictions,	
39	SETON	HALL	L.	REV.	843	(2009).	
	 184.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Arambasic	 v.	 Ashcroft,	 403	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 951,	 962	 (D.S.D.	 2005);	
Germany	v.	United	States,	No.	06-CV-01201,	2007	WL	2581894,	at	*7	(E.D.N.Y.	Sept.	5,	
2007);	In	re	Extradition	of	Ernst,	No.	97	CRIM.MISC.1	PG.22,	1998	WL	395267,	at	*7–
10	 (S.D.N.Y.	 July	 14,	 1998)	 (finding	 probable	 cause	 to	 extradite	 lacking	 when	
prosecution	presented	only	the	decision	of	a	Swiss	court,	which	failed	to	describe	the	
basis	for	its	decision);	see	also	Note,	Foreign	Trials	in	Absentia:	Due	Process	Objections	
to	 Unconditional	 Extradition,	 13	 STAN.	 L.	 REV.	 370,	 377	 (1961)	 (“The	 established	
practice	in	the	United	States	and	most	other	countries	.	.	.	is	that	a	person	convicted	in	
absentia	is	not	treated	as	a	person	convicted,	but	as	a	person	charged.”).	
	 185.	 See,	 e.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	 Avdic,	 No.	 CR.	 07-M06,	 2007	WL	 1875778,	 at	 *8	
(D.S.D.	 June	 28,	 2007)	 (finding	 probable	 cause	 to	 extradite	 based	 on	 Bosnian	
conviction	in	absentia	when	“an	independent	judicial	officer	in	the	requesting	country	
heard	 the	 evidence	 and	 found	 it	 sufficient	 to	 convict”);	 United	 States	 v.	 Bogue,	No.	
CRIM.A.	98-572-M,	1998	WL	966070,	at	*2	(E.D.	Pa.	Oct.	13,	1998)	(“A	determination	
of	the	French	government’s	procedural	fairness	in	undertaking	the	petitioner’s	trial	in	
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convicted	by	a	foreign	country	in	absentia	does	not	warrant	a	denial	
of	extradition,	even	when	the	defendant	may	not	be	afforded	a	new	
trial	by	 the	 requesting	 state,	 as	 is	 typically	 the	 case.186	 In	Gallina	v.	
Fraser,	the	defendant	was	found	extraditable	to	Italy	on	the	basis	of	
two	in	absentia	convictions.187	In	rejecting	the	defendant’s	contention	
that	a	finding	of	extraditability	violated	his	due	process	rights	because	
he	would	be	 returned	directly	 to	prison	without	a	 trial,	 the	Second	
Circuit	noted	that	it	could	find	“no	case	authorizing	a	federal	court,	in	
a	habeas	corpus	proceeding	challenging	extradition	from	the	United	
States	to	a	foreign	nation,	to	inquire	into	the	procedures	which	await	
the	[defendant]	upon	extradition.”188	The	court	further	observed	that	
the	case	law	holding	that	convictions	in	absentia	should	be	treated	as	
a	charge	was	“not	to	be	construed	as	a	statement	that	[a]	federal	court	
may,	 as	 a	 condition	 for	 discharging	 the	 writ,	 require	 retrial	 in	 the	
foreign	country.”189	
To	sum	up,	pursuant	to	the	outlier	approach,	courts	deploy	an	ad	
hoc,	retrospective,	generalized	assessment	of	foreign	criminal	justice	
systems.	 The	 courts	 have	 used	 a	 number	 of	 flexible	 tests	 when	
evaluating	criminal	procedural	rights	both	in	the	course	of	conviction	
and	in	sentencing.190	On	the	one	hand,	every	defendant	is	guaranteed	
minimum	 standards	 of	 “civilized	 conduct,”	 regardless	 of	 whether	
other	constitutional	provisions	apply.191	On	the	other	hand,	the	courts	
exclude	 rights	 that	 are	 sufficiently	 “impracticable”	 and	 deny	
protection	to	defendants	lacking	sufficient	“connection”	to	the	United	
States.192	Each	of	these	tests	is	highly	fact-specific,	and	the	Supreme	
Court	has	not	established	a	particular	structure	for	courts	to	take	in	
their	 approach	 to	 these	 questions.	 Regarding	 foreign	 evidence—
including	 fruits	 of	 extraterritorial	 searches	 and	 foreign	
 
his	absence	.	.	.	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Court’s	review.”).	
	 186.	 Iraola,	supra	note	183,	at	857–58.	
	 187.	 Gallina	v.	Fraser,	278	F.2d	77,	78	(2d	Cir.	1960).	
	 188.	 Id.	
	 189.	 Id.	at	78–79.	What	the	case	law	stood	for,	according	to	the	court,	was	merely	
that	 an	 in	 absentia	 conviction	 does	 not	 preclude	 a	 district	 court	 from	 making	 an	
independent	 probable	 cause	 determination	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 evidence	 presented	
justifies	a	reasonable	belief	that	the	fugitive	committed	the	crime	for	which	extradition	
is	sought.	See	id.	At	the	time	Gallina	was	decided,	in	two	of	the	seven	reported	cases	
concerning	extradition	for	defendants	convicted	in	absentia,	the	courts	discharged	the	
defendant,	finding	the	evidence	insufficient	to	support	even	an	indictment.	See	Note,	
supra	note	184,	at	377	n.31.	
	 190.	 See	supra	Parts	I.B.1–2.	
	 191.	 See	United	States	v.	Abu	Ali,	395	F.	Supp.	2d	338,	380	(E.D.	Va.	2005)	(quoting	
County	 of	 Sacramento	 v.	 Lewis,	 523	U.S.	 833,	 846	 (1998));	 supra	 notes	 18–19	 and	
accompanying	text.	
	 192.	 See	supra	notes	122–29	and	accompanying	text.	
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interrogations193—evidence	 is	 admitted	 unless	 it	 falls	 under	 an	
outlier	 test	 such	 as	 “shocking	 the	 judicial	 conscience.”	 When	
considering	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 upward	
departure	 at	 sentencing,	 there	 are	 few,	 if	 any,	 procedural	 rights	on	
which	U.S.	 courts	 insist	 a	 foreign	 conviction	must	 safeguard.194	U.S.	
courts	have	affirmed	the	use	of	foreign	judgments	that	were	obtained	
without	the	right	to	counsel,195	the	right	against	self-incrimination,196	
and,	most	frequently,	the	right	to	a	jury	trial.197	Similarly,	concerning	
extradition,	U.S.	courts	have	found	probable	cause	to	extradite	based	
on	foreign	convictions	obtained	in	absentia,	even	when	no	guarantees	
exist	that	the	convicted	party	will	receive	a	new	trial	upon	arrival	to	
the	requesting	country.198		
 
	 193.	 See	supra	notes	135–40	and	accompanying	text.	
	 194.	 On	 occasion,	 courts	 have	 refused	 to	 consider	 foreign	 convictions	 obtained	
without	the	assistance	of	counsel.	See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Moskovits,	784	F.	Supp.	193	
(E.D.	Pa.	1992).	However,	such	practice	undoubtedly	represents	the	exception,	not	the	
rule.	 See	 United	 States	 v.	 Concha,	 294	 F.3d	 1248,	 1254	 (10th	 Cir.	 2002)	 (“[E]ven	
assuming	 [the	 foreign	 convictions]	 are	 subject	 to	 challenge	 on	 Sixth	 Amendment	
grounds,	.	.	.	it	is	proper	to	consider	the	underlying	conduct	in	assessing	the	propriety	
of	an	upward	departure.”);	Houle	v.	United	States,	493	F.2d	915,	916	n.2	(5th	Cir.	1974)	
(“We	decline	to	assume	that	[a	conviction	obtained	without	the	assistance	of	counsel]	
may	be	the	basis	for	a	judgment	that	a	foreign	system,	utilizing	procedures	with	which	
we	are	unfamiliar,	has	failed	to	provide	a	fair	trial	if	it	does	not	conform	with	our	right-
to-counsel	 concepts.”);	 cf.	 United	 States	 v.	 Shavanaux,	 647	F.3d	993,	 997	 (10th	Cir.	
2011)	(affirming,	for	purposes	of	upward	departure,	sentencing	judge’s	consideration	
of	prior	tribal	convictions	obtained	without	the	assistance	of	counsel).	
	 195.	 See	Concha,	294	F.3d	at	1254;	United	States	v.	Fleishman,	684	F.2d	1329,	1346	
(9th	Cir.	1982);	Houle,	493	F.2d	at	916	n.2.	
	 196.	 See	 United	 States	 v.	 Small,	 183	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 755,	 769	 (W.D.	 Pa.	 2002)	
(“Although	[violating	defendant’s	right	to	remain	silent]	would	be	highly	improper	in	
a	 criminal	 prosecution	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 we	 cannot	 say	 that	 the	 prosecutor’s	
actions	.	.	.	rendered	[the	defendant’s]	conviction	unfair.”).	
	 197.	 United	 States	 v.	 Kole,	 164	 F.3d	 164,	 175	 (3d	 Cir.	 1998);	 United	 States	 v.	
Delmarle,	99	F.3d	80,	85–86	(2d	Cir.	1996);	United	States	v.	Ngombwa,	No.	14-CR-123-
LRR,	2017	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	17373,	at	*66	n.8	(N.D.	 Iowa	Feb.	7,	2017);	Small,	183	F.	
Supp.	2d	at	768.	
	 198.	 Iraola,	supra	note	183,	at	857–58;	see,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Avdic,	No.	CR.	07-
M06,	 2007	 WL	 1875778,	 at	 *8	 (D.S.D.	 June	 28,	 2007)	 (finding	 probable	 cause	 to	
extradite	 based	 on	 Bosnian	 conviction	 in	 absentia	when	 “an	 independent	 judicial	
officer	in	the	requesting	country	heard	the	evidence	and	found	it	sufficient	to	convict”);	
United	States	v.	Bogue,	No.	CRIM.A.	98-572-M,	1998	WL	966070,	at	*2	(E.D.	Pa.	Oct.	13,	
1998)	 (“A	 determination	 of	 the	 French	 government’s	 procedural	 fairness	 in	
undertaking	the	petitioner’s	trial	in	his	absence	.	.	.	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Court’s	
review.”).	 But	 see	 In	 re	 Extradition	 of	 Ernst,	 No.	 97	 CRIM.MISC.1	 PG.22,	 1998	WL	
395267,	at	*7–10	(S.D.N.Y.	July	14,	1998)	(finding	probable	cause	to	extradite	lacking	
when	prosecution	presented	only	decision	of	a	Swiss	court,	which	failed	to	describe	
the	basis	for	its	decision).	
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C. ASSESSING	AND	EXPLAINING	THE	TWO	APPROACHES	
How	may	we	explain	and	assess	the	two	approaches	described	
above?	 On	 its	 own	 terms,	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach	
coheres.	 The	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 the	 greatest	 interest	 in	
preserving	process	domestically;	the	Court	both	decides	which	Bill	of	
Rights	guarantees	apply	to	the	states	and	what	form	they	should	take	
in	 such	 prosecutions.199	 The	 political	 branches	 then	 have	 the	 next	
highest	 concern	 in	 the	negotiation	 and	 ratification	 of	 human	 rights	
treaties	that	apply	both	abroad	and	at	home.200	And	finally,	the	United	
States	has	established	 the	most	narrow	minimum	core	 in	 instances	
where	a	mutuality	of	agreement	exists	but	the	normative	concerns	are	
at	their	lowest,	either	because	the	instrument	is	not	legally	binding	(in	
the	case	of	the	UDHR)201	or	because	the	guarantees	concern	foreign	
jurisdictions	prosecuting	foreign	nationals	(in	the	case	of	the	CLOUD	
Act).		
Similarly,	the	outlier	approach	makes	some	intuitive	sense	on	its	
own	terms.	Foreign	jurisdictions	are	permitted	a	robust	set	of	criminal	
procedures—even	 those	 procedures	 that	 will	 influence	 domestic	
criminal	prosecutions—as	long	as	there	is	no	flagrant	activity	on	the	
part	of	U.S.	 law	enforcement	and/or	 in	 the	structure	of	 that	 foreign	
legal	 system.202	And	extradition	 is	driven	by	political	 branch	 treaty	
making,	 in	particular	executive	branch	 foreign	affairs	expertise;	 the	
judiciary	then	defers	because	the	political	branches	have	“cleared	the	
space”	with	formal	law	enforcement	agreements.203	
But	 combined,	 these	 two	 approaches	 are	 nonsensical.	 The	
clearest	example	of	such	doctrinal	incoherence	is	that	of	the	CLOUD	
Act,	 which	 draws	 procedural	 lines	 to	 include	 greater	 explicit	
protections	for	foreign	nationals	prosecuted	in	foreign	countries	than	
it	does	U.S.	nationals	prosecuted	abroad	or,	 in	some	instances,	even	
domestically.204	 First,	 the	 CLOUD	Act	 excludes	U.S.	 nationals,	 so	 by	
definition	 foreign	 countries	 are	 advancing	 investigations	 into	 their	
own	 or	 other	 nationals;	 this	 presumably	 gives	 the	 United	 States	 a	
lower	stake	in	the	process.	Second,	in	contrast	to	extraditions,	where	
a	foreign	government	has	already	indicted	an	individual,	CLOUD	Act	
cases	 apply	 to	 investigations,	 which	 almost	 always	 arise	 pre-
 
	 199.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.	As	discussed	in	Part	II.A,	infra,	this	differentiation	is	also	
consistent	with	 Rawlsian	 second	 and	 third	 original	 positions,	 as	well	 as	 the	 rights	
flowing	from	them.	
	 200.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.	
	 201.	 See	supra	note	95.	
	 202.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.	
	 203.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.	
	 204.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.3.	
286	 MINNESOTA	LAW	REVIEW	 [105:251	
	
indictment.205	 There	 is	 thus	 less	 immediate	 risk	 of	 a	 flagrant	 due	
process	 or	 human	 rights	 violation,	 though	 of	 course	 such	 an	
investigation	 may	 lead	 to	 prosecution	 and	 incarceration.	 In	 other	
words,	 the	 Act	 saliently	 provides	 guidance	 regarding	 fundamental	
fairness	when	foreign	sovereigns	are	obtaining	evidence	in	the	United	
States,	and	yet	little-to-no	guidance	exists	for	concluding	extradition	
treaties	or	articulating	an	“outlier	test”	due	process	analysis.206	Such	
explicit	 guidance	 on	 core	 criminal	 procedure—more	 than	 in	 other	
contexts—is	 surprising	 because	 the	 U.S.	 government	 has	 less	 of	 a	
stake	in	these	cases.	
Another	example	of	such	doctrinal	incoherence	is	the	treatment	
of	 foreign	 convictions	 in	 absentia.207	 U.S.	 courts	 disfavor	 such	
convictions	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 extradition	 abroad,	 where	 constitutional	
criminal	procedural	rights	otherwise	have	little	applicability.208	And	
yet	 domestically,	 such	 convictions	 may	 be	 the	 basis	 for	 upward	
departure	for	sentences.209	This	is	surprising	because	the	U.S.	criminal	
justice	 system	 should	 presumably	 have	 more	 of	 a	 stake	 in	 the	
administration	 of	 its	 own	 sentences	 than	 it	 does	 in	 prosecutions	
abroad.	
Why	such	doctrinal	incoherence?	The	answer	lies	in	the	historical	
development	 of	 four	 distinct	 legal	 movements—incorporation,	
human	 rights	 codification,	 judicial	 rulings	 on	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality,	 and	 internationalization	 of	 criminal	 law	
enforcement—each	coming	online	at	various	points	in	the	twentieth	
century.	 First,	 judicial	 rulings	 on	 extraterritoriality	 are	 of	 oldest	
vintage	and	are	internally	incoherent;	for	example,	the	Insular	Cases,	
Reid	 v.	 Covert	 and	 Verdugo-Urquidez,	 exemplify	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality	 doctrine	 decided	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	
then	fractured	in	the	twentieth	century.210	Second,	the	human	rights	
movement	began	in	the	1940s	with	the	negotiation	of	the	UDHR	and	
subsequent	 international	 human	 rights	 instruments,	 though	 the	
United	States	has	been	slow	to	ratify	many	of	these	treaties	since	that	
time.211	 Third,	 incorporation	of	 the	U.S.	Bill	 of	Rights	did	not	 occur	
until	 the	 Warren	 Court	 “revolution,”	 beginning	 in	 earnest	 in	 the	
 
	 205.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.3.	
	 206.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.3.	
	 207.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.	
	 208.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.3.	
	 209.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.2.	
	 210.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.1.	
	 211.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.2.	
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1960s.212	 And	 finally,	 law-enforcement	 activity	 abroad	 has	 grown	
aggressively	in	the	last	twenty	years.213	
These	successive	and	overlapping	legal	regimes	have	led	to	a	lag	
in	the	articulation	and	implementation	of	criminal	procedural	norms	
over	time.	When	the	United	States	was	pushing	for	certain	rights	to	be	
included	in	international	human	rights	treaties,	many	of	these	rights	
had	not	been	incorporated	in	the	fifty	U.S.	states.214	Similarly,	when	
the	 U.S.	 courts	were	 ruling	 on	 applicability	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	
abroad,	they	were	doing	so	in	a	pre-incorporation	era	and,	mostly,	in	
a	 pre-human	 rights	 era.215	 And	 from	 a	 broader	 transnational	 legal	
process	perspective,	many	of	these	crosscurrents	are	interrelated.	For	
example,	 the	 international	human	rights	movement	derives	 in	 large	
part	from	American	influence	on	the	instruments,	and	the	American	
influence	 is	 largely	 rooted	 in	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution.216	 As	
such,	 many	 of	 these	 concepts	 were	 “uploaded”	 from	 U.S.	 law	 to	
international	human	rights	law,	and	then	“downloaded”	to	many	other	
countries	pursuant	 to	 transnational	 legal	process.217	And	yet,	 in	 the	
United	States,	this	download	has	ironically	stalled	out	in	transnational	
criminal	law	enforcement.	
These	 successive	 and	 overlapping	 legal	 regimes	 have	 led	 to	
confusion	in	the	lower	courts.218	The	best	example	of	this	has	been	the	
 
	 212.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.1.	
	 213.	 In	 criminal	 procedure	 in	 particular,	 the	 rise	 of	 law	 enforcement	 abroad	
corresponded	with	the	“constitutionalization”	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	during	the	Warren	
Court	 era;	 reconciling	 these	 trends	 has	 been	 an	 enduring	 challenge	 for	 the	 federal	
courts.	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	184	(“[T]he	criminal	procedure	revolution	of	the	
1960s	 .	.	.	 created	 a	 host	 of	 legal	 protections	 for	 suspects	 that	 fit	 awkwardly	 with	
overseas	policing	efforts.”).	
	 214.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.2.	
	 215.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.1.	This	is	similar	to	Kal	Raustiala’s	point	that	various	forms	
of	 constitutional	 extraterritoriality	 and	 intra-territoriality	 exist	 concurrently	 and	
incoherently	today	due	to	their	different	legal	geneses	at	various	points	in	our	history.	
See	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	7.	
	 216.	 David	 S.	 Law	&	Mila	 Versteeg,	The	 Declining	 Influence	 of	 the	 United	 States	
Constitution,	87	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	762,	764–66	(2012)	(discussing	the	one-time	influence	
of	the	U.S.	Constitution	on	constitutionalism	and	human	rights	abroad).	
	 217.	 See	Harold	Hongju	Koh,	Twenty-First-Century	International	Lawmaking,	101	
GEO.	L.J.	725,	747	(2013)	(“Twenty-first-century	international	lawmaking	has	become	
a	swirling	interactive	process	whereby	norms	get	‘uploaded’	from	one	country	into	the	
international	system	and	then	‘downloaded’	elsewhere	into	another	country’s	laws	or	
even	a	private	actor’s	internal	rules.”).	
	 218.	 See,	e.g.,	Ibrahim	v.	Dep’t	of	Homeland	Sec.,	669	F.3d	983,	997	(9th	Cir.	2012)	
(“The	 law	 that	 we	 are	 bound	 to	 follow	 is,	 instead,	 the	 ‘functional	 approach’	 of	
Boumediene	 and	 the	 ‘significant	 voluntary	 connection’	 test	 of	 Verdugo–Urquidez.”);	
Rodriguez	v.	Swartz,	111	F.	Supp.	3d	1025,	1035	(D.	Ariz.	2015)	(“In	sum,	this	Court	
finds	most	appropriate	to	apply	the	‘practical	considerations’	outlined	in	Boumediene	
in	 conjunction	 with	 Verdugo–Urquidez’	 ‘voluntary	 connections’	 test	 to	 evaluate	
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Hernandez	case,	which	has	had	a	long	history	both	in	the	Fifth	Circuit	
and	 in	 the	Supreme	Court.219	The	2010	case	 involved	a	U.S.	Border	
Patrol	agent,	standing	in	the	United	States,	killing	a	Mexican	citizen,	
Sergio	 Adrian	 Hernandez	 Guereca	 (“Hernandez”),	 standing	 in	
Mexico.220	 Hernandez’s	 parents	 subsequently	 brought	 a	 variety	 of	
claims	against	the	agent	and	the	United	States,	including	claims	under	
Bivens	 and	 the	 Alien	 Tort	 Statute,	 that	 turned	 on	 the	 question	 of	
whether	the	U.S.	Constitution	applied	extraterritorially	to	Mexico.221	
As	part	of	this	litigation,	the	courts	struggled	with	how	to	reconcile	the	
“voluntary	connections”	test	with	the	“impracticable	and	anomalous”	
test.222		
 
whether	 J.A.	was	protected	by	 the	Fourth	Amendment.”);	Al	Bahlul	v.	United	States,	
767	 F.3d	 1,	 31–33	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 2014)	 (Henderson,	 J.,	 concurring)	 (reconciling	 the	
overlapping	 doctrine	 to	 determine	 extraterritorial	 applicability	 of	 the	 Fifth	
Amendment).	
	 219.	 Hernandez	 v.	 United	 States,	 802	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 834,	 846	 (W.D.	 Tex.	 2011)	
(granting	the	government’s	motion	to	dismiss	in	its	entirety),	aff’d	in	part,	rev’d	in	part,	
757	F.3d	249,	280	(5th	Cir.	2014)	(holding	that	while	the	United	States	had	not	waived	
sovereign	immunity	for	any	of	the	claims	brought	against	it,	appellants	were	able	to	
bring	forth	a	Fifth	Amendment	claim	against	Agent	Mesa	and	had	asserted	sufficient	
facts	to	overcome	qualified	immunity),	aff’d	on	reh’g	en	banc	per	curiam,	785	F.3d	117,	
119	(5th	Cir.	2015)	(determining	that	plaintiffs	failed	to	assert	a	breach	of	the	Fourth	
Amendment,	and	that	Agent	Mesa	was	entitled	to	qualified	immunity	from	the	Fifth	
Amendment	excessive-force	claim),	cert.	granted	sub	nom.	Hernandez	v.	Mesa,	137	S.	
Ct.	291	(2016),	vacated	per	curiam,	137	S.	Ct.	2003,	2007–08	(2017)	(holding	that	the	
court	of	appeals	erred	in	granting	qualified	immunity	to	Agent	Mesa).	On	remand,	the	
Fifth	Circuit,	 sitting	en	banc,	affirmed	the	district	court’s	earlier	decision	 to	dismiss	
plaintiffs’	claims	against	the	government	and	Agent	Mesa.	Hernandez	v.	Mesa,	885	F.3d	
811	(5th	Cir.	2018)	(en	banc),	cert.	granted	in	part,	139	S.	Ct.	2636	(2019),	aff’d,	140	S.	
Ct.	735,	739,	744,	750	(2020)	(declining	to	extend	Bivens	to	the	“new	context”	of	a	claim	
arising	out	of	a	cross-border	shooting);	cf.	United	States	v.	Allen,	864	F.3d	63,	68	(2d	
Cir.	2017)	(“[T]he	Fifth	Amendment’s	prohibition	on	the	use	of	compelled	testimony	
in	 American	 criminal	 proceedings	 applies	 even	 when	 a	 foreign	 sovereign	 has	
compelled	the	testimony.”).	
	 220.	 Hernandez	v.	United	States,	757	F.3d	at	255.	
	 221.	 Id.	
	 222.	 See	 id.	 at	 265	 (“While	 the	 Boumediene	 Court	 appears	 to	 repudiate	 the	
formalistic	 reasoning	 of	Verdugo-Urquidez’s	 sufficient	 connections	 test,	 courts	 have	
continued	to	rely	on	the	sufficient	connections	test	and	its	related	interpretation	of	the	
Fourth	 Amendment	 text.”);	 Hernandez	 v.	 United	 States,	 785	 F.3d	 at	 136	 (Prado,	 J.,	
concurring)	(“Citing	Eisentrager	and	Verdugo-Urquidez,	the	concurrence	asserts	that	
the	Supreme	Court	has	foreclosed	the	question	before	our	Court.	This	uncomplicated	
view	of	extraterritoriality	fails	to	exhibit	due	regard	for	the	Court’s	watershed	opinion	
in	Boumediene,	which	not	only	authoritatively	interpreted	these	earlier	cases	but	also	
announced	 the	 bedrock	 standards	 for	 determining	 the	 extraterritorial	 reach	 of	 the	
Constitution	.	.	.	.”);	Hernandez	v.	Mesa,	137	S.	Ct.	at	2011	(Breyer,	J.,	dissenting)	(“These	
six	sets	of	considerations	taken	together	provide	more	than	enough	reason	for	treating	
the	entire	culvert	as	having	sufficient	involvement	with,	and	connection	to,	the	United	
States	to	subject	the	culvert	to	Fourth	Amendment	protections.	I	would	consequently	
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It	 is	 time	 to	 clear	 up	 this	 confusion	 and	 resolve	 the	 lag	 in	
articulation	of	criminal	procedural	norms.	Core	criminal	procedure	is	
the	superior	approach	because	it	is	most	consistent	with	domestic	and	
international	legal	obligations	in	a	time	of	increasing	law	enforcement	
cooperation.	 It	 thus	 affirms	 defendants’	 individual	 rights—rights	
which	 affirm	 individual	 dignity,	 mandate	 necessary	 process,	 and	
delineate	the	 limits	of	government	authority—at	a	 time	where	they	
are	most	 vulnerable	 in	 the	 face	of	not	one,	but	multiple	 sovereigns	
advancing	 their	 prosecution.	 The	 following	 Parts	 will	 build	 the	
normative	case	for	core	criminal	procedure,	provide	a	methodology	
for	its	application,	and	show	its	utility	in	engaging	with	the	broader	
system	of	international	criminal	law.	
II.		TOWARDS	A	NEW	FRAMEWORK	FOR	CORE	CRIMINAL	
PROCEDURE			
How	should	the	U.S.	government	engage	in	criminal	procedural	
line	 drawing?	 This	 Part	 builds	 a	 normative	 foundation	 for	 core	
criminal	procedure.	 It	 first	 theorizes	such	core,	using	constitutional	
and	global	justice	theory.	It	then	argues	for	a	tripartite	framework—
rooted	 in	 constitutional	 incorporation,	 international	 human	 rights	
obligations,	 and	 comparative	 functionalism—for	 the	 judiciary	 and	
political	branches	 to	employ	when	engaging	 in	cross-sovereign	 line	
drawing.	Finally,	it	prescribes	the	role	each	of	the	three	branches	of	
government	should	play	in	applying	this	standard	to	foreign	criminal	
justice	systems.	
A. THEORIZING	THE	CORE	
What	should	be	the	inviolable	inner	core	of	criminal	procedure?	
What	is	the	obligation	of	any	state	to	provide	such	process	to	its	own	
nationals	and	to	other	nationals?	Does	that	obligation	extend	only	to	
cases	where	the	U.S.	government	is	itself	prosecuting	individuals,	or	
does	U.S.	involvement	in	foreign	prosecutions	trigger	certain	criminal	
procedural	 and/or	 constitutional	 obligations?	 From	 these	
fundamental	 questions	 emerges	 an	 obvious	 tension,	 one	 scholars	
often	 overlook:	 either	 way,	 cross-border	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation	opens	the	United	States	to	both	praise	and	criticism.	On	
one	hand,	arguments	for	the	status	quo	favor	broad	law	enforcement	
cooperation	 and	 thus	 promotion	 of	 criminal	 accountability	 and	
security—but	open	the	United	States	to	accusations	of	brutal	realism	
that	overrides	individual	rights	and	sucks	individuals	worldwide	into	
its	 expansive	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 Conversely,	 prescribing	 a	
 
conclude	that	the	Fourth	Amendment	applies.”).	
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rigorous	 rights	 framework	 could	 promote	 the	 United	 States	 as	
laudable	arbiter	of	 individual	rights,	but	opens	it	to	charges	of	both	
cultural	imperialism	and	reluctance	to	assist	other	countries	in	critical	
law	 enforcement	 goals.	 As	 a	 general	 rule,	 a	 greater	 insistence	 on	
criminal	 procedural	 rights	will	 lead	 to	 decreasing	 law-enforcement	
cooperation—at	 the	 extreme,	 insisting	 on	 the	 identical	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 as	 in	 the	 United	 States	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 total	
cessation	of	any	such	cooperation.223	
One	 starting	 point	 to	 resolve	 this	 tension	 is	 to	 affirm	 its	
contemporary	 inevitability.	 International	 cooperation	 in	 law	
enforcement	 constitutes	 a	 consequential,	 necessary	 shift	 in	 U.S.	
criminal	justice.	Such	cross-border	cooperation	addresses	one	of	the	
central	 concerns	 of	 international	 criminal	 law:	 that	 global	 crime	
metastasizes	 more	 rapidly	 than	 any	 domestic	 or	 international	
institution	 can	 legally	 adapt	 to	 promote	 criminal	 accountability,	
creating	 impunity	 gaps.224	 While	 this	 cross-border	 crime	 may	 be	
traced	to	piracy	in	the	earliest	days	of	the	U.S.	republic	or	the	rise	of	
drug	 trafficking	 in	 the	1970s,	 the	 accelerating	 rate	of	movement	of	
people	 and	 information	 across	 borders	 has	 catalyzed	 a	 new	 era	 of	
global	 crime.225	 The	 U.S.	 government	 knows	 that	while	 its	 borders	
delimit	 the	geographical	boundaries	of	 its	enforcement	 jurisdiction,	
criminality	increasingly	transcends	such	borders.226	As	the	FIFA	and	
Charles	 “Chuckie”	Taylor,	 Jr.	 cases	demonstrate,	 these	borders	now	
represent	 an	 advantage	 for	 criminals,	 who	 exploit	 “national	
sanctuaries”	to	live	in	impunity.227	In	light	of	this,	the	question	is	not	
 
	 223.	 This	 balance	 adds	 a	 transnational	 twist	 to	 the	 classic	 dichotomy	 between	
crime	control	values—emphasizing	efficiency,	speed,	finality,	and	other	characteristics	
that	serve	the	repression	of	criminal	conduct—and	due	process—focusing	on	formal,	
adjudicative,	 adversarial	 processes	 that	 instantiate	 formidable	 “obstacle	 course”	
impediments	 to	 carrying	 an	 accused	 further	 along	 in	 the	 criminal	 process—first	
outlined	by	Herbert	 Packer	 in	 1964.	Herbert	 L.	 Packer,	Two	Models	 of	 the	 Criminal	
Process,	113	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	1,	9–23	(1964).	
	 224.	 See	Koh,	supra	note	12,	at	352;	Tuerkheimer,	supra	note	16,	at	308–14.	
	 225.	 See	Koh,	supra	note	12,	at	351–52;	Tuerkheimer,	supra	note	16,	at	309	(“An	
earlier	example	of	‘global	crime’	might	have	been	the	importation	of	heroin	from	Italy	
to	 the	 United	 States.	 Today’s	 criminal	 efforts	 totally	 eclipse	 such	 earlier	 ‘global’	
criminal	ventures.”).	
	 226.	 See	Koh,	 supra	note	 12	 (discussing	 the	 proliferation	 of	 U.S.	 foreign	 affairs	
prosecutions).	
	 227.	 Id.	at	352–55	(discussing	both	the	2015	arrest	of	seven	senior	FIFA	officials	
and	 the	 2008	 conviction	 of	 Charles	 “Chuckie”	 Taylor,	 Jr.—son	 of	 former	 Liberian	
President	 Charles	 Taylor—for	 perpetuating	 torture	 while	 serving	 as	 head	 of	 the	
Liberian	Anti-Terrorism	Unit	from	1999	to	2002).	
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whether,	but	how	to	best	draw	cross-border	criminal	procedural	lines	
in	this	contemporary	space.228	
1. Beyond	the	Social	Contract	
At	first	blush,	constitutional	doctrine	and	theory	could	provide	a	
framework	 for	 theorizing	 core	 criminal	 procedure,	 given	 the	 long	
history	 of	 complex	 questions	 regarding	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality	and	scholarship	relating	to	it.	Indeed,	debates	about	
constitutional	 extraterritorial	 applicability	 have	 long	 turned	 on	
shifting	accounts	of	when,	where,	and	to	whom	the	U.S.	Constitution	
applies	 abroad.229	 As	 Gerald	 Neuman	 has	 noted,	 “[t]o	 resolve	 the	
question	of	the	proper	scope	of	the	individual	rights	provisions	of	the	
United	 States	 Constitution,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 ask	 what	 rights	 in	 a	
constitution	 are	 for,	 and	 in	 particular	 what	 United	 States	
constitutional	 rights	 are	 for.”230	 In	 1991,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Neuman’s	
writing,	 that	 was	 a	 pressing	 question	 in	 the	 space	 of	 the	
 
	 228.	 In	other	words,	when	courts	are	engaging	in	“impracticable	and	anomalous”	
analysis,	“impracticable”	does	not	equal	unbridled	pragmatism	or	outlier	pragmatism	
rooted	in	only	the	most	flagrant	foreign	procedural	conduct.	Instead,	this	Article	calls	
for	a	principled	pragmatism,	one	that	equals	 fundamental	rights,	rights	 informed	by	
constitutional,	 human	 rights,	 and	 functionalist	 analysis.	 This	 Part	 structures	 this	
analysis.	
	 229.	 See	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	7.	A	central	tension	in	these	cases	has	been	
between	 a	 territorial	 conception	 of	 U.S.	 criminal	 procedural	 rights—i.e.,	 wherein	
constitutional	guarantees	stop	“at	the	water’s	edge”—and	a	conception	wherein	the	
Constitution	applies	more	robustly	to	aliens	and	to	U.S.	nationals	in	foreign	territories.	
Id.	at	185–86.	For	example,	Reid	v.	Covert,	decided	in	1957,	likely	indicates	the	high-
water	mark	for	the	extraterritorial	application	of	constitutional	criminal	procedural	
rights.	354	U.S.	1	(1957).	Writing	for	a	four-justice	plurality,	Justice	Black	declared	that	
whenever	 the	 United	 States	 acts	 against	 its	 citizens	 abroad,	 it	 may	 do	 so	 only	 in	
conformity	with	 the	Bill	of	Rights.	 Id.	at	5–6.	Half	a	century	earlier,	by	contrast,	 the	
Court	held	in	Neely	v.	Henkel	that	the	Bill	of	Rights	retains	no	force	abroad,	even	for	
U.S.	citizens.	180	U.S.	109,	122–23	(1901).	Between	these	two	extremes,	perhaps,	lies	
Justice	Edward	Douglass	White’s	concurring	opinion	in	Downes	v.	Bidwell.	182	U.S.	244,	
287	 (1901)	 (White,	 J.,	 concurring).	 In	 its	 articulation	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 “territorial	
incorporation,”	 Justice	 White’s	 concurrence	 suggests	 that	 even	 territories	
unincorporated	by	the	United	States	may	benefit	from	“inherent	.	.	.	principles	.	.	.	of	.	.	.	
free	government.”	Id.	at	291.	
	 230.	 Gerald	L.	Neuman,	Whose	Constitution?,	100	YALE	L.J.	909,	976	(1991);	see	id.	
at	 917	 (“Social	 contract	 rhetoric	 has	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 American	
constitutionalism.	.	.	.	A	skeptic	who	did	not	ascribe	normative	force	to	social	contract	
arguments	still	could	invoke	the	idea	of	a	social	contract	as	a	historically-grounded	tool	
for	interpreting	American	constitutionalism.	This	sort	of	reasoning	is	evident	in	Chief	
Justice	Rehnquist’s	opinion	in	Verdugo-Urquidez.”).	But	see	David	M.	Golove	&	Daniel	J.	
Hulsebosch,	A	Civilized	Nation:	The	Early	American	Constitution,	the	Law	of	Nations,	and	
the	Pursuit	of	International	Recognition,	85	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	932,	1065	(2010)	(arguing	
that	 the	 drafting	 and	 adoption	 of	 the	U.S.	 Constitution	was	 in	 fact	 an	 international	
affair).	
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extraterritorial	enforcement	of	constitutional	rights	and	one	that	he	
resolved	through	a	social	contract	framework.231	
However,	 the	Constitution	 is	undertheorized	at	the	edges	of	 its	
extraterritorial	applicability,	and	beyond	that	line	there	is	virtually	no	
guidance	on	how	courts	should	evaluate	criminal	procedure.	As	Noah	
Feldman	has	noted,	social	contract	theories	are	so	co-extensive	with	
the	design	of	nation	states	that	they	provide	no	guidance	about	how	
to	do	justice	to	those	falling	outside	the	basic	requirements	of	equal	
citizenship.232	For	example,	as	described	above,	per	Verdugo-Urquidez	
and	Boumediene,	the	Constitution	will	not	apply	abroad	when	it	would	
be	“impracticable	and	anomalous”	to	do	so.233	As	Neuman	has	noted,	
the	meaning	of	 this	phrase	 is	unclear,	 though	 the	 former	 term	may	
mean	 compliance	 is	 impossible	 or	 imposes	 great	 costs	 in	 foreign	
territory,	 while	 the	 latter	 could	 indicate	 cultural	 incongruity	 with	
customs	in	a	foreign	legal	system.234	And	even	in	cases	where	foreign	
law	enforcement	 is	operating	entirely	 independently	 in	 its	 criminal	
investigations	 and	 thus	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 apply,	 evidence	
gathered	will	still	be	excluded	when	foreign	law	enforcement	methods	
“shock	 the	 conscience”	 of	 the	 court.235	 This	 discretion	 is	 rooted	 in	
federal	courts’	inherent	“supervisory	powers	over	the	administration	
of	federal	justice.”236		
Furthermore,	 a	 focus	 on	 traditional	 constitutional	 norms	 risks	
overlooking	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 obligations	 that	 govern	
even	in	the	absence	of	formal	constitutional	applicability.	Often	such	
rights	 are	 thought	 irrelevant	 once	 the	 constitutional	 inquiry	 ends;	
such	 ambiguity	 and	 oversight	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 debates	 regarding	
rights	 in	 the	War	on	Terror.237	 In	areas	where	 the	U.S.	Constitution	
 
	 231.	 See	Neuman,	supra	note	230,	at	919.	
	 232.	 Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1034	(citing	MARTHA	C.	NUSSBAUM,	FRONTIERS	OF	
JUSTICE:	DISABILITY,	NATIONALITY,	SPECIES	MEMBERSHIP	(2006)).	
	 233.	 United	States	v.	Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	259,	277–78	(1990)	(Kennedy,	J.,	
concurring);	Boumediene	v.	Bush,	553	U.S.	723,	770	(2008).	
	 234.	 Neuman,	supra	note	116,	at	391–93	(drawing	on	Justice	Harlan’s	opinion	in	
Reid	v.	Covert,	354	U.S.	1	(1957)).	
	 235.	 See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Maturo,	982	F.2d	57,	60–61	(2d	Cir.	1992);	United	
States	v.	Nagelberg,	434	F.2d	585,	587	n.1	(2d	Cir.	1970).	
	 236.	 United	 States	 v.	 Emmanuel,	 565	 F.3d	 1324,	 1330	 (11th	 Cir.	 2009)	 (citing	
Birdsell	 v.	 United	 States,	 346	 F.2d	 775,	 782	 n.10	 (5th	 Cir.	 1965);	 United	 States	 v.	
Barona,	56	F.3d	1087,	1091	(9th	Cir.	1995)).	
	 237.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Oona	 A.	 Hathaway	 et	 al.,	Human	 Rights	 Abroad:	When	 Do	 Human	
Rights	 Treaty	 Obligations	 Apply	 Extraterritorially,	 43	 ARIZ.	 ST.	 L.J.	 389	 (2011)	
(surveying	foreign	and	international	tribunals’	approach	to	extraterritorial	application	
of	 human	 rights	 treaties);	 see	 also	 Young,	 supra	 note	 25,	 at	 123–24	 (noting	 that	
constitutional	 courts	 worldwide	 have	 not	 grasped	 economic	 and	 social	 rights	
protections	in	various	national	constitutional	contexts).	
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does	not	apply,	does	“anything	go”?238	Of	course,	from	the	perspective	
of	the	first	legal	movement	of	Insular	constitutional	extraterritoriality	
cases	described	in	Part	I.C,	the	answer	could	be	“yes,	anything	goes”	
or	“yes,	though	some	limited	rights	apply.”	But	this	answer	is	of	course	
outdated	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century:	 the	 structure	 of	 international	
human	rights	norms	now	includes	virtually	all	countries	of	the	world,	
cohering	 around	 certain	 baseline	 rules	 and	 standards	 that	 ground	
equal	 treatment	 of	 individuals,	 regardless	 of	 nationality.	 For	 the	
United	States,	this	means	especially	the	ICCPR,	and	the	UDHR.239	This	
tension	 is	 salient	 in	 cases	 regarding	 the	war	 on	 terror;	 in	 criminal	
justice,	this	tension	is	heretofore	less	visible.	
2. Global	Justice	Theory		
Global	 justice	 theory	 can	 help	 to	 update	 our	 constitutional	
conception,	 highlighting	 how	 constitutional	 law	 interlocks	 with	
international	human	rights	and	comparative	law.	While	U.S.	criminal	
justice	 has	 traditionally	 unfolded	 only	 on	 a	 domestically	 focused	
paradigm,	 similarly	 “the	 history	 of	 political	 philosophy	 has	 been	
marked	 by	 an	 interest	 in	 domestic	 justice	within	 the	 state.”240	 But	
 
	 238.	 See	TINA	M.	FIELDING	FRYLING,	CONSTITUTIONAL	LAW	IN	CRIMINAL	JUSTICE	150–51	
(2014).	
	 239.	 Gerald	Neuman	has	called	this	the	multiple	positivisation	of	human	rights,	or	
“the	creation	of	different	legal	regimes	at	the	national	and	transnational	level	for	the	
protection	 of	 individual	 rights,	 and	 the	 resulting	 problem	 of	 how	 these	 regimes	
compete	 or	 co-operate	 or	 can	 be	 reconciled	with	 one	 another.”	 Gerald	 L.	 Neuman,	
Human	Rights	and	Constitutions	in	a	Complex	World,	50	IRISH	JURIST 1,	1	(2013);	see	also	
Gerald	L.	Neuman,	Human	Rights	and	Constitutional	Rights:	Harmony	and	Dissonance,	
55	 STAN.	L.	REV.	 1863,	 1874	 (2003)	 (“The	 consensual	 and	 suprapositive	 aspects	 of	
fundamental	 rights	 each	 create	 potential	 for	 conflicting	 claims	 of	 legitimacy	 and	
authority	 between	 the	 national	 constitutional	 system	 and	 the	 international	 human	
rights	system.”);	United	States	Ratification	of	International	Human	Rights	Treaties,	HUM.	
RTS.	WATCH	 (July	24,	2009),	https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/24/united-states	
-ratification-international-human-rights-treaties	[https://perma.cc/Z7XS-Z9YZ]	
(noting	that	the	United	States	is	party	to	numerous	human	rights	treaties,	 including	
the	 ICCPR	 and	 the	 CAT).	 Most	 countries	 in	 the	 world	 are	 also	 bound	 by	 the	
International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social,	and	Cultural	Rights;	 the	Convention	on	
the	Rights	of	the	Child;	and	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities.	
International	Covenant	on	Economic,	 Social	 and	Cultural	Rights,	Dec.	16,	1966,	993	
U.N.T.S.	3;	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	the	Child,	Nov.	20,	1989,	1577	U.N.T.S.	3;	G.A.	
Res.	61/106,	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities	(Jan.	24,	2007);	see	
also	United	States	Ratification	of	International	Human	Rights	Treaties,	supra	note	239	
(noting	that	 the	United	States	has	refrained	from	ratifying	any	 international	human	
rights	treaties	since	December	2002).	
	 240.	 Thom	Brooks,	 Introduction	 to	THE	GLOBAL	 JUSTICE	READER	xii	 (Thom	Brooks	
ed.,	2008);	Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1025	(“Traditional	liberal	conceptions	of	law	
tend	to	hold	that	law,	properly	so	called,	can	only	exist	and	justifiably	coerce	people	
when	it	emanates	from	some	political	association	such	as	a	state,	a	treaty	regime,	or	
the	international	community	.	.	.	.	But	perhaps	there	are	other	ways	for	binding	law	to	
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global	justice	theory	is	responsive	to	the	contemporary	transnational	
criminal	justice	questions	arising	between	states.241	
Returning	 to	 the	 original	 question:	 in	 this	 contemporary	 era,	
what	are	rights	 for?	To	whom	do	we	guarantee	criminal	procedural	
rights,	 where,	 and	 when?	 And—just	 as	 crucially—what	 amount	 of	
process	 is	 required	 in	 this	 space?	 In	 one	 conception,	 attributed	
originally	 to	 Thomas	 Hobbes	 and	 to	 contemporary	 scholars	 in	 the	
nationalism	school,	the	absence	of	a	world	judicial	body	means	that	
anarchy,	 without	 justice,	 characterizes	 international	 affairs.242	 In	
another	conception,	 rooted	 in	 Immanuel	Kant’s	On	Perpetual	Peace,	
democratic	 states	 promote	 a	 peaceful	 world	 order,	 even	 in	 the	
absence	of	 a	 higher	world	 government.243	 John	Rawls’	 contribution	
extends	 this	beyond	merely	democratic	nations	 to	“decent	peoples”	
that,	 though	 not	 democratic,	 respect	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 permit	
dissent.244	 In	his	 conception,	a	 cosmopolitan,	peaceful	world	means	
“respecting	the	right	of	different	peoples	to	establish	varying	political	
constitutions	 within	 certain	 safeguards.”245	 This	 helps	 to	 frame	
questions	 regarding	 the	 duties—including	 the	 criminal	 procedural	
duties—that	 states	 owe	 to	 foreign	 nationals.	 From	 a	 Hobbesian	
nationalist	 viewpoint,	 a	 state	 owes	 no	 duties	 to	 those	 beyond	 its	
borders.246	 To	 the	 Kantian,	 the	 individual—not	 the	 state—is	 the	
highest	 unit	 of	 moral	 concern	 and	 thus	 entitled	 to	 equal	 respect,	
regardless	 of	 citizenship	 status.247	 From	 this	 cosmopolitan	 vantage	
 
come	into	existence.”).	
	 241.	 Frank	J.	Garcia,	Three	Takes	on	Global	Justice,	31	U.	LA	VERNE	L.	REV.	323,	325	
(2009)	(“When	we	speak	of	global	justice	we	are	arguing,	in	effect,	that	globalization	
is	creating	social	outcomes	and	processes	.	.	.	that	make	justice	relevant	at	the	global	
level,	and	that	we	need	to	consider	whether	these	outcomes	and	processes	are	indeed	
acceptable	in	terms	of	core	principles.”).	
	 242.	 Brooks,	 supra	 note	 240,	 at	 xv;	 see	 THOMAS	HOBBES,	THE	 ELEMENTS	 OF	 LAW,	
NATURAL	AND	POLITIC	182	(J.C.A.	Gaskin	ed.,	Oxford	Univ.	Press	1994)	(1650)	(“For	that	
which	 is	 the	 law	 of	 nature	 between	 man	 and	 man,	 before	 the	 constitution	 of	
commonwealth,	is	the	law	of	nations	between	sovereign	and	sovereign,	after.”).	
	 243.	 Brooks,	supra	note	240,	at	xvi.	
	 244.	 Id.	at	xvi.	
	 245.	 Id.	 (emphasis	 added);	 see	 GILLIAN	 BROCK,	 GLOBAL	 JUSTICE:	 A	 COSMOPOLITAN	
ACCOUNT	3	(2009)	(“On	one	common	account	of	cosmopolitanism,	the	key	idea	is	that	
every	person	has	global	stature	as	the	ultimate	unit	of	moral	concern	and	is	therefore	
entitled	to	equal	respect	and	consideration	no	matter	what	her	citizenship	status	or	
other	affiliations	happen	to	be.”).	
	 246.	 Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1028	(“[P]olitical	theory	since	Thomas	Hobbes’s	
Leviathan	has	focused	largely	on	the	functioning	of	states.”);	Brooks,	supra	note	240,	
at	xvi.	
	 247.	 BROCK,	supra	note	245;	Brooks,	supra	note	240,	at	xvi.	
2020]	 CORE	CRIMINAL	PROCEDURE	 295	
	
point,	 the	 question	 becomes	what	 practical	 steps	 a	 country	 should	
take	in	order	to	satisfy	those	duties.248		
Rawls	 and	 another	 theorist	 in	 this	 tradition—Charles	 Beitz—
provide	 particular	 guidance	 here.	 To	 start,	 Rawls’s	 Law	 of	 Peoples	
distinguishes	 between	 rights	 guaranteed	 domestically	 and	 those	
guaranteed	 between	 peoples	 of	 different	 nations.249	 He	 makes	 the	
distinction	between	reasonable	pluralism	of	comprehensive	doctrines	
within	 a	 constitutional	 democracy	 and	 an	 even	 greater	 diversity	
among	decent	peoples	with	many	different	cultures	and	traditions.250	
Despite	such	variety,	however,	free	and	democratic	peoples	will	agree	
on	 certain	 principles	 of	 justice,	 including	 that	 they	 are	 to	 “honor	
human	rights.”251	While	the	specific	rights	on	which	Rawls	insists	is	a	
source	 of	 debate,252	 Rawls	 justifies	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	
approach	 to	 fundamental	 rights,	 given	 that	 the	 U.S.	 federal	
government	 has	 twice	 made	 these	 distinctions—first	 as	 a	 federal	
 
	 248.	 Brooks,	supra	note	240,	at	xix;	BROCK,	supra	note	245	(“What	policies	should	
a	cosmopolitan	support	in	the	world	we	live	in	today?”).	See	generally	SAMUEL	MOYN,	
NOT	ENOUGH:	HUMAN	RIGHTS	IN	AN	UNEQUAL	WORLD	146–72	(2018)	(discussing	the	rise	
of	 global	 justice	 theory	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s);	 KWAME	 ANTHONY	 APPIAH,	
COSMOPOLITANISM:	ETHICS	IN	A	WORLD	OF	STRANGERS	151	(2006)	(“[C]osmopolitanism	is	
.	.	.	universality	plus	difference	.	.	.	.”).	
	 249.	 John	Rawls,	The	Law	of	Peoples,	in	THE	GLOBAL	JUSTICE	READER,	supra	note	240,	
at	218,	230	(“The	parties’	first	task	in	the	second	original	position	is	to	specify	the	Law	
of	 Peoples—its	 ideals,	 principles,	 and	 standards—and	 how	 those	 norms	 apply	 to	
political	relations	among	peoples.”).	Since	its	publication,	The	Law	of	Peoples	has	been	
heavily	criticized	on	a	variety	of	fronts.	See,	e.g.,	Seyla	Benhabib,	The	Law	of	Peoples,	
Distributive	 Justice,	and	Migrations,	 72	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	1761,	1761	 (2004)	 (arguing	
that	 Rawls’s	 emphasis	 on	 political	 communities	 and	 the	 modern	 nation-state	
abandoned	 the	 Kantian	 framework	 of	 liberal	 cosmopolitanism);	 Charles	 R.	 Beitz,	
Rawls’s	 Law	 of	 Peoples,	 110	 ETHICS	 669,	 669–96	 (2000);	 Thomas	 W.	 Pogge,	Moral	
Universalism	and	Global	Economic	Justice,	1	POL.	PHIL.	&	ECON.	29,	29–58	(2002).	
	 250.	 BROCK,	 supra	 note	 245,	 at	 12–13	 (acknowledging	 that	 moderate	
cosmopolitanism	recognizes	a	distinction	between	norms	of	justice	that	apply	within	
an	individual	society	and	those	that	apply	to	a	global	population	at	large).	
	 251.	 JOHN	RAWLS,	THE	LAW	OF	PEOPLES	36–37	(1999).	For	“decent	peoples,”	Rawls	
identifies	a	narrower	core	of	human	rights,	such	as	 the	right	 to	 life,	 right	 to	 liberty,	
right	to	property,	and	to	formal	equality.	Id.	at	59–65.	Such	distinctions	are	one	of	many	
critiques	that	scholars	have	advanced	against	The	Law	of	Peoples.	See	BROCK,	supra	note	
245,	 at	 28	 (“Another	 common	 observation	 is	 that	 Rawls	 provides	 very	 little	
argument	.	.	.	 for	why	decent	societies	would	endorse	only	 the	 limited	set	of	human	
rights	 [whereas]	 liberal	 societies	 .	.	.	 would	want	 to	 add	more	 to	 the	 list	 of	 human	
rights	.	.	.	.”).	Rawls	uses	the	case	of	fair	trade	to	show	that—in	addition	to	principles	
that	define	the	basic	equality	of	all	peoples—parties	will	establish	guidelines	to	set	up	
cooperative	 organizations	 and	 agree	 to	 standards	 of	 fairness	 of	 trade	 alongside	
provisions	for	mutual	assistance.	Rawls,	supra	note	249,	at	231.	
	 252.	 BROCK,	supra	note	245,	at	38	(“Quite	apart	from	which	[human	rights]	Rawls	
actually	means	 to	 endorse,	 there	 is	 the	 question	 of	 those	 he	 should	 endorse,	 if	 his	
project	is	to	be	consistent.”).	
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arbiter	of	which	rights	are	fundamental	between	and	among	the	fifty	
U.S.	 states	 and	 the	 federal	 government,	 and	 second	by	determining	
which	 rights	 are	 guaranteed	 between	 and	 among	 nation	 states.253	
Incorporation	 first	 allows	 for	procedural	diversity	but	provides	 the	
greatest	 guidance	 to	 individual	 U.S.	 states	 regarding	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 guarantees;	 fewer	 are	 then	 provided	 in	 cases	 of	
extradition	 and	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments.254	 In	
furtherance	 of	 such	 second	 category,	 American	 leadership	 in	 the	
creation	 of	 multilateral	 institutions	 such	 as	 Interpol,255	 the	 United	
Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime,256	the	Egmont	Group	of	Financial	
Intelligence	 Units,257	 and	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 Organization	 of	
American	States258	provide	some	grounding	for	multilateral	criminal	
law	 enforcement	 cooperation	 and	 standards,	while	 extradition	 and	
mutual	 legal	 assistance	 treaties	 ground	 bilateral	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation.259	
Even	more	 to	 the	 point,	 Charles	 Beitz	 advances	 two	 potential	
grounds	 for	 thinking	 about	 human	 rights—and	 thus,	 by	 definition,	
certain	criminal	procedural	rights—as	a	neutral,	“nonparochial”	basis	
for	 criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing.260	 First,	 human	 rights	 could	
meet	 a	 reasonableness—as	 opposed	 to	 complete	 agreement—
standard.261	This	then	provides	a	universal	and	legitimate	basis	from	
which	 to	 criticize	 states	 and,	 thus,	 constrain	 them.262	 Drawing	 on	
Michael	Walzer,	Beitz	notes	that	a	comparison	of	moral	codes	across	
societies	may	produce	a	set	of	universal	standards—including	human	
rights	 and	 certain	 rules	 such	 as	 those	 prohibiting	 murder,	 deceit,	
 
	 253.	 Rawls,	 supra	 note	 249,	 at	 231	 (arguing	 that	 peoples’	 “concern	 for	 human	
rights	leads	them	to	limit	a	state’s	right	of	internal	sovereignty”).	
	 254.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.	
	 255.	 Todd	 Sandler,	 Daniel	 G.	 Arce	 &	Walter	 Enders,	An	 Evaluation	 of	 Interpol’s	
Cooperative-Based	Counterterrorism	Linkages,	54	J.L.	&	ECON.	79,	80–82	(2011).	
	 256.	 Eve	de	Coning	&	Gunnar	Stolsvik,	Combating	Organised	Crime	at	Sea:	What	
Role	for	the	United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime,	28	INT’L	J.	MARINE	&	COASTAL	L.	
189,	190	(2013).	
	 257.	 Endre	Nyitrai,	Money	Laundering	and	Organised	Crime,	2015	J.	E.-EUR.	CRIM.	L.	
94,	95.	
	 258.	 David	 P.	 Warner,	 Law	 Enforcement	 Cooperation	 in	 the	 Organization	 of	
American	States:	A	Focus	on	REMJA,	37	U.	MIA.	INTER-AM.	L.	REV.	387,	395–97	(2006).	
	 259.	 Id.	
	 260.	 Charles	R.	Beitz,	Human	Rights	as	a	Common	Concern,	95	AM.	POL.	SCI.	REV.	269,	
272	(2001).	
	 261.	 Thom	Brooks,	Introduction	to	Part	III	to	THE	GLOBAL	JUSTICE	READER,	supra	note	
240,	 at	 117.	 See	 generally	 KATRINA	 FORRESTER,	 IN	 THE	 SHADOW	 OF	 JUSTICE:	 POSTWAR	
LIBERALISM	AND	THE	REMAKING	OF	POLITICAL	PHILOSOPHY	140–71	(2019)	(describing	the	
emergence	of	global	justice	theory	in	the	1970s	and	1980s).	
	 262.	 Brooks,	supra	note	261.	
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torture,	 and	 oppression—that	 constitute	 a	 “moral	 minimum.”263	
Second,	Beitz	also	offers	the	Rawlsian	idea	of	“overlapping	consensus”	
of	political	moralities	to	accentuate	rights	acceptable	by	a	reasonable	
person	 consistently	 with	 acceptance	 of	 any	 of	 the	 main	 global	
conceptions	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 justice.264	 Broader	 than	 a	
“common	 core”	 of	 human	 rights,	 it	 would	 instead	 reflect	 a	 broad	
account	 of	 rights	 that	 each	 culture	 could	 reasonably	 accept	 as	
consistent	 with	 its	 moral	 conventions.265	 Without	 fully	 endorsing	
either	conception,	Beitz	notes	that	human	rights	signal	 the	minimal	
legitimacy	of	a	society.266	In	other	words,	while	human	rights	may	not	
indicate	 that	 a	 nation	 is	 fully	 legitimate,	 such	 rights	may	meet	 the	
threshold	 necessary	 for	 the	 nation	 to	merit	 respect	 as	 a	minimally	
legitimate	cooperating	member	of	international	society.267	
Beitz’s	 framework	 helps	 theorize	 a	 field	 in	 which	 judges,	 law	
enforcement,	and	diplomats	are	making	criminal	procedural	decisions	
in	 law	 enforcement	 cooperation.	 In	 this	 space,	 criminal	 procedural	
rights	 are	 not	 rigid	 protections	 that	 simply	 do	 or	 do	 not	 exist.268	
Instead,	a	broad	standard	of	reasonableness	governs	cooperation,	as	
certain	rights	provide	 indicia	of	minimal	 legitimacy	 for	purposes	of	
extradition,	mutual	 legal	assistance,	and	other	 forms	of	 information	
sharing.269	 And	 furthermore,	 multilateral	 human	 rights	 treaties	
provide	a	contractarian	foundation	for	the	legal	duties	that	states	owe	
to	their	own	and	other	nationals,	in	the	form	of	criminal	procedural	
rights.270	 This	 both	 explains	 and	 justifies	 U.S.	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation	 with	 certain	 countries.	 Germany,	 South	 Korea,	 and	
Argentina	necessarily	lack	the	exact	same	constellation	of	rights	that	
exist	in	the	United	States,	but	at	the	same	time	have	some	minimum	
 
	 263.	 Beitz,	supra	note	260.	R.J.	Vincent	has	similarly	pointed	to	a	certain	“lowest	
common	denominator	 .	.	.	core	of	basic	rights	that	 is	common	to	all	cultures	despite	
their	apparently	divergent	theories.”	Id.	
	 264.	 Id.	at	273.	
	 265.	 Id.	
	 266.	 Id.	at	274.	
	 267.	 Id.	
	 268.	 See	Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1062–63.	
	 269.	 Protection	of	basic	human	rights—along	with	non-arbitrary	judgments	and	
punishment	for	heinous	crimes—may	constitute	three	moral	requirements	for	a	legal	
system	to	qualify	as	legitimate.	See	id.	(citing	KWAME	ANTHONY	APPIAH,	THE	ETHICS	OF	
IDENTITY	88–99	(2005)).	
	 270.	 Id.	at	1056	(“Association	is	made	the	condition	of	legal	duty—it	is	just	that	the	
association	is	extended	globally,	either	through	the	original	social	contract	or	through	
some	secondary	contract	among	peoples	or	states.”).	While	Feldman	considers	natural	
law	 as	 a	 foundation	 for	 a	 cosmopolitan	 conception	 of	 law,	 natural	 law	 seems	
unnecessary	 where	 human	 rights	 treaties	 provide	 a	 contractarian	 foundation	 for	
certain	criminal	procedural	rights.	
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core	of	criminal	procedural	rights	that	resemble	our	own.271	From	a	
political	 theoretical	 perspective,	 their	 commitment	 to	 enumerated	
human	 rights	 as	 holistic	 systems,	 while	 not	 identical,	 provide	
reasonable	protection	along	certain	constitutional	safeguards.	This	is	
what	 Rawls	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 essential	 criteria	 for	 liberal	
peoples,	 namely,	 a	 reasonably	 just	 constitutional	 democratic	
government	 that	 serves	 their	 fundamental	 interests.272	 Such	
governments	are	effectively	under	the	political	and	electoral	control	
of	 their	 people,	 answering	 to	 and	 protecting	 fundamental	 interests	
that	are	specified	in	constitutions	and	their	interpretations.273	But	in	
doing	so,	they	apply	coercive	law	to	certain	individuals	in	an	arranged,	
interpreted	manner	that,	ultimately,	legitimizes	the	global	set	of	legal	
systems.274	And	in	doing	so,	governments	must	honor	human	rights	as	
a	necessary—but	not	 sufficient—condition	 to	be	considered	among	
free	and	democratic	peoples.275	
B. FROM	THEORY	TO	PRACTICE:	HOW	TO	EVALUATE	FOREIGN	CRIMINAL	
JUSTICE	SYSTEMS		
Moving	 now	 from	 theory	 toward	 practice,	 what	 constitutes	
reasonableness	when	evaluating	a	foreign	country’s	criminal	 justice	
system?	Evaluation	of	foreign	criminal	justice	systems	is	a	particular,	
“longstanding	problem”	 for	U.S.	 judges.276	 Judges	 from	Holmes277	 to	
 
	 271.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	96.	See	generally	CAT,	supra	note	104.	
	 272.	 Rawls,	supra	note	249,	at	222	(“Liberal	peoples	have	three	basic	features:	a	
reasonably	just	constitutional	democratic	government	that	serves	their	fundamental	
interests;	citizens	united	by	what	Mill	called	‘common	sympathies’;	and	finally,	a	moral	
nature.”);	see	also	Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1062	(“[L]egal	systems	must	embrace	
certain	universal	commitments	simply	in	virtue	of	being	legitimate	legal	systems.	To	
be	 a	 legitimate	 legal	 system,	 on	 this	 view,	 requires	 satisfying	 some	 basic	 moral	
requirements	 .	.	.	.	 [This]	 justifies	the	very	undertaking	of	doing	law,	of	coercing	and	
demanding	compliance.”).	
	 273.	 Rawls,	supra	note	249,	at	222.	
	 274.	 Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1066.	
	 275.	 Additionally,	this	global	justice	framework	does	not	merely	inform	criminal	
procedure;	 real-world	 criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing	 also	 informs	 global	 justice	
theory	by	 focusing	on	 a	 legal	methodology	 to	 assess	what	 specific	 legal	 rights	may	
constitute	a	“core”	from	a	Rawlsian	law	of	peoples	perspective.	
	 276.	 Jia,	supra	note	22	(manuscript	at	30–31)	(“Can	American	 judges	accurately	
apply	 continental	 law?	 How	 much	 weight	 should	 be	 accorded	 to	 statutes,	 judicial	
decisions,	or	treatises?	Are	the	two	systems	close	enough	as	to	preclude	the	need	for	
experts?”).	
	 277.	 Diaz	v.	Gonzalez,	261	U.S.	102,	106	(1923)	(“When	we	contemplate	[a	foreign	
legal]	system	from	the	outside	it	seems	like	a	wall	of	stone,	every	part	even	with	all	the	
others,	except	so	far	as	our	own	local	education	may	lead	us	to	see	subordinations	to	
which	we	are	 accustomed.	But	 to	one	brought	up	within	 it,	 varying	 emphasis,	 tacit	
assumptions,	 unwritten	practices,	 a	 thousand	 influences	 gained	only	 from	 life,	may	
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Posner278	 have	 run	 the	 gamut	 in	 their	 comfort	 and	 willingness	 to	
evaluate	such	foreign	legal	systems.279	The	answer	is	to	ground	rights	
in	 a	 methodology	 that	 all	 three	 U.S.	 government	 branches	 should	
apply.280		
 
give	to	the	different	parts	wholly	new	values	that	logic	and	grammar	never	could	have	
got	from	the	books.”).	
	 278.	 Bodum	 USA,	 Inc.	 v.	 La	 Cafetiere,	 Inc.,	 621	 F.3d	 624,	 633	 (7th	 Cir.	 2010)	
(Posner,	 J.,	 concurring)	 (“[O]ur	 linguistic	 provincialism	does	 not	 excuse	 intellectual	
provincialism.	It	does	not	justify	our	judges	in	relying	on	paid	witnesses	to	spoon	feed	
them	foreign	law	that	can	be	found	well	explained	in	English-language	treatises	and	
articles.”).	
	 279.	 Jia,	 supra	note	22	 (manuscript	 at	 31–32)	 (situating	Holmes	 and	Posner	on	
opposite	 ends	 of	 a	 continuum	 of	 legal-cultural	 translation).	 To	 some	 degree,	 this	
question	 is	 inherent—and,	 arguably,	 an	 inherent	 flaw—in	 any	 reasonableness	
standard.	To	use	a	famous	and	familiar	example,	the	Katz	test—which	asks	whether	an	
individual’s	 subjective	 expectation	 of	 privacy	 is	 one	 that	 society	 recognizes	 as	
reasonable	for	purposes	of	determining	what	constitutes	a	“search”	under	the	Fourth	
Amendment—is	often	criticized	for	placing	such	societal	determinations	in	the	hands	
of	 the	 subjective	 assessments	 of	 judges.	 Katz	 v.	 United	 States,	 389	 U.S.	 347,	 361	
(Harlan,	 J.,	 concurring);	 see,	 e.g.,	 Orin	 S.	 Kerr,	 Four	 Models	 of	 Fourth	 Amendment	
Protection,	60	STAN.	L.	REV.	503,	504	(2007)	(“[N]o	one	seems	to	know	what	makes	an	
expectation	of	privacy	constitutionally	‘reasonable’”);	Carpenter	v.	United	States,	138	
S.	 Ct.	 2206,	 2246	 (2018)	 (Thomas,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (“The	 only	 thing	 the	 past	 three	
decades	have	established	about	the	Katz	test	is	that	society’s	expectations	of	privacy	
bear	 an	 uncanny	 resemblance	 to	 those	 expectations	 of	 privacy	 that	 this	 Court	
considers	 reasonable.”	 (internal	 quotations	 omitted)).	 In	 the	 cross-border	 context,	
policymakers	 and	 judges	may	 similarly	 default	 to	 their	 own	 expectation	 of	what	 is	
reasonable,	 which	 to	 some	 degree	 is	 rooted	 in	 their	 historically	 and	 culturally	
contingent	assessments	as	to	what	process	is	“good	enough.”	This	may	open	them	to	
the	charge	that	they	find	Western	countries	“good	enough”	and	non-Western	countries	
lacking,	 a	 variation	 on	 the	 racial	 disparity	 questions	 that	 plague	 criminal	 justice	
systems	today.	See	Jia,	supra	note	22	(manuscript	at	58–59)	(describing	how	a	judge	
may	use	“a	Western	ear”	to	cause	bias).	
	 280.	 A	 broad	 reasonableness	 regime	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 the	 European	 Court	 of	
Human	Rights’	“margin	of	appreciation,”	wherein	compromises	are	made	between	the	
goals	of	 fundamental	 rights	and	 the	 circumstances	 for	 limitations	 to	 these	 rights	 in	
particular	 national	 jurisdictions.	 See	 Janneke	 Gerards,	Margin	 of	 Appreciation	 and	
Incrementalism	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	18	HUM.	RTS.	L.	
REV.	495,	498	(2018).	The	Restatement	(Third)	of	Foreign	Relations	Law	also	advanced	
reasonableness	 as	 a	 limitation	 on	 the	 jurisdiction	 to	 prescribe,	 though	 this	 was	
removed	in	the	Fourth	Restatement.	Compare	RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	FOREIGN	RELS.	L.	
OF	THE	U.S.	§	403(1)	(AM.	L.	INST.	1987)	(“Even	when	one	of	the	bases	for	jurisdiction	
under	 §	402	 is	 present,	 a	 state	may	 not	 exercise	 jurisdiction	 to	 prescribe	 law	with	
respect	to	a	person	or	activity	having	connections	with	another	state	when	the	exercise	
of	such	jurisdiction	is	unreasonable.”),	with	RESTATEMENT	(FOURTH)	OF	FOREIGN	RELS.	L.	
OF	THE	U.S.	(AM.	L.	INST.	2018).	See	generally	Steven	Arrigg	Koh,	The	Criminalization	of	
Foreign	Policy	(unpublished	manuscript)	(on	file	with	author)	(calling	for	a	principled	
engagement	when	engaging	with	foreign	countries	that	have	politicized	their	criminal	
justice	systems).	
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In	this	cross-border	space,	both	international	human	rights	law	
and	comparative	 legal	method	are	applicable.281	 First,	 international	
human	 rights	 norms	 provide	 a	 global	 baseline	 of	 individual	
protections,	 rooted	 in	 universality,	 human	 autonomy,	 and	 human	
dignity.282	 Furthermore,	 due	 to	 their	 force	 of	 law	 in	 virtually	 all	
countries	today,	human	rights	laws	protect	U.S.	and	foreign	nationals	
at	home	but	also	when	being	prosecuted	in	foreign	systems.	And	they	
provide	a	mutually	agreed	upon	criminal283	procedural	foundation	for	
the	interaction	of	two	systems	when	they	cooperate	in	cross-border	
law	enforcement.	Indeed,	human	rights	may	be	a	ground	for	foreign	
cooperation,	 not	 just	 coercive	 intervention.284	 Second,	 comparative	
functionalism	guides	how	foreign	criminal	justice	systems’	procedural	
protections	may	reasonably	be	interpreted	on	their	own	terms.285	This	
 
	 281.	 A	cosmopolitan	conception	of	legal	duty	may	involve	each	system	applying	its	
version	of	certain	universal	 laws	 to	everyone	with	whom	it	comes	 into	contact.	See	
Feldman,	supra	note	182,	at	1064.	In	so	doing	in	the	criminal	space,	each	system	must	
apply	its	version	of	certain	universal	procedural	protections	as	well.	Id.	
	 282.	 See	Jack	Donnelly,	The	Relative	Universality	of	Human	Rights,	29	HUM.	RTS.	Q.	
281,	281,	297,	306	(2007).	Other	scholars	have	noted	the	usefulness	of	human	rights	
treaties	 as	 a	 procedural	 baseline	 in	 the	 extradition	 and	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality	 contexts.	 See	 John	 T.	 Parry,	 International	 Extradition,	 the	 Rule	 of	
Non-Inquiry,	and	the	Problem	of	Sovereignty,	90	B.U.	L.	REV.	1973,	2007–14	(2010).	
	 283.	 See	Piet	Hein	Van	Kempen,	Introduction	to	CRIMINAL	LAW	AND	HUMAN	RIGHTS	
xiii	(P.H.P.H.M.C.	van	Kempen	ed.,	2014)	(“Human	rights	have	touched	on	almost	every	
aspect	of	criminal	procedure	law	and	practice,	regardless	of	the	specifics	of	any	given	
criminal	justice	system.”).	
	 284.	 Beitz,	supra	note	260,	at	275–76.	
	 285.	 See,	 e.g.,	Mark	Tushnet,	The	Possibilities	 of	 Comparative	Constitutional	 Law,	
108	 YALE	 L.J.	 1225,	 1238–69	 (1999)	 (examining	 the	 role	 of	 functionalism	 in	
comparative	constitutional	law).	Of	course,	as	an	epistemological	matter,	one	criminal	
justice	 system	 cannot	 completely	 understand	 another	 from	 that	 foreign	 criminal	
justice	system’s	“internal	perspective,”	given	that	legal	rules	and	texts	are	themselves	
deeply	rooted	within	a	distinct	economic,	political,	moral,	and	cultural	 context.	Nils	
Jansen,	Comparative	 Law	 and	 Comparative	 Knowledge,	 in	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	 OF	
COMPARATIVE	LAW,	supra	note	28,	at	306	(“For	a	long	time,	comparative	lawyers	have	
regarded	 it	 as	 their	 methodological	 problem	 to	 be	 gaining	 knowledge	 of	 another	
system	and	understand	its	way	of	reasoning:	in	applying	concepts,	rules	or	precedents,	
and,	more	basically,	in	knowing	the	relevant	sources	of	knowledge.”).	Criminal	justice	
is	 “culture-bearing,”	 and	 as	 an	 artifact	 of	 culture	 brings	 with	 it	 the	 challenges	 of	
translating	one	culture	 to	another.	 Joshua	Kleinfeld,	Two	Cultures	of	Punishment,	68	
STAN.	 L.	REV.	 933,	 940	 (2016)	 (“[Criminal	 justice]	 is	 .	.	.	 the	 site	 at	 which	 cultures	
negotiate	 certain	 kinds	 of	 issues	 connected	 to	 wrongdoing	 and	 community,	 social	
order	and	violence,	identity,	the	power	of	the	state,	and	the	terms	of	collective	ethical	
life.”).	See	generally	MITCHEL	DE	S.-O.-L’E.	LASSER,	JUDICIAL	DELIBERATIONS:	A	COMPARATIVE	
ANALYSIS	OF	TRANSPARENCY	AND	LEGITIMACY	(2009)	(discussing	the	varied	conceptions	
of	 French,	 American,	 and	 European	 Union	 judicial	 decision-making	 and	 related	
discursive	practices	within	each	system).	And	functionalism	itself	is	both	mainstream	
and	highly	 criticized	 as	 a	 comparative	 legal	methodology.	See	 Jansen,	 supra,	 at	 308	
(“[C]omparative	 lawyers	 have	 always	 analysed	 legal	 rules	 and	 systems	 in	 their	
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gets	 to	 the	 nub	 of	 how,	 holistically,	 certain	 sets	 of	 rights	 and	
procedures	 in	a	 foreign	criminal	 justice	system	constitute	sufficient	
criminal	 process,	 even	 though	 individual	 rights	 may	 not—indeed,	
cannot—function	 in	precisely	 the	same	way	 in	any	two	systems.	As	
with	 any	 system—political,	 linguistic,	 or	 religious,	 for	 example—a	
comparative	approach	reveals	the	historical	and	cultural	contingency	
of	a	system	that	justifies	itself	completely	from	an	internal	perspective	
but	takes	on	a	new	valence	from	an	external	perspective.	In	criminal	
justice,	for	example,	cultures	of	punishment	vary:	America’s	culture	of	
punishment	 likely	 views	 offender	 criminality	 as	 immutable	 and	
devaluing,	while	European	culture	does	not.286	
This	 Part	 addresses	 this	 question	 by	 providing	 a	 tripartite	
framework	 for	 evaluating	 foreign	 sovereigns.	 It	 then	 prescribes	
process	 roles	 for	 each	 of	 the	 three	 branches	 of	 government	 in	
furtherance	of	such	framework.	
1. A	Tripartite	Framework:	Constitutional,	Human	Rights,	and	
Comparative		
Let	us	now	operationalize	the	tripartite	framework.	Judges	and	
policymakers	 should	draw	on	 three	 sources	when	articulating	 core	
criminal	 procedure.	 First,	 judges	 and	 policymakers	 should	 use	 U.S.	
 
historical	 context,	 reconstructing	 the	 individual	 functions	 of	 rules	 from	within	 the	
individual	legal	system.”);	Ralf	Michaels,	The	Functional	Method	of	Comparative	Law,	
in	 THE	 OXFORD	 HANDBOOK	 OF	 COMPARATIVE	 LAW,	 supra	 note	 28,	 at	 340–43	 (“The	
functional	method	 has	 become	 both	 the	mantra	 and	 the	 bête	 noire	 of	 comparative	
law.”).	While	 a	more	 rigorous	 defense	 of	 functionalism	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	
Article,	 suffice	 it	 to	say	 that	 functionalism	advantageously	avoids	essentializing	any	
particular	legal	element	in	a	given	legal	system,	instead	focusing	on	its	connection	with	
another	 variable	 element	 and,	more	 generally,	 describing	 groups	 of	 legal	 elements	
without	the	specificity	that	comes	with	traditional,	abstracted	legal	classification.	Id.	at	
355–56.	
	 286.	 Kleinfeld,	supra	note	285,	at	941;	see	also	James	Q.	Whitman,	Presumption	of	
Innocence	or	Presumption	of	Mercy?:	Weighing	Two	Western	Modes	of	Justice,	94	TEX.	L.	
REV.	933,	934	(2016)	(noting	that	continental	European	courts	place	less	emphasis	on	
the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 than	 the	 United	 States	 does,	 opting	 instead	 for	
protections	for	the	guilty	and	thus	inflicting	less	excessive	punishment).	The	doctrine	
evinces	 this	 awareness	 at	 the	 limits	 of	 constitutional	 applicability.	 For	 example,	
Boumediene	noted	that	“questions	of	extraterritoriality	turn	on	objective	factors	and	
practical	concerns,	not	formalism.”	Boumediene	v.	Bush,	553	U.S.	723,	764	(2008)	(“A	
constricted	reading	of	Eisentrager	overlooks	what	we	see	as	a	common	thread	uniting	
the	 Insular	Cases,	Eisentrager,	and	Reid:	the	 idea	 that	questions	of	extraterritoriality	
turn	 on	 objective	 factors	 and	 practical	 concerns,	 not	 formalism.”).	 And	 it	 provides	
some	 guidance	 that	 “cultural	 inappropriateness”—for	 example,	 the	 Insular	 Cases	
reticence	to	impose	common	law	procedures	on	a	population	accustomed	to	the	civil	
law—is	one	of	the	factors	the	Boumediene	court	identified	when	courts	may	identify	
enforcement	of	a	right	as	“impracticable	and	anomalous.”	Boumediene	v.	Bush,	553	
U.S.	723,	770	(2008);	see	Neuman,	supra	note	127,	at	269.	
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constitutional	 procedure	 rights	 as	 their	 baseline.	 This	 can	 include	
both	resemblance	to	enumerated	rights	 in	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	
lessons	 from	 the	 incorporation	 of	 procedural	 guarantees.	 For	
example,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 due	 process	
clause	does	not	incorporate	the	Fifth	Amendment	right	to	indictment	
by	 grand	 jury,	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 not	 as	 fundamental	 to	 Anglo-
American	 jurisprudence	 as,	 say,	 the	 right	 to	 a	 speedy	 and	 public	
trial.287	This	provides	a	clear	basis	upon	which	to	reject	any	defendant	
challenge	 that	 a	 foreign	 process	 violates	 this	 right	 because	 it	 lacks	
indictment	by	grand	jury.	
Second,	the	branches	should	consider	international	human	rights	
standards.	 As	 noted	 in	 Part	 I	 above,	 the	 history	 of	 negotiation	 and	
ratification	of	international	human	rights	instruments	demonstrates	
the	U.S.	government’s	willingness	to	affirm	certain	rights	as	core.	And	
such	 instruments	 affirm	 the	 duties	 owed	 to	 the	 United	 States	 and	
other	nationals	in	cross-border	criminal	cases.	For	example,	the	right	
to	the	trial	by	jury	is	conspicuously	absent,	whereas	the	right	against	
retroactivity	is	integral	to	all.288	In	so	doing,	they	may	also	consult	the	
general	comments	and	reports	of	the	human	rights	treaty	bodies	that	
monitor	the	implementation	of	human	rights	treaties.289		
Third	and	finally,	the	relevant	legal	actors	may	use	functionalism	
to	 ask	 how	 certain	 rights	 have	 been	 or	will	 be	 upheld	 in	 a	 foreign	
criminal	justice	system.	This	functionalism	analysis	materially	differs	
from	the	incorporation	context,	which	asks	more	narrowly	whether	
the	provision	was	 fundamental	 to	Anglo-American	 jurisprudence.290	
Instead,	 the	 query	 is	 whether	 such	 rights	 may	 be	 reasonably	
interpreted	as	upheld	based	on	that	legal	system’s	own	terms.	So,	for	
example,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 civil	 law	 investigating	 judge	 is	 foreign	 to	
common	 law	 judges	and	policymakers,	 in	particular	 the	 idea	 that	 a	
judge	can	build	a	record	that	is	automatically	admitted	into	evidence	
 
	 287.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.1.	
	 288.	 UDHR,	 supra	note	83,	art.	 11(2)	 (“No	one	 shall	 be	held	guilty	of	 any	penal	
offence	on	account	of	any	act	or	omission	which	did	not	constitute	a	penal	offence,	
under	national	or	international	law,	at	the	time	when	it	was	committed.”);	ICCPR	supra	
note	96,	art.	15.1	(“No	one	shall	be	held	guilty	of	any	criminal	offence	on	account	of	any	
act	 or	 omission	 which	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 criminal	 offence,	 under	 national	 or	
international	law,	at	the	time	when	it	was	committed.”);	U.S.	CONST.	art.	I,	§	9	(“No	.	.	.	
ex	post	 facto	Law	shall	 be	passed.”);	U.S.	CONST.	art.	 I,	 §	10	 (“No	State	 shall	 .	.	.	 pass	
any	.	.	.	ex	post	facto	Law.”).	
	 289.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Hum.	 Rts.	 Comm.,	 supra	 note	 96,	 ¶	 5	 (“While	 reservations	 to	
particular	clauses	of	article	14	may	be	acceptable,	a	general	reservation	to	the	right	to	
a	fair	trial	would	be	incompatible	with	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	Covenant.”).	
	 290.	 Timbs	v.	Indiana,	139	S.	Ct.	682,	689–90	(2019)	(incorporating	the	Excessive	
Fines	Clause	and	noting	that	“protection	against	excessive	fines	has	been	a	constant	
shield	throughout	Anglo-American	history”).	
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before	 criminal	 proceedings	 begin.	 But	 from	 a	 functionalist	
perspective	this	judicial	role	makes	sense,	given	civil	 law	judges	act	
within	a	broader	system	 lacking	a	 jury;	 in	such	systems,	 judges	are	
making	 factual	 and	 legal	 determinations	 as	 neutral	 adjudicators	
determining	 guilt	 or	 innocence.	 Indeed,	 a	 functionalist	 perspective	
focuses	 “not	 on	 rules	 alone	 but	 on	 their	 effects,	 not	 on	 doctrinal	
structures	.	.	.	alone	but	on	the	consequences	they	bring	about.”291	
Applying	this	tripartite	framework	to	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	
instructive.	First,	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	codified	in	both	Article	III	
and	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 and	 has	 been	
incorporated	through	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	Due	Process	Clause	
to	 apply	 to	 the	 states.292	 Owing	 to	 this,	 as	 Justice	 Scalia	 once	
memorably	noted,	courts	engaging	with	this	guarantee	are	“operating	
upon	the	spinal	column	of	American	democracy.”293	But	this	right	is	
lacking	in	any	international	human	rights	treaty—most	saliently	the	
ICCPR—given	 it	 is	 a	 creature	 of	 common	 law	 and	 conspicuously	
absent	 from	most	civil	 law	jurisdictions.294	And	second,	deploying	a	
functionalist	 view,	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 jury	 trial	 right	 in	 foreign	
jurisdictions	 is	 not	 problematic	 from	 a	 holistic	 comparative	
perspective,	given	that	in	civil	law	countries	judges	are	making	factual	
and	legal	determinations	as	neutral	adjudicators.	As	such,	courts	may	
deny	 defendants’	 challenges	 to	 admission	 of	 evidence,	 upward	
departure	of	sentences,	or	extradition	if	such	challenges	are	grounded	
in	 the	 argument	 that	 civil	 law	 countries	 lack	 a	 jury	 trial	 right.	 This	
affirms	the	rhetorical	flourish	of	the	U.S.	District	Court	for	the	Eastern	
District	of	Pennsylvania,	which	as	described	in	the	Introduction,	held	
 
	 291.	 Michaels,	 supra	note	285,	 at	47–48	 (“Institutions,	both	 legal	 and	non-legal,	
even	 doctrinally	 different	 ones,	 are	 deemed	 comparable	 if	 they	 are	 functionally	
equivalent,	 i[.]e[.],	 if	 they	 fulfill	 similar	 functions	 in	 different	 legal	 systems.”).	 For	
example,	Akhil	Amar	has	argued	that	the	Sixth	Amendment	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	a	
required	component	of	a	tribunal’s	structure	not	just	an	accused’s	individual	right	to	
be	waived	at	her	discretion.	Akhil	Reed	Amar,	The	Bill	of	Rights	as	a	Constitution,	100	
YALE	L.J.	1131,	1196	(1991).	As	Raustiala	has	noted,	 the	 latter	 interpretation	would	
provide	greater	restraint	on	the	government—just	as	the	U.S.	Senate	in	Mexico	could	
not	bypass	bicameralism,	a	U.S.	tribunal	located	elsewhere	may	not	bypass	a	jury	in	
convicting	a	person	of	a	criminal	offense.	See	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	67.	
	 292.	 U.S.	CONST.	art.	III,	§	2;	id.	amends.	VI,	XIV.	
	 293.	 Neder	v.	United	States,	527	U.S.	1,	30	(1999)	(Scalia,	J.,	concurring)	(“When	
this	Court	deals	with	the	content	of	this	guarantee—the	only	one	to	appear	in	both	the	
body	of	the	Constitution	and	the	Bill	of	Rights—it	is	operating	upon	the	spinal	column	
of	American	democracy.”).	
	 294.	 See	 generally	 Hans,	 supra	 note	 165	 (surveying	 and	 comparing	 lay	
participation	systems	worldwide).	
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that	it	would	be	“cultural	imperialism”	to	insist	on	a	Sixth	Amendment	
right	to	trial	by	jury	abroad.295	
By	contrast,	the	tripartite	framework	affirms	the	right	to	counsel	
as	part	of	the	inner	core	of	criminal	procedure.	First,	like	the	right	to	
trial	by	jury,	the	right	to	counsel	is	codified	in	the	Sixth	Amendment	
and	applies	to	the	U.S.	states	through	incorporation.296	But	it	 is	also	
codified	 in	 the	 ICCPR,	wherein	Article	 14(3)(b)	 affirms	defendants’	
right	“[t]o	have	adequate	time	and	facilities	for	the	preparation	of	his	
defence	 and	 to	 communicate	with	 counsel	 of	 his	 own	 choosing.”297	
And	finally,	a	functionalist	comparative	analysis	affirms	that	virtually	
all	states	guarantee	a	right	 to	counsel.298	 Indeed,	while	counsel	 in	a	
civil	 law	 system	 relies	 less	 on	 adversarial	 functions	 such	 as	 cross-
examining	witnesses,	it	plays	a	largely	analogous	function	vis-à-vis	the	
state	 and	 the	 judiciary	 in	 civil	 law	 systems.299	 But	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Rwandan	 gacaca	 courts,	 which	 included	 a	 community-based	
conception	of	 justice	but	lacked	a	functional	equivalent	of	a	right	to	
counsel,300	 U.S.	 courts	 should	 not	 rely	 on	 such	 proceedings	 for	
purposes	 of	 upward	 departure.	 The	 U.S.	 District	 Court	 for	 the	
Northern	 District	 of	 Iowa	 was	 thus	 wrong	 in	 its	 use	 of	 Rwandan	
gacaca	in	absentia	convictions	in	its	upward	departure	at	sentencing	
in	Ngombwa.301	
2. Separation	of	Powers	
Let	us	now	consider	how	the	three	branches	of	government	may	
apply	 this	 tripartite	 framework	 to	 better	 articulate	 core	 criminal	
procedure.		
 
	 295.	 Cf.	United	States	v.	Moskovits,	784	F.	Supp.	193,	196	(E.D.	Pa.	1992)	(“It	would,	
however,	be	a	form	of	cultural	imperialism	for	the	United	States	to	insist	that	it	would	
not	countenance,	for	U.S.	purposes,	recognition	of	a	foreign	criminal	judgment	which	
came	from	a	legal	culture	which	did	not	employ	the	jury	.	.	.	.”).	
	 296.	 Gideon	 v.	 Wainwright,	 372	 U.S.	 335	 (1963)	 (incorporating	 the	 Sixth	
Amendment	right	to	counsel).	
	 297.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	96.	
	 298.	 Laura	 K.	 Abel	 &	 Lora	 J.	 Livingston,	 The	 Existing	 Civil	 Right	 to	 Counsel	
Infrastructure,	JUDGES	J.,	Fall	2008,	at	24,	24	(2008).	
	 299.	 See	 VIVIENNE	 O’CONNOR,	 PRACTITIONER’S	 GUIDE:	 COMMON	 LAW	 AND	 CIVIL	 LAW	
TRADITIONS	 20–21	 (2012),	 https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/Common%	
20and%20Civil%20Law%20Traditions.pdf	[https://perma.cc/NQC2-XPYF]	
(surveying	the	role	of	defense	counsel	in	civil	law	countries).	
	 300.	 See	United	States	v.	Ngombwa,	No.	14-CR-123-LRR,	2017	WL	508208,	at	*4	
(N.D.	 Iowa	Feb.	 7,	 2017)	 (explaining	 how	Rwandan	 communities	were	 tasked	with	
prosecuting	genocide	perpetrators).	
	 301.	 United	 States	 v.	 Ngombwa,	 893	 F.3d	 546,	 556	 (8th	 Cir.	 2018);	 see	 also	
Ngombwa,	2017	WL	508208,	at	*19	n.	8.	
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The	tripartite	framework	prescription	must	balance	the	inherent	
tension	when	 foreign	affairs	and	criminal	 justice	mix:	 the	executive	
branch	has	comparative	foreign	affairs	expertise,	while	the	legislature	
has	an	affirmative	mandate	to	articulate	criminal	law	and	procedure.	
In	 traditional	 criminal	 cases,	 all	 three	 government	 branches	 play	
familiar	 roles.	 Congress	 passes	 criminal	 laws,	 the	 executive	 branch	
enforces	 them,	and	 the	 judiciary	adjudicates	questions	arising	 from	
them.	But	contemporary	cross-border	law	enforcement	cooperation	
complicates	 this	 picture,	 particularly	 because	 courts	 are	 less	
equipped—though	 arguably	 not	 ill-equipped—to	 evaluate	 foreign	
jurisdictions’	 criminal	 justice	 systems.	 In	 other	 words,	 criminal	
procedural	line	drawing	is	both	outside	of	core	judicial	competence—
because	courts	are	not	foreign	affairs	authorities302—and	within	it—
because	 they	 regularly	 adjudicate	 defendant	 rights.303	 The	 political	
branches,	then,	are	left	with	unusually	wide	discretion	to	enact	new	
laws,	ratify	treaties,	and	enforce	domestic	and	foreign	criminal	laws	
within	this	framework.	A	prescriptive	account	may	thus	resolve	many	
of	 the	 doctrinal	 tensions	 and	 ambiguities	 above	 by	 drawing	 on	 the	
executive’s	 foreign	 affairs	 expertise,	 followed	 by	 Congress	 and	 the	
judiciary	 exercising	 their	 more	 traditional	 functions	 as	 criminal	
justice	system	actors.	
Broadly	 speaking,	 a	 prescriptive	 institutional	 account	 must	
uphold	 two	 broad	 principles.	 First,	 returning	 to	 the	 descriptive	
taxonomy	 in	 Part	 I,	 criminal	 procedural	 evaluation	 in	 this	 space	
should	 shift	 toward	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach—which	
includes	a	deliberate,	ex	ante,	core	criminal	procedure	to	which	other	
sovereigns	must	adhere—from	the	outlier	approach—a	more	ad	hoc,	
retrospective,	 generalized	 assessment	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 justice	
systems.304	More	 explicit	 guidance	 in	 this	 space	 allows	 for	 a	 better	
evaluation	of	foreign	criminal	justice	systems	and	a	more	established	
framework	for	resolving	the	numerous	criminal	procedural	questions	
 
	 302.	 Compare	U.S.	CONST.	art.	I,	§	8	(giving	congress	the	power	to	declare	war	and	
collect	imposts	(among	other	things)),	and	id.	art.	II,	§	2	(empowering	the	President	to	
make	treaties	and	appoint	ambassadors),	with	id.	art.	III,	§	2	(giving	the	judiciary	the	
power	to	hear	cases	involving	foreign	actors,	but	not	actively	make	policy).	
	 303.	 Scholars	addressing	the	rule	of	non-inquiry	have	addressed	this	institutional	
design	question	to	some	degree.	John	Parry,	for	example,	has	called	for	a	more	engaged	
judicial	role	in	the	extradition	process	and,	thus,	a	more	limited	version	of	the	rule	of	
non-inquiry.	See	John	T.	Parry,	International	Extradition,	the	Rule	of	Non-Inquiry,	and	
the	 Problem	 of	 Sovereignty,	 90	 B.U.	 L.	REV.	 1973,	 2003	 (2010)	 (“I	 do	 not	 want	 to	
overstate	the	current	willingness	of	courts	to	relax	their	deference	to	foreign	affairs	
concerns	 .	.	.	.	 Similarly,	 I	 do	 not	 mean	 to	 deny	 the	 importance	 of	 foreign	 affairs	
concerns.”).	
	 304.	 Supra	Part	I.A.	
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that	arise	 in	 cross-border	 spaces.305	And	second,	all	 three	branches	
should	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 more	 explicitly	 in	 an	
assessment	of	 the	tripartite	 framework	described	above—rooted	 in	
constitutional,	international	human	rights,	and	comparative	law.306	
Starting	with	Congress,	it	should	continue	to	codify	its	guidance	
regarding	cross-border	criminal	procedural	rights,	as	it	has	recently	
done	with	the	CLOUD	Act.	After	all,	the	written	statute	requirement	in	
criminal	law	dictates	that	legislatures	codify	both	substantive	offenses	
and	 procedure,	 given	 the	 liberty	 interests	 at	 stake	 in	 criminal	
justice.307	Why	is	it,	for	example,	that	Congress	currently	insists	upon	
certain	rights	protections	regarding	transfer	of	electronic	data	abroad	
for	purposes	of	prosecuting	foreign	nationals308	but	does	not	do	so	in	
the	 context	 of	 extradition,	wherein	 a	U.S.	 citizen	may	be	 physically	
transferred	 abroad	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 there?	More	 explicit	 guidance	
provides	 notice	 to	 defendants,	 both	 American	 and	 non-American,	
regarding	the	procedural	rights	at	stake	in	cross-border	prosecutions.	
For	its	part,	the	executive	branch	likely	already	engages	in	some	
form	of	this	tripartite	inquiry	when	deciding,	for	example,	whether	to	
conclude	 a	 bilateral	 law	 enforcement	 treaty	 with	 another	
sovereign.309	 As	 noted	 at	 the	 outset,	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 an	
explanatory	 account,	 grounded	 in	 what	 is	 likely	 State	 Department	
attorney	practice.	It	is	not	a	coincidence,	for	example,	that	the	United	
States	 has	 a	 more	 robust	 law	 enforcement	 relationship	 with	 the	
United	Kingdom	than	it	does	with	China	or	Rwanda,	owing	to	the	rule	
of	law	in	such	countries.310	The	State	Department,	in	conjunction	with	
 
	 305.	 Supra	Part	I.A.	
	 306.	 Supra	Part	I.A.	
	 307.	 See	 The	 Nature,	 Purpose,	 and	 Function	 of	 Criminal	 Law,	 in	 CONTEMPORARY	
CRIMINAL	LAW	1,	5	(2019).	
	 308.	 18	U.S.C.	§	2523(b)(1)(B)(iii).	The	Act	also	specifies	certain	requirements	for	
the	 agreements	 themselves,	 such	 as	 a	 prohibition	on	 targeting	U.S.	 persons.	See	18	
U.S.C.	§	2523(b)(4).	As	noted	above,	the	CLOUD	Act	specifies	fair	trial	rights;	freedom	
of	expression,	association,	and	peaceful	assembly;	prohibitions	on	arbitrary	arrest	and	
detention;	 and	 prohibitions	 against	 torture	 and	 cruel,	 inhuman,	 or	 degrading	
treatment	or	punishment.	
	 309.	 See	 generally	 U.S.	DEP’T	 OF	 STATE,	 SUPPLEMENTARY	HANDBOOK	 ON	 THE	 C-175	
PROCESS:	ROUTINE	SCIENCE	AND	TECHNOLOGY	AGREEMENTS	(2009)	(providing	an	overview	
of	 treaty	 negotiation	 and	 ratification,	which	 includes	 inter-agency	 consultation	 and	
review).	
	 310.	 By	“rule	of	law”	I	mean,	broadly,	“a	requirement	that	people	in	positions	of	
authority	 should	 exercise	 their	 power	 within	 a	 constraining	 framework	 of	 public	
norms,	rather	than	on	the	basis	of	their	own	preferences,	their	own	ideology,	or	their	
own	individual	sense	of	right	and	wrong.”	Jeremy	Waldron,	The	Concept	and	the	Rule	
of	Law,	43	GA.	L.	REV.	1,	6	(2008)	(citing	RONALD	A.	CASS,	THE	RULE	OF	LAW	IN	AMERICA	17	
(2001)).	 Rule	 of	 law	 thus	 emphasizes	 legal	 certainty,	 predictability,	 settlement,	 the	
determinacy	of	certain	societal	norms,	and	the	state’s	reliable	administration	of	such	
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DOJ,	 has	 the	 foreign	 affairs	 expertise	 and	 negotiation	 capability	 to	
conclude	 law	 enforcement	 treaties	 with	 foreign	 countries.	 But	 the	
State	 Department	 should	 also	 make	 such	 findings	 more	 explicit,	
particularly	 in	 the	 transmittal	 of	 such	 information	 to	 Congress	 for	
advice	and	consent	prior	to	ratification.	As	of	now,	such	findings	are	
largely	 non-existent.311	 In	 virtually	 all	 cases,	 this	 ensures	 that	 the	
executive	branch’s	evaluation	of	foreign	process—rooted	in	its	foreign	
affairs	 expertise—will	 inform	Congress’s	 evaluation	 of	 the	 relevant	
treaty	or	law.	
Turning	to	the	judiciary,	such	explicit	findings	will	inform	courts’	
decisions	as	to	whether	a	foreign	criminal	justice	system	satisfies	core	
criminal	procedure.	Currently,	DOJ	rarely	makes	representations	on	
the	merits	 about	 foreign	procedure	 at	 extradition	hearings,	 instead	
insisting	simply	that	courts	abide	by	the	rule	of	non-inquiry.312	When	
the	executive	branch	enters	into	an	extradition	treaty,	“that	branch	is	
presumed	to	have	studied	the	other	country’s	criminal	justice	system	
and	 determined	 that	 [extradition	 of	 individuals	 to	 that	 country]	 is	
sufficiently	 fair.”313	As	 such,	 the	executive	has	no	occasion	 to	argue	
about	foreign	criminal	procedure	in	an	extradition	proceeding.	Thus,	
courts	are	right	to	generally	uphold	the	rule	of	non-inquiry,	given	that	
it	 reflects	 the	 considered	 position	 of	 the	 executive	 branch	 in	
evaluating,	 among	 other	 things,	 process	 in	 a	 foreign	 country.	 But	
often,	 courts	 are	 relying	 on	 ad	 hoc	 determinations	 about	 foreign	
criminal	process.314	More	explicit	executive	branch	findings	regarding	
foreign	process	mitigates	the	problem	of	the	parochial	district	court	
judge	 making	 such	 determinations	 beyond	 his	 or	 her	 core	 judicial	
 
norms.	Id.	
	 311.	 See,	e.g.,	Extradition	Treaty	Between	the	Government	of	the	United	States	of	
America	 and	 the	 Government	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Kosovo,	 U.S.-Kos.,	 Mar.	 29,	 2016,	
T.I.A.S.	19-613.	
	 312.	 See,	e.g.,	Memorandum	of	Law	in	Support	of	Extradition	at	9,	In	re	Extradition	
of	Howard,	2017	U.S.	Dist.	LEXIS	104582	(D.	Nev.	2017)	(No.	2:15-MJ-00627-NJK)	(“It	
is	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State,	 not	 judicial	 officers,	 to	 determine	 whether	
extradition	should	be	denied	on	humanitarian	grounds	or	on	account	of	the	treatment	
the	fugitive	will	likely	receive	on	return	to	the	requesting	country.”);	Brief	for	United	
States	at	17,	Hilton	v.	Kerry,	754	F.3d	79	(2014)	(No.	13-2444)	(“Here,	[Appellant’s]	
claims—which	go	to	the	procedures	or	treatment	that	he	will	receive	if	extradited	to	
the	United	Kingdom	and	the	fairness	of	the	Scottish	system	of	criminal	procedure—
are	precisely	the	type	of	claims	barred	by	the	rule	of	non-inquiry.”);	see	also	Ahmad	v.	
Wigen,	 910	 F.2d	 1063,	 1067	 (2d	 Cir.	 1990)	 (criticizing	 the	 district	 court’s	
consideration	of	the	“fairness”	of	requesting	country’s	criminal	procedures).	
	 313.	 Rachel	A.	Van	Cleave,	The	Role	of	United	States	Federal	Courts	in	Extradition	
Matters:	The	Rule	of	Non-Inquiry,	Preventive	Detention	and	Comparative	Legal	Analysis,	
13	TEMP.	INT’L	&	COMPAR.	L.J.	27,	40	(1999).	
	 314.	 See	supra	notes	194–98.	
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competence.315	Additionally,	courts	may	use	the	tripartite	framework	
described	 above—domestic	 constitutional	 guarantees,	 international	
human	rights	standards,	and	functionalist	comparative	evaluations—
in	order	to	ensure	that	core	criminal	procedure’s	fundamental	rights	
are	being	upheld.316	
III.		ENGAGEMENT	WITH	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	
INSTITUTIONS			
Core	criminal	procedure	has	implications	beyond	individual	U.S	
criminal	cases;	it	has	the	potential	to	recast	national	engagement	with	
international	courts	and	investigative	mechanisms.	This	international	
application	 may	 at	 first	 appear	 distinct	 from	 the	 domestic	 and	
transnational	 contexts	 described	 above.	 And	 yet	 the	 ultimate	
concern—how	 the	 United	 States	 conceives	 of	 criminal	 procedure	
rights	when	engaging	with	other	jurisdictions—is	the	same.	As	such,	
 
	 315.	 For	 a	 country	 with	 which	 law	 enforcement	 cooperation	 is	 minimal,	 the	
executive	branch	may	lack	public	representations	regarding	the	state	of	the	country’s	
criminal	justice	system.	For	example,	as	noted	above,	the	United	States	does	not	have	
an	 extradition	 treaty	 relationship	with	Rwanda.	See	18	U.S.C.	 §	 3181.	 Thus,	 even	 if	
explicit	findings	at	time	of	treaty	ratification	were	routine	State	Department	practice,	
there	would	likely	be	less	regarding	Rwandan	gacaca	courts	having	sufficient	process	
for	purposes	of	upward	departure.	The	State	Department	does,	however,	issue	annual	
Country	Reports	on	Human	Rights	Practices,	pursuant	to	the	Foreign	Assistance	Act	of	
1961	and	the	Trade	Act	of	1974.	2018	Country	Reports	on	Human	Rights	Practices,	U.S.	
DEP’T	 STATE	 (2018),	 https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on	
-human-rights-practices	 [https://perma.cc/HB5P-F7W7].	 Such	 reports	 could	
constitute	a	basis	for	judicial	evaluation	of	foreign	countries’	criminal	process.	
	 316.	 While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Article,	in	the	long	term	courts	could	also	
“constitutionalize”	 this	 space—or,	 arguably,	 do	 so	 once	 again.	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	
Supreme	 Court	 has	 oscillated	 in	 its	 approach	 to	 when	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution—and,	
specifically,	its	Bill	of	Rights	guarantees—applies,	where,	and	to	whom.	See	discussion	
supra	Part	I.A.1.	The	Court	could	return	to	its	jurisprudence	before	Verdugo-Urquidez	
in	1990,	applying	a	more	robust	conception	of	rights	both	extraterritorially	and	to	U.S.	
and	other	citizens	abroad.	In	other	words,	if	many	of	these	questions	lie	just	outside	of	
the	 edge	 of	 constitutional	 applicability,	 the	 Court	 could	 expand	 constitutional	
application	to	regulate	this	space.	This	would	not	be	unprecedented:	the	United	States	
holds	within	it	other	domestic	sovereigns,	and	the	Supreme	Court	has,	at	times,	“closed	
the	gap”	to	ensure	that	individual	states	may	not	circumvent	federal	protections.	See,	
e.g.,	Elkins	v.	United	States,	364	U.S.	206	(1960).	The	clearest	example	of	 this	 is	 the	
mechanism	of	incorporation,	which	closes	cross-sovereign	law	enforcement	loopholes.	
Take,	for	example,	the	previously	problematic	“silver	platter	doctrine”:	prior	to	1960,	
evidence	illegally	obtained	by	state	law	enforcement	authorities	could	nonetheless	be	
introduced	 at	 trial	 in	 federal	 court,	 as	 long	 as	 federal	 officials	 played	 no	 role	 in	
gathering	it.	Id.	at	208.	In	Elkins	v.	United	States,	 the	Supreme	Court	closed	this	gap,	
holding	that	such	a	doctrine	engendered	too	many	“practical	difficulties”	to	continue	
to	be	upheld	“in	an	era	of	expanding	federal	criminal	jurisdiction	.	.	.	.”	Id.	at	211.	Cross-
border	 law	 enforcement	 represents	 yet	 another	 front	 in	 which	 the	 role	 of	 other	
sovereigns	may	factor	into	criminal	cases	outside	of	orthodox	criminal	process.	
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this	 Part	 completes	 the	 discussion	 of	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 by	
considering	 its	 function	in	the	third	of	 three	tiers	 in	which	criminal	
justice	 is	 articulated	 today:	 international	 criminal	 courts	 and	
investigative	mechanisms.	
A. THE	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	COURT	
Core	criminal	procedure	informs	debate	about	U.S.	engagement	
with	 international	 criminal	 courts.	 As	 is	 well	 known,	 the	 United	
States—and	 the	 international	 community	 as	 a	 whole—has	 created	
international	and	hybrid	tribunals	to	prosecute	atrocity	crimes.317	U.S.	
leadership	 has	 included	 creation	 of	 the	 post-World	 War	 II	
International	 Military	 Tribunals	 in	 Nuremberg,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 U.N.	
International	 Criminal	 Tribunals	 for	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 and	 for	
Rwanda.318	More	recently,	however,	the	United	States	has	entered	a	
period	 of	 oscillating	 hostility	 and	 engagement	 towards	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	and	has	signed	but	not	ratified	the	
Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	 ICC.319	 For	 example,	 when	 serving	 as	 Trump	
Administration	 National	 Security	 Adviser,	 John	 Bolton	 openly	
declared	that	the	United	States	“will	let	the	ICC	die	on	its	own”	given	
that	“the	ICC	is	already	dead	to	us.”320	
How	does	core	criminal	procedure	 influence	our	conception	of	
this	 international	 system?	 It	 undermines	 a	 key	 argument	 against	
Rome	Statute	ratification,	namely,	that	it	would	deny	U.S.	nationals	the	
process	that	U.S.	criminal	justice	customarily	affords	them.321	A	classic	
critique	of	the	ICC	is	that	it	lacks	the	proper	U.S.	criminal	procedural	
safeguards.	As	grounding	for	their	criticism,	scholars	have	used	as	a	
baseline	both	the	Bill	of	Rights	and	more	granular	criminal	procedure,	
such	as	the	ability	to	object	to	the	introduction	of	hearsay	as	evidence	
at	criminal	trials.322	Most	often	invoked	is	that	the	ICC	lacks	a	jury	trial,	
 
	 317.	 See	generally	Harold	Hongju	Koh,	International	Criminal	Justice	5.0,	38	YALE	
INT’L	L.	525	 (2013)	 (reviewing	 the	 history	 of	 U.S.	 leadership	 and	 engagement	with	
international	criminal	tribunals,	including	that	of	the	Obama	administration	with	the	
ICC	and	ICC	assembly	of	State	Parties).	
	 318.	 Id.	at	525–30.	
	 319.	 Id.	at	533.	
	 320.	 John	Bolton,	Nat’l	 Sec.	Advisor,	Address	at	 the	Federalist	 Society	 (Sept.	10,	
2018),	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech	
-federalist-society-180910172828633.html	[https://perma.cc/H4Y5-G93L].	
	 321.	 Id.	 (“The	 framers	of	our	 constitution	 considered	 such	a	melding	of	powers	
unacceptable	for	our	own	government,	and	we	should	certainly	not	accept	it	in	the	ICC.	
Other	governments	may	choose	systems	which	reject	the	separation	of	powers,	but	not	
the	United	States.”).	
	 322.	 See,	e.g.,	Lee	A.	Casey,	The	Case	Against	 the	 International	Criminal	Court,	25	
FORDHAM	INT’L	L.J.	 840,	 861–64	 (2002)	 (“[N]either	 international	 criminal	 courts	 in	
general,	 nor	 the	 ICC	 in	 particular,	 provide	protections	 to	 the	 accused	 equivalent	 to	
310	 MINNESOTA	LAW	REVIEW	 [105:251	
	
as	 guaranteed	 by	 Article	 III	 and	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 of	 the	 U.S.	
Constitution.323	
Core	 criminal	 procedure	 undermines	 this	 claim.	 As	 the	 above	
discussion	makes	clear,	 the	U.S.	 legal	 system	 long	ago	abandoned	a	
strict	demand	for	criminal	procedural	sameness	when	it—in	contrast	
to	 certain	 civil	 law	 jurisdictions,	 such	 as	 Brazil324—made	 the	
determination	 that	 it	 would	 extradite	 its	 own	 nationals	 for	
prosecution	in	other	countries.325	And	the	U.S.	government	has	since	
demonstrated	 across	 various	 doctrinal	 areas	 that	 it	 is	 relatively	
comfortable	with	deferring	 to	 foreign	criminal	process	so	 long	as	 it	
does	 not	 violate	 certain	 criminal	 procedural	 norms.326	 As	 already	
discussed	above,	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	not	and	likely	should	not	
be	 affirmed	 as	 necessary	 at	 all	 times	 in	 the	 cross-border	 context,	
particularly	given	that	international	tribunals	operate	with	judges	as	
fact	 finders	 in	 a	 manner	 derived	 from	 civil	 law	 systems.327	 And	
notwithstanding	 this	 particular	 right,	 the	 ICC	 meets	 all	 other	
constitutional	thresholds.328	Even	a	cursory	glance	at	the	ICC’s	Rules	
 
those	guaranteed	by	the	Bill	of	Rights.”);	Andrew	J.	Walker,	When	a	Good	Idea	Is	Poorly	
Implemented:	 How	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 Fails	 to	 Be	 Insulated	 from	
International	Politics	and	to	Protect	Basic	Due	Process	Guarantees,	106	W.	VA.	L.	REV.	
245,	278–79	(2004)	(holding	that	the	ICC	is	silent	on,	inter	alia,	the	right	to	privacy,	
the	introduction	of	hearsay,	and	the	definition	of	effective	counsel).	
	 323.	 See	 Casey,	supra	 note	 322,	 at	 861	 (“First,	 and	 foremost,	 the	 Rome	 Statute	
makes	 no	 provision	 for	 trial	 by	 jury.”);	 JOHAN	D.	 VAN	DER	VYVER,	 IMPLEMENTATION	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	 181	 (2010)	 (“The	argument	 that	 seems	 to	
surface	most	frequently	questions	the	constitutional	tenability	of	a	treaty	that	would	
expose	nationals	of	the	United	States	to	criminal	prosecution	without	the	benefit	of	a	
jury	 trial	 as	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 .	.	.	.”	 (citing	 JACKSON	 NYAMUYA	
MAOGOTO,	 STATE	 SOVEREIGNTY	 AND	 INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	LAW:	VERSAILLES	 TO	ROME	
275–76	(2003)));	 Ilia	B.	Levitine,	Constitutional	Aspects	of	an	 International	Criminal	
Court,	92	N.Y.	INT’L	L.	REV.	27,	37–38;	Cara	Levy	Rodriques,	Slaying	the	Monster:	Why	
the	United	States	Should	Not	Support	the	Rome	Treaty,	14	AM.	U.	INT’L	L.	REV.	805,	814–
15	(1999);	Robinson	O.	Everett,	American	Servicemembers	and	the	ICC,	in	THE	UNITED	
STATES	AND	THE	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	COURT	137	(Sarah	B.	Sewall	&	Carl	Kaysen	eds.,	
2000);	Casey,	supra	note	322,	at	842,	853,	861–63,	867–68.	
	 324.	 CONSTITUIÇÃO	 FEDERAL	 [C.F.]	 [CONSTITUTION]	 art.	 LI	 (Braz.)	 (“[N]o	 Brazilian	
shall	be	extradited,	except	for	a	naturalized	Brazilian	for	a	common	crime	committed	
prior	 to	 naturalization,	 or	 proven	 involvement	 in	 unlawful	 traffic	 in	 narcotics	 and	
similar	drugs,	as	provided	by	law.”).	
	 325.	 See	supra	Part	I.B.3.	
	 326.	 See	supra	Parts	I,	II.	
	 327.	 See	supra	notes	258–66	and	accompanying	text.	
	 328.	 Scheffer	&	Cox,	supra	note	26,	at	1047–48,	1048	n.353	(“[A]n	examination	of	
the	due	process	rights	demonstrates	that	with	the	exception	of	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	
.	.	.	the	ICC	would	provide	a	U.S.	defendant	with	essentially	the	same	due	process	rights	
as	enjoyed	in	U.S.	courts.”	(citing	Ruth	Wedgwood,	The	Constitution	and	the	ICC,	in	THE	
UNITED	STATES	AND	THE	INTERNATIONAL	CRIMINAL	COURT	119,	119–23	(Sarah	B.	Sewall	&	
Carl	 Kaysen	 eds.,	 2000)))	 (“[T]he	 ICC	 is	 carefully	 structured	 with	 procedural	
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of	 Procedure	 and	 Evidence	 demonstrates	 a	 pre-trial,	 trial,	 and	
appellate	 procedural	 system	 that	 safeguards	 the	 Rome	 Statute’s	
Article	55	rights	of	persons	during	an	investigation—which	includes	
protections	 against	 self-incrimination	 and	 torture	 and	 the	 right	 to	
counsel—as	well	as	the	Article	67	rights	of	the	accused—including	the	
right	to	a	public	hearing,	to	be	tried	without	undue	delay,	and	to	the	
examination	of	witnesses.329	
In	 the	 past,	 both	 scholars	 and	 State	 Department	 officials	 have	
emphasized	 the	 ICC’s	 procedural	 acceptability.330	 Louis	 Henkin,	
writing	 before	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 ICC,	 emphasized	 this	 point	 in	
comparison	to	extradition;	from	a	contemporary	perspective—which	
includes	the	codification	of	ICC	process	and	an	expansive	cross-border	
system	of	criminal	procedural	flexibility—this	only	rings	more	true.331	
More	recently,	David	Scheffer	and	Ashley	Cox	have	already	gone	right-
by-right	 through	 the	 Rome	 Statute,	 showing	 how—broadly	
speaking—the	 ICC	 upholds	 all	 fundamental	 rights	 in	 this	 space.332	
Notably,	they	advise	that	“one	can	quibble	about	lack	of	precise	parity”	
with	certain	U.S.	constitutional	rights,	but	notes	that	the	Rome	Statute	
system	“do[es]	not	give	rise	to	any	serious	doubt”	about	fundamental	
protections.333	In	this	regard,	they	are	correct.	
This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 ICC’s	 procedural	 system	 is	 ideal,	 or	
lacking	 need	 for	 reform.	 Scholars	 and	 practitioners	 alike	 have	
criticized	the	ICC’s	“hybrid”	system	of	justice	on	its	own	merits,334	not	
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international	tribunals	so	far,	and	certainly	the	ICC,	have	adopted	the	main	principles	
of	the	ICCPR,	to	which	the	United	States	is	a	signatory.”).	
	 329.	 Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	2187	U.N.T.S.	90	(entered	
into	force	July	1,	2002)	[hereinafter	Rome	Statute].	
	 330.	 Scheffer	&	Cox,	supra	note	26,	at	1047–49.	
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extradition);	accord	Scheffer	&	Cox,	supra	note	26,	at	1033–34,	1034	n.268	(noting	that	
the	U.S.	Constitution	does	not	require	jury	trials	abroad,	as	evidenced	by	extradition	
practice).	
	 332.	 Scheffer	&	Cox,	supra	note	26,	at	1050–59.	
	 333.	 Id.	at	1049–56	(reviewing	ICC	guarantees	such	as	the	right	to	remain	silent,	
prohibition	against	ex	post	facto	crimes,	and	presence	at	trial).	The	Rome	Statute	even	
prohibits	trials	in	absentia,	matching	U.S.	practice	in	the	extradition	context.	Id.	at	1054	
(citing	Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court,	supra	note	329,	art.	63	(“The	
accused	shall	be	present	during	the	trial.”)).	
	 334.	 Casey,	supra	 note	 322,	 at	 842–43	 (“Even	 the	 most	 closely	 related	 of	 the	
world’s	legal	systems,	the	Common	Law	and	the	Civil	Law,	begin	from	fundamentally	
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to	mention	the	length	of	its	trials	and	the	disproportionate	impact	of	
selective	 prosecutions	 on	 certain	 regions.335	 Such	 critiques	 are	
related—but	distinct	from—the	question	here,	which	is	whether	the	
ICC	passes	a	minimum	threshold	of	procedural	permissibility,	judged	
by	the	constitutional	standards	of	the	United	States	and	the	practice	
of	cross-border	law	enforcement	cooperation.	
B. INVESTIGATIVE	MECHANISMS		
Finally,	core	criminal	procedure	advances	understanding	of	U.S.	
engagement	 with	 new	 investigative,	 independent	 mechanisms	
relevant	to	the	development	of	international	criminal	law.	One	such	
innovation	 is	 the	 development	 of	 international	 mechanisms	 that	
collect	evidence	for	the	duration	of	armed	conflict	in	afflicted	states.336	
The	 underlying	 idea	 behind	 such	 mechanisms	 is	 for	 state	 and	
international	 actors	 to	 ultimately	 promote	 accountability	 for	 such	
crimes	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 accountability	 mechanisms,	 including	
international	tribunals	and	domestic	prosecutions.337	
Two	prominent	mechanisms	relate	to	Syria	and	Myanmar.338	The	
former,	 established	 in	 December	 2016	 pursuant	 to	 U.N.	 General	
Assembly	 Resolution	 71/248,	 is	 formally	 called	 the	 International,	
Impartial	and	Independent	Mechanism	to	Assist	in	the	Investigation	
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	 336.	 See	 Lara	 Talsma,	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Fact-Finding:	 Protecting	 a	 Protection	
Mechanism,	20	ILSA	Q. 29	(2012)	(“After	sporadic	use	of	[human	rights	fact-finding]	
mechanism[s]	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s	 through	 ad	 hoc	 missions,	 a	 system	 of	 both	
permanent	and	ad	hoc	fact-finding	missions	was	developed	since	the	1980s	and	is	now	
well	established	within	the	UN	framework.”).	
	 337.	 See	id.	at	33	(“[O]ne	of	the	main	purposes	of	fact-finding	missions	is	to	hold	
perpetrators	accountable.”).	
	 338.	 See	Isabella	Regan,	Justice	in	an	Ever-Evolving	(Digital)	World—A	Reflection	on	
the	Annual	International	Bar	Association’s	War	Crimes	Conference,	11	AMSTERDAM	L.F.	
50,	61–63	(2019).	The	United	Nations	Investigative	Team	to	Promote	Accountability	
for	 Crimes	 Committed	 by	 Da’esh/ISIL	 (UNITAD),	 established	 in	 2017,	 represents	 a	
variation	of	such	mechanisms.	The	difference	between	this	mechanism	and	IIIM,	the	
UN	mechanism	for	Syria,	is	that	the	former’s	mandate	is	much	narrower,	focusing	on	
one	group	alone,	known	as	Daesh.	Its	main	tasks	are	“collecting,	preserving	and	storing	
evidence”	of	Daesh’s	war	crimes,	as	well	as	coordinating	collection	efforts	with	local	
actors	within	Iraq	and	Syria.	Id.	at	62.	
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and	Prosecution	of	Persons	Responsible	for	the	Most	Serious	Crimes	
Under	International	Law	Committed	in	the	Syrian	Arab	Republic	Since	
March	 2011	 (IIIM).339	 Its	 formal	 mandate	 is	 to	 collect	 evidence	 of	
human	 rights	 violations	 committed	 in	 Syria	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
presenting	such	evidence	in	future	national	or	international	criminal	
proceedings.340	Thus	 far,	 it	has	collected	over	a	million	records	and	
received	requests	from	judicial	authorities	in	at	least	five	countries	for	
cooperation	 in	 Syria-related	 cases.341	 The	 Human	 Rights	 Council	
established	 the	 latter,	 called	 the	 Independent	 Investigative	
Mechanism	 for	 Myanmar	 (IIMM),	 in	 September	 2018	 through	
resolution	39/2.342	Similarly,	its	mandate	is	to	assemble	evidence	of	
international	crimes	and	violations	of	international	law	committed	in	
Myanmar	for	use	in	future	prosecutions.343	Thus	far,	it	conducted	its	
first	mission	to	Bangladesh	in	November	2019,	explaining	its	mandate	
and	 leading	discussions	with	representatives	of	 the	community	and	
other	civil	leaders.344	
The	link	to	core	criminal	procedure	is	likely,	at	this	point,	obvious	
to	 the	 reader.	 These	 United	 Nations	 mechanisms	 are	 collecting	
information	to	be	used	in	criminal	prosecutions;	if	such	information	is	
later	 introduced	 as	 evidence	 in	 U.S.	 criminal	 prosecutions	 for	
individuals	in	the	United	States	who	were	alleged	to	have	perpetrated	
crimes	 in	 these	 relevant	 countries,	 and	 the	 United	 States	 has	
jurisdiction	 over	 such	 crimes,	 the	 focus	will	 likely	 turn	 to	 the	 U.N.	
methods	 of	 collection	 and	whether	 such	methods	 violate	 domestic	
norms	 for	 criminal	 procedure	 rights.	 Although	 some	NGOs	 such	 as	
Global	 Rights	 Compliance	 have	 attempted	 to	 codify	 a	 range	 of	
minimum	standards	 for	 the	 investigation	of	 international	crimes,345	
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no	standard	procedure	governs	how	fact-finding	should	be	conducted	
by	 such	 international	 investigatory	 mechanisms.346	 Thus,	 every	
mandate-holder	needs	to	decide	such	standards	for	itself.	In	the	case	
of	the	IIIM,	it	has	yet	to	clarify	any	procedural	guidelines	relating	to	
the	 mechanism’s	 evidence-gathering	 and	 review	 functions.347	
Similarly,	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 IIMM,	 its	 precise	 procedures	 and	
methods	of	work	remain	unspecified,	although	it	has	articulated	that	
such	procedures	and	methods,	once	developed,	would	be	designed	to	
ensure	[the	evidence’s]	“integrity	and	preservation”	and	protect	the	
“security	and	privacy	of	witnesses.”348	Given	this	opacity,	whether	and	
how	such	information	is	introduced	into	evidence	in	U.S.	prosecutions	
remains	 an	 open	 question.	 Very	 likely,	 defendants	 will	 assert	 that	
introduction	 of	 such	 information	 would	 shock	 the	 conscience,	 or	
offend	some	other	set	of	rights.	Future	research	will	 illuminate	 this	
intriguing	 procedural	 question,	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 U.S.	 criminal	
prosecutions	and	emerging	 international	 criminal	 legal	 institutions.	
But	 a	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach,	 rooted	 in	 the	 tripartite	
methodology	described	above,	will	provide	the	most	effective	means	
of	 safeguarding	 criminal	 defendant	 rights	 in	 this	 emerging	
transnational	criminal	space.	
		CONCLUSION			
“To	 what	 criminal	 procedural	 standard	 do	 we	 hold	 another	
sovereign?”	
This	question	has	sounded	throughout	U.S.	legal	history.	Justice	
Frankfurter	and	Justice	Black	posed	this	question	when	disputing	the	
meaning	 of	 the	 due	 process	 clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment.	
Eleanor	 Roosevelt	 presented	 this	 issue	 to	 U.S.	 State	 Department	
diplomats	when	creating	the	United	Nations	UDHR,	and	U.S.	senators	
debated	 it	 before	 giving	 advice	 and	 consent	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	
ICCPR.	And	the	question	arises	today	when	U.S.	prosecutors	and	law	
enforcement	 agencies	 cooperate	 with	 other	 nations	 to	 advance	
foreign	and	domestic	criminal	cases.		
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This	Article	provides	the	answer	to	this	question:	core	criminal	
procedure.	 This	 standard	 both	 upholds	 defendants’	 fundamental	
rights	 and	provides	 enough	 flexibility	 to	 facilitate	 cross-border	 law	
enforcement	 realities.	 The	 approach	 already	 manifests	 itself	 in	
incorporation,	human	rights,	and	electronic	evidence	doctrine;	it	must	
also	 be	 applied	 to	 foreign	 evidence	 material	 to	 conviction,	 foreign	
judgments	 material	 to	 sentencing,	 and	 extradition.	 Political	 theory	
bolsters	 this	 approach,	 in	 which	 the	 three	 government	 branches	
evaluate	 rights	 rooted	 in	 constitutional	 criminal	 procedural	
guarantees,	international	human	rights	standards,	and	a	functionalist	
assessment	rooted	in	comparative	law.	This	framework	then	informs	
U.S.	 engagement	 with	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 and	
investigative	mechanisms.	
	
 
